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Abstract 
Continued escalation in health care expenditures in the United States has led to an 
unsustainable model that consumes almost 20% of GDP. Policymakers have recognized 
the need for industry reform and have taken action through the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal study was to examine the 
relationship between the type of health insurance and health care costs. Mechanism 
theory and game theory provided the theoretical framework. The analysis of secondary 
data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project included a sample of 1,956,790-
inpatient hospital stays from 2007 to 2014. Results of one-way ANOVAs indicated that 
between 2% and 9% of health care costs could be attributed to type of health insurance, a 
statistically significant finding. Results also supported the effectiveness of the ACA in 
stabilizing health care costs. The average annual rate of health care cost increase was 
38.6% from 2007 until 2010, decreasing to an average annual increase of 4.3% from 
2011 until 2014. Results provide important information to generate positive social change 
for consumers, providers, and policymakers. This includes improving decisions related to 
health care costs, improved understanding of the costs of health care services, increased 
transparency, increased patient engagement, maximizing consumer utility, facilitation of 
reduction of waste within the industry, and increased understanding of the impact of 
health policy on health care costs and efficiencies within newly created health policies. 
Results may also improve transparency of health care costs, which allows consumers, 
providers, and policymakers to take specific action to reduce health care costs, resulting 
in a more just and sustainable health care model.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Health care costs continue to be a significant economic challenge in the United 
States. In 2013, health care costs exceeded $2.9 trillion, resulting in more than $9,255 in 
spending per individual, which represents approximately 17.4% of GDP (Hartman, 
Martin, Lassman, Catlin, & National Health Expenditure Accounts Team, 2015). This 
amount is expected to exceed 20% of GDP by 2020. The United States is outpacing other 
developed countries in health expenditures. France, the second highest country in health 
expenditures, spent approximately 11.6% of GDP during the same period (The World 
Bank, n.d.). This study focused on two important factors that influence the cost of health 
care services: transparency and type of insurance. 
The purpose of this quantitative longitudinal study was to provide a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between health care costs and type of health insurance. 
Findings may provide the increased transparency that will allow consumers and 
legislators to make better decisions related to the delivery of health care services. This 
chapter includes the problem statement, background, and research questions for the study. 
The study examined cost differences by type of insurance for a sample of DRG 
codes using discharge data from the National Inpatient Sample (NIS), Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project (HCUP), Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  A 
purposeful sample of the 10 most common, 10 most expensive, and 10 least expensive 
DRG codes from the 10 largest cities in the United States was taken from the HCUP data. 
Total costs for each service was reduced by the average contractual allowance for the 
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hospital where the services were provided. Later in this chapter, I provide additional 
information regarding the design of the study. 
Background 
Health care costs continue to be a challenge for individuals seeking access to 
affordable services. Health care costs in the United States exceeded 17.4% of GDP in 
2013, representing an amount almost twice as high as France, the next closest country 
(Hartman et al., 2015). Schoen, Osborn, Squires, and Doty (2013) compared delivery of 
health care services in the United States to Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Schoen et al. found that individuals living in the United States “were the most likely to 
report high out-of-pocket costs, problems paying medical bills, and forgoing care because 
of costs” (p. 4). High costs have been attributed to a number of factors, but Schoen et al. 
cited complexity as the primary reason for costs attributed to receiving health care 
services in the United States. Another contributing factor was the amount of waste in 
areas such as overtreatment, failures of care coordination, failures in execution of care 
processes, administrative complexity, pricing failures, fraud, and abuse that accounted for 
between 21% and 47% of total health care expenditures, which could have amounted to 
as much as $1.3 trillion (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012). 
Stabile et al. (2013) found that Canada, France, England, and Germany were able 
to control costs through measures that included budget constraints, reducing services, 
increasing payments from consumers, and altering the reimbursement model to providers. 
It is unlikely that similar approaches will work in the United States due to expectations of 
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consumers and resistance from providers and insurance companies (Stabile et al., 2013). 
Faden et al. (2013) found that consumers, regulators, and representatives have come to 
recognize the need to reform health industry practices using innovative methods that 
produce value-based services. The adoption of the ACA was a direct result of the 
recognition of a need for change and an attempt to improve health care delivery in the 
United States (Rosenbaum, 2011).  
Provisions of the ACA focus on five major areas of health care, including 
increasing the number of individuals with health insurance, improving fairness, 
improving health care value by reducing waste, increasing access to services, and 
improving public health (Rosenbaum, 2011). These areas are inclusive of the primary 
factors related to the delivery of health care in the United States. Access, quality, and cost 
are often referred to as the iron triangle or health care trifecta (Dai, 2015). Despite the 
efforts of policymakers to curtail health care costs, costs have continued to rise 
(Rosenbaum, 2011). Lack of transparency and type of health insurance are two factors 
that could affect the cost of health care services. 
Lack of Transparency 
According to Barr (2014), a significant amount of research has been conducted to 
evaluate factors of access and quality; however, few studies have been conducted 
regarding the factors related to health care costs due to a continued lack of transparency 
with health care costs to the consumer (Jevsevar, 2015). Christensen, Floyd, and Maffett 
(2016) found that by making health care pricing transparent, the overall costs of health 
care services provided were reduced by approximately 6% without any negative 
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correlation with the quality of health care services provided. Health providers were able 
to achieve the same outcomes with less money. Muir, Alessi, and King (2013) stated that 
price transparency would be a primary factor in reducing health care costs. Muir et al. 
(2013) indicated that improved transparency for the consumer, insurance provider, and 
employer helped to identify barriers to reduce health care costs.  
Consumers focus on the amount that is required to be paid out of their pocket 
rather than the full cost of the service being provided (Hibbard, Greene, Sofaer, 
Firminger, & Hirsh, 2012). In addition to this challenge, consumers tend to equate low 
price with low quality, adding additional complexity to providing information for 
decision-making purposes (Hibbard et al., 2012). Increasing transparency of health care 
costs is an essential element in reducing health care spending. “The goal of reporting cost 
data is to reduce waste and unnecessary care without sacrificing quality of care” (Hibbard 
et al., 2012, p. 560). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently 
provided information relative to the chargemaster prices of a hospital, which is similar to 
a manufacturer’s suggested retail price, resulting in more confusion among consumers 
(Beck, 2014). The current study provided additional transparency related to the net cost 
of health care services through the elimination of the contractual allowances and 
adjustments given to third-party payers. 
Type of Health Insurance 
Another factor in health care costs stems from the type of health insurance used to 
pay for services. According to a study of Oregon Medicaid recipients, individuals sought 
out medical treatment through the most convenient method, often resulting in emergency 
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department visits (Taubman, Allen, Wright, Baicker, & Finkelstein, 2014). This approach 
can be partially attributed to the affordability of services that is determined by the third-
party payer. Patients often do not consider the overall cost of services when seeking 
treatment. Patient co-payments and personal responsibility are the primary factors in 
determining the affordability of care (Levesque, Harris, & Russell, 2013). These concerns 
highlight the need to consider the type of insurance when evaluating the cost of health 
care services. Medicare and Medicaid services have been reimbursed at rates that are 
published and available to providers to determine whether they want to provide services 
at the specified rate (CMS, HHS, 2014). Although consumers rarely evaluate the 
reimbursement rate, the cost of services is consistent for individuals receiving health care 
services that use Medicare and Medicaid insurance.  
Private insurance companies negotiate contractual rates with individual health 
care providers based on fee-for-service or capitated reimbursement models. Fee-for-
service reimbursement models pay a provider each time a consumer receives services 
(Porter & Kaplan, 2014). This model produces incentives for a provider to see more 
patients and bill for the services provided. Capitated reimbursement models employ a 
per-member, per-month payment schedule in which an insurer pays a provider a set 
monthly amount for each person covered regardless of the number of services provided 
(Porter & Kaplan, 2014). This model produces an incentive for a provider to restrict 
access to services to obtain the highest amount of profit. Private insurance companies are 
not required to report the contractual agreements established with health providers. 
Information released to the consumer is limited to co-payment amounts and a list of 
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approved providers, which results in a consumer being focused on network providers and 
co-payment amounts when making a decision regarding the cost of health care services. 
There has been significant growth in and shift to high-deductible health insurance 
plans to meet the requirements of ACA provisions (Wharam, Ross-Degnan, & Rosenthal, 
2013). Wharam, Graves, and Kozhimannil (2015) found that the rate of childbirths 
decreased significantly due to the increase in the amount of cost-sharing responsibility 
with the patient. This factor highlights the increase in participation and accountability of 
a patient when faced with an increase in cost-sharing responsibility. Policymakers may 
need to adapt public policy to ensure that patients are seeking appropriate care, which 
will require a new model of health insurance (Wharam et al., 2015). Results of the current 
study provided policymakers with empirical data that allows comparison of health care 
costs based on the type of health insurance, which may provide an improved 
understanding of cost-sharing health insurance models.  
Individuals who rely on self-insurance (also referred to as being uninsured) are 
faced with paying the chargemaster rates of a hospital, which can be more than 10 times 
higher than Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance (Bai & Anderson, 2015). This 
disparity has resulted in an environment in which the individuals who can least afford 
health care services pay the highest cost. 
Problem Statement 
Health care costs continue to be a primary concern of policymakers, business 
leaders, and patients as costs continue to rise (Muir et al., 2013). In 2013, the United 
States spent $2.9 trillion on health care, accounting for 17.4% of GDP and averaging 
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approximately $9,255 per person (Hartman et al., 2015). Current data indicate that health 
care costs may exceed 20% of GDP by 2020 (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012). 
Policymakers adopted the ACA in an attempt to reduce health care costs through 
provisions that increase the number of individuals with health insurance, improve health 
care delivery, and reduce waste (Rosenbaum, 2011). Recent studies supported the 
effectiveness of the ACA in increasing the number of individuals who have health 
insurance, which indicated movement toward the goal of universal coverage (Blumenthal, 
Abrams, & Nuzum, 2015; Sommers, Buchmueller, Decker, Carey, & Kronick, 2013). 
However, evaluating health care costs has been difficult due to the lack of price and cost 
transparency in the health care industry.  
Transparency in the health care industry includes the ability of the consumer to 
easily obtain and understand the pricing of specific services to make health care 
decisions. Misuse of information by consumers, complex billing practices and cost-
shifting, contractual confidentiality requirements, preferred provider incentives, trade 
secrets, and health care provider resistance all contribute to a lack of transparency (Muir 
et al., 2013). Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2011) defined transparency of health care costs as 
dissemination of the prices that a patient pays for medical care. Publishing credible 
information related to health care costs may increase transparency and assist in reducing 
overall health care costs. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this quantitative longitudinal study was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the role of health insurance in the cost of health care services. The study 
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was also intended to increase transparency of information related to the cost of health 
care services. Data from NIS HCUP were analyzed to evaluate the relationship between 
the type of insurance and health care costs over a 8-year period (HCUP, n.d.). 
An improved understanding of the role of insurance in driving health care costs 
should increase transparency for not only the patient but also for policymakers. The 
results of the study will be disseminated through publication in a scholarly journal to 
increase transparency of health care costs to aid in the effort to reduce health care costs. 
In addition, the information regarding the relationship between health care costs and the 
type of health insurance may allow policymakers to determine whether additional 
legislation may be necessary to address health care costs. For example, legislation may be 
needed that requires providers to disclose the costs of health care services to potential 
patients.  
Significance 
The significance of the study resided in providing additional information that may 
increase the transparency of health care costs and the relationship between the type of 
insurance and the influence on the cost of health care services. Christensen et al. (2016) 
found that by making health care pricing transparent, the overall costs of health care 
services provided were reduced by approximately 6% without any negative correlation 
with the quality of health care services provided. Muir et al. (2013) stated that price 
transparency would be a primary factor in reducing health care costs. Muir et al. also 
indicated that improved transparency for the consumer, insurance provider, and employer 
helped to identify barriers to reduce health care costs. The current study involved three 
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primary goals: (a) evaluate the relationship between health care costs and type of 
insurance, (b) evaluate changes, if any, in this relationship over a 6-year period, and (c) 
determine the influence of transparency on pricing for health care services based on type 
of insurance. 
The information resulting from this study may be used by consumers, 
policymakers, public health leaders, and health care organizations to better understand 
the relationship between health care costs and the type of health insurance with emphasis 
given to the change in this relationship over a 6-year period of time. I analyzed the 
change in costs based on the type of insurance and whether there had been a shift in the 
type of insurance over time. An improved understanding of these relationships may allow 
patients to make better choices regarding health insurance and health care services. 
Increased transparency may also empower patients to discuss the cost of health care 
services prior to purchasing from a specific provider. Policymakers may be able to better 
understand health care costs and may be provided with the necessary information to 
improve decision-making regarding health care policy, which may assist in lowering 
health care costs. 
Nature of the Study 
I conducted a quantitative longitudinal analysis using 8 years of data to evaluate 
the relationship between health care costs and type of insurance. A quantitative approach 
was the most appropriate method to better understand the factors that influence the cost 
of health care services (see Creswell, 2009). A qualitative approach should be used when 
the “research is exploratory and is useful when the researcher does not know the 
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important variables to examine” (Creswell, 2009, p. 18). The important variables were 
identified in the research questions, and the NIS HCUP data provided the information 
necessary to develop a better understanding of the relationship between the type of health 
insurance and health care costs. 
Various research designs were considered for this study. An experimental design 
requires a control group and an experimental group in which an intervention or treatment 
is introduced that allows for a pretest and posttest measurement (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). The NIS HCUP data did not allow for the introduction of an 
intervention or treatment for two reasons. First, the data had been de-identified, which 
prevented a pretest and posttest for the same individual. Second, the NIS HCUP data did 
not allow for a control group. All individuals had been subjected to the same market 
conditions, including the adoption of the ACA, which prevented a comparison of two 
different groups based on the independent variables. 
Time-series designs, including longitudinal designs, are quasi-experiments that 
allow a researcher to evaluate the dependent variable over a period of time (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Longitudinal designs allow a researcher to evaluate the 
relationship between variables when a control group is not available (Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Nachmias, 2008). In the current study, the relationship between the type of insurance 
and cost of health care services was evaluated over a period of 8 years without the 
presence of a control group. In addition, the use of random selection is not required in a 
quasi-experiment, which allows the use of a purposeful sample. The purposeful sample in 
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the current study included the 10 most frequent procedures, the 10 most expensive 
procedures, and the 10 least expensive procedures identified in the NIS HCUP data. 
Researchers using a longitudinal design control for maturation and reduce the 
likelihood of making invalid causal inferences (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008). However, researchers using a longitudinal design cannot control for other factors 
that may reduce validity and that occur over time. For example, the researcher may not 
take into consideration new technology that influences the cost of health care services. 
Other factors that may contribute to the change in health care costs over time need to be 
considered to reduce the likelihood of making an invalid causal inference. Supplementary 
data were gathered including information related to inflation and geographic location. A 
longitudinal design has the advantage of allowing the study to be carried out in the actual 
setting and does not require randomized sample selection (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). However, the longitudinal design cannot be used to provide an 
explanation for other potential causes of the change in the dependent variable and does 
not allow for manipulation (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
Theoretical Foundation 
 The theoretical foundation for this study was mechanism theory combined with 
game theory. Mechanism theory suggests that an organization uses incentives to obtain a 
specific behavior, objective, or outcome from a participant (Jackson, 2014). Game theory 
refers to a situation in which one party has incomplete information regarding the 
willingness of a second party to pay a specific price to maximize personal benefits rather 
than follow historical reasoning (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1993). Mechanism theory is 
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coupled with game theory to determine whether an organization can achieve the desired 
result by implementing specific strategies and incentives to obtain the desired outcome 
(Jackson, 2014). In the case of health insurance, the U.S. government mandated universal 
health insurance coverage for all citizens, as identified in the provisions of the ACA 
(Rosenbaum, 2011). Health insurance reform and financial penalties for failure to obtain 
health insurance became the incentives to compel individuals to act and increase the 
number of citizens with health insurance (Sommers et al., 2013). 
 Carter et al. (2014) determined that mechanism theory could be applied to cost-
effectiveness measures to prioritize health care services using quality-adjusted life years 
and available resources. Grennan (2014) applied game theory to health insurance pricing 
models and found that costs for the same services from a single provider varied by up to 
79%. These two examples provide additional evidence that mechanism and game theory 
can support a framework to explain the complex nature of health care costs.  
Complexities of decision-making can inhibit the effectiveness of a single 
incentive. Jackson (2014) suggested that the simplest solution becomes the 
implementation of a tax to achieve the desired result. The ACA established a tax for not 
obtaining health insurance, which becomes increasingly higher each year (Eastman & 
Eastman, 2013). According to mechanism design theory, the tax penalties established by 
the ACA should significantly influence the choice of health insurance and produce a shift 
in health insurance from self-pay to the most cost-effective health insurance for U.S. 
citizens: private health insurance. 
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DeSmet et al. (2014) conducted a meta-analysis of 54 studies in which game 
theory was applied in an effort to change health behavior. The results of the analysis 
indicated that a small effect size was measured in behavior that increased a healthy 
lifestyle (DeSmet et al., 2014). The larger the incentives and personal benefit associated 
with a specific behavior, the more likely that an individual would change behaviors. For 
example, a larger penalty for not having health insurance would increase the likelihood 
that an individual would obtain coverage. Zhang, Wernz, and Slonim (2015) combined 
mechanism theory and game theory to evaluate decisions made by health providers based 
on insurance company incentives and reimbursement models that resulted in a 
determination that the current health care model is more complicated than a two-agent 
principal-agent model. Zhang et al. determined that direct incentives to physicians or 
consumers resulted in the most efficient reimbursement model. In this example, the 
personal benefit derived from a change in behavior must be given directly to the 
individual making the change. For example, insurance companies have provided an 
economic incentive of not out-of-pocket costs to a patient to increase the focus on 
preventive medicine, such as an annual physical or diabetes monitoring, to reduce the 
costs of chronic diseases. Lin, Ramakrishnan, Chang, Spraragen, and Zhu (2013) found 
that game theory and mechanism theory could be combined using a web-based 
interaction to improve health behavior and patient compliance. Patients are given an 
economic incentive from insurance companies that included cash payments and no out-
of-pocket costs to achieve improvements in behaviors that improve overall health. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1. To what extent, if any, does the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-
pay) affect the average cost of health care services? 
Ho1: Type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) is not related to the 
average cost of health care services. 
Ha1: Type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) is related to the 
average cost of health care services. 
2. To what extent, if any, does transparency of health care costs affect the average 
cost of health care services. 
Ho2: There is not a relationship between transparency of the type of health 
insurance (public, private, or self-pay) and the average cost of health care 
services. 
Ha2: There is a relationship between transparency of the type of health insurance 
(public, private, or self-pay) and the average cost of health care services. 
3. To what extent, if any, does the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-
pay) modify the effect of transparency on the average cost of health care services? 
Modify the effect refers to a change in transparency based on the type of 
insurance. More specifically, is there a difference in the level of transparency of 
costs based upon the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay)? 
Ho3: There is not a relationship between the type of health insurance (public, 
private, or self-pay) and transparency of the average cost of health care services. 
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Ha3: There is a relationship between the type of health insurance (public, private, 
or self-pay) and transparency of the average cost of health care services. 
Limitations 
The longitudinal design in this study included a number of limitations that posed 
internal and external threats to validity. Internal threats included history, maturation, 
regression, selection, and instrumentation. External threats included the interaction of 
selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and treatment, and the interaction of 
history and treatment. Each threat presented unique challenges that required additional 
steps to increase the overall validity of the study. For example, the threat of history 
related to the time that passed during the study and the events, such as inflation, that 
could have influenced the cost of health care services (see Creswell, 2009). Maturation 
referred to changes that could have occurred over time to a specific DRG code. For 
example, the services in a bypass conducted in 2005 may have been different than a 
bypass conducted in 2009. Regression referred to the possibility that outliers were chosen 
and indicated a trend over time that was not reflective of the actual change in cost. For 
example, if a major technological advance was implemented in treating a kidney disorder 
and resulted in a significant decrease in the cost of the treatment during the second year 
of data included in the study, the overall change would have resulted in findings that 
should not have been generalized to all health care costs because it was an outlier. 
Selection referred to the possibility that the DRG codes selected for analysis had 
specific characteristics that predisposed them to certain outcomes (see Creswell, 2009). 
For example, the 10 least expensive procedures may have been predisposed to little or no 
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change over time. Instrumentation referred to a change in the data collection process 
during the time being studied. This threat to validity was of concern due to a change in 
the NIS HCUP data in 2012 (HCUP, n.d.). Procedures to overcome the change in the data 
collection process were presented by HCUP and needed to be followed to reduce this 
threat to validity. 
The threats to external validity prevented the results from being generalized to the 
larger population. Specifically, limitations are specified for population members who do 
not have the same characteristics or function in different settings in past or future 
situations. The study included results only for the DRG codes selected in specific 
metropolitan areas for the years specified in the data collection process. Although the 
study findings may not be generalizable to the larger population, the information 
provided should allow the reader to better understand the relationship between health care 
costs and type of health insurance. 
Additional limitations of the current study included the lack of transparency and 
use of a purposeful sample. The lack of transparency for health care costs prevented an 
analysis of exact costs, and average amounts needed to be used. Although this limited the 
usability of the study, the intent was to improve transparency within the health care 
industry to improve the decision-making process for individuals and policymakers. The 
use of a purposeful sample decreased the reliability and validity related to generalizations 
about the cost of health care services. The limitations of the study prevented 
generalizability of findings to the entire population. The intent of the study was not to 
develop an overall understanding of health care costs but to further understand the 
17 
 
relationship between the type of insurance and health care costs. The study findings may 
be used to initiate additional conversations and research that will help to reduce health 
care costs in the future. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope and delimitations within the current study depended on the secondary 
data chosen for analysis. The data collected through NIS HCUP includes an enormous 
amount of data starting from 1988. The data set contains information on inpatient hospital 
discharges for more than seven million records for each year with more than 250 specific 
DRG codes (HCUP, n.d.). To make the study more manageable, the scope of analysis had 
to be limited.  
The boundaries of the study were established by the selection of DRG codes and 
metropolitan areas. The study was limited to 30 DRG codes in the 10 largest metropolitan 
areas in the United States. The selection and analysis of the 10 most frequent, 10 most 
expensive, and 10 least expensive DRG codes provided an overall understanding of 
health care costs. This provided meaningful information to answer the research questions 
without overwhelming the reader with an inordinate amount of information.  
In addition, the location of services in which the analysis occurred included only 
the 10 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. Geographic locations can create a 
significant variation in the cost of health care services (Teno et al., 2013). For example, 
the costs of delivering health care in Albuquerque, New Mexico are significantly less 
than New York, New York. By limiting the analysis to the 10 largest metropolitan areas, 
the results of the analysis provided information that could be more readily compared 
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between the selected locations. The selection of limited locations reduced the ability to 
generalize regarding health care costs to all locations, but improved the comparability 
between locations due to less variation in the cost of providing services in differing 
markets. 
The final boundary of the study concerned the cost of health care services. In 
applying the average contractual allowance for each hospital, the resulting information 
provide more accurate costs for each DRG. However, use of the average allowance did 
not provide an exact measurement for each service that was provided. The lack of 
transparency in the health care industry prevented precise measurement, but the study 
provided improved information and may increase transparency related to reporting health 
care costs. 
Several delimitations were present in the study through the selection of secondary 
data for analysis. Some of the delimitations included the reliance on information that had 
been self-reported from hospitals around the country, lack of information regarding the 
actual cost of services, limited information on the payer mix for each hospital, and lack of 
information regarding private insurance contractual allowances. NIS HCUP data undergo 
a rigorous testing and verification process that deems the information reliable; however, 
the accuracy of self-reported data cannot be guaranteed. Data verification included a 
comparison to other data collected from the National Hospital Discharge Survey and the 
American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, n.d.). The result of this limitation was that the findings would not 
be generalizable for all health care costs. The lack of information regarding the actual 
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cost of health care services required the use of averages in contractual allowances. This 
allowed only an estimate to be made about the cost of each specific DRG code. Although 
the calculations for the estimated costs involved reliable information, the lack of 
transparency regarding actual costs prohibited generalizations about all health care costs 
in the United States. 
Payer-mix information would have enabled more precise calculations to be made 
regarding the actual costs of procedures. Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement 
information was available. Payer-mix information would have allowed more accurate 
contractual allowance estimates to be made regarding private insurance reimbursement 
rates. Without this information, there was a larger margin of error in calculating health 
care costs, resulting in an inability to generalize the results of the study. Another method 
of overcoming this limitation included the review of contractual allowances between 
private insurance organizations and health providers. However, the release of this 
information was highly unlikely and would have resulted in an overwhelming amount of 
information to be analyzed.  
Operational Definitions 
Cost of health care services: The amount billed for services for a specific DRG 
code for a single inpatient stay minus the average contractual discount for a particular 
hospital. Patrick et al. (2012) used the amount billed by DRG code to conduct a study 
related to the costs of newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome but did not adjust for 
the average contractual discount. The average contractual discount becomes an essential 
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component of evaluating health care costs to determine what amount is actually paid for 
the services rendered (Rollins, 2014). 
Transparency of health care costs: The availability of information from a health 
care provider to the end consumer of the cost of a specific health care service prior to the 
service being rendered. The lack of transparency of cost information has continued due to 
the unwillingness of health care providers to release trade secrets through a website or 
over the phone for the costs of common procedures (Reinhardt, 2013). Transparency can 
be measured based on the cost of procedures for both Medicare and Medicaid insurance. 
CMS has predetermined rates that are available to both the provider and consumer, which 
should result in more consistent costs for a specific procedure across various geographic 
areas. 
Type of health insurance: The primary contracted third-party payer that is 
expected to pay for the health care services being provided. Medicare and Medicaid were 
grouped in a category of public insurance. Private insurance included payers such as Blue 
Cross Blue Shield and United Healthcare. Individuals without insurance were classified 
as self-pay. These classifications were chosen due to common groupings in the health 
industry and data collection from NIS HCUP (see Capp, Rooks, Wiler, Zane, & Ginde, 
2014).  
Assumptions 
I assumed that data associated with the selected DRG codes and type of insurance 
were consistent with all procedures. For example, if health care costs for an imaging 
procedure were related to the type of health insurance, I assumed the same relationship 
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would hold for open-heart surgery or knee replacement surgery. Because the sampling 
procedure was not random, generalizations to the larger population were not possible. 
I also assumed that data from the NIS HCUP database were accurate (HCUP, 
n.d.). NIS HCUP data have been collected since 1988 and have involved a number of 
methods to validate the information reported by hospitals across the United States 
(HCUP, n.d.). This assumption was necessary to establish the relationship between the 
type of insurance and health care costs. If the data were not reliable and this assumption 
was not true, the relationship could not be established with any degree of reliability. 
I further assumed that the cost-to-charge ratio files provided by HCUP were 
accurate. This information includes the average contractual discounts provided against all 
third-party payers to allow for a calculation to be made of actual costs, as opposed to the 
amount billed (HCUP, n.d.). This assumption was necessary to establish reliability in the 
calculation of average health care costs that would be used to determine the relationship 
with the type of insurance. 
Summary 
Health care costs present a significant economic challenge as expenditures 
approach 20% of GDP in the United States (Hartman et al., 2015). Individuals are more 
likely to voice concerns over high out-of-pocket costs, inability to pay for health care 
services, and not seeking care compared to many other developed countries. Factors 
associated with high-cost health care include the complexity of the industry, waste, lack 
of transparency, and type of health insurance used. The ACA was passed to reduce costs 
associated with health care services. Although more individuals have access to health 
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care services as a result of the ACA, less is known about the impact on health care costs. 
A review of the literature, detailed in Chapter 2, confirmed that research associated with 
the cost of health care has been limited due to a lack of transparency.  
The purpose of the current study was to provide a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between the cost of health care services and the type of health insurance used 
over a period of 8 years. The study may provide additional transparency for consumers 
and legislators to make decisions related to the delivery of health care services. The 
longitudinal study was based on a theoretical background of mechanism theory and game 
theory. Mechanism theory focuses on incentives and penalties for taking a specific action 
while game theory focuses on personal gain.  
Additional information regarding the methodology of the study is presented in 
Chapter 3. This includes the research design and approach, sample selection, 
instrumentation (NIS HCUP data), data collection and analysis procedures, and ethical 
concerns. A summary of findings related to each research question is presented in 
Chapter 4 including the procedures followed, data analysis, tables and figures of the 
findings, alternative interpretations, and outcomes. Chapter 5 presents implications and 
recommendations including an overview of the study, interpretation of the findings, 
implications for social change, recommendations, and a conclusion. 
23 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
As health care costs continue to increase at a rapid rate, additional information is 
needed to identify approaches that might be effective in reducing costs and improving the 
decision-making process for consumers, providers, payers, and policymakers in the 
United States (Muir et al., 2013). The purpose of this study was to provide information to 
improve transparency in the health care industry and to understand the relationship 
between type of insurance and health care costs, which could improve decision-making 
and lower the cost of health care services. Chapter 2 includes a review of the literature on 
health care costs, health insurance, the influence of the ACA, and other factors that 
influence decisions related to the purchase of health care services. The chapter contains a 
summary of the research problem, the purpose of the study, the literature review search 
strategy, and the theoretical framework that guided the study. The aspects of mechanism 
theory and game theory are discussed, including the origin of each theory, major 
propositions, previous applications, the rationale for using these theories, and how each 
relates to the present study.  
I also present a brief historical review of the development of the health care 
industry and the regulations imposed by policymakers to influence the amount being 
spent for health care services. The discussion continues with an exploration of the current 
billing practices in the health care industry; the role of third-party payers, primarily 
insurance companies, in the billing cycle; and the role of the consumer in purchasing 
health care services. The chapter concludes with a summary of strengths and weaknesses 
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of previous studies, the rationale for variable selection and research question 
development in the current study, and a description of its unique contribution.  
Problem Statement 
Health care costs continue to be a primary concern for policymakers, business 
leaders, and patients as costs continue to rise (Muir et al., 2013). In 2013, the United 
States spent $2.9 trillion on health care, accounting for 17.4% of GDP and averaging 
approximately $9,255 per person (Hartman et al., 2015). Current data indicated that 
health care costs may exceed 20% of GDP by 2020 (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012). 
Policymakers adopted the ACA in an attempt to reduce health care costs through 
provisions that increase the number of individuals with health insurance, improve health 
care delivery, and reduce waste (Rosenbaum, 2011). Recent studies supported the 
effectiveness of the ACA in increasing the number of individuals who have health 
insurance, which indicated movement toward the goal of universal coverage (Blumenthal 
et al., 2015; Sommers et al., 2013). However, evaluating health care costs has been 
difficult due to the lack of price and cost transparency in the health care industry.  
Transparency in the health care industry includes the ability of the consumer to 
easily obtain and understand the pricing of specific services to make health care 
decisions. Misuse of information by consumers, complex billing practices and cost-
shifting, contractual confidentiality requirements, preferred provider incentives, trade 
secrets, and health care provider resistance contribute to a lack of transparency (Muir et 
al., 2013). Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2011) defined transparency of health care costs as 
dissemination of the prices that a patient pays for medical care. Publishing credible 
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information related to health care costs may increase transparency and assist in reducing 
overall health care costs. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this quantitative longitudinal study was to provide a deeper 
understanding of the role of health insurance in the cost of health care services. The study 
was also intended to increase transparency of data related to the cost of health care 
services. Data from the NIS HCUP were analyzed to evaluate the relationship between 
the type of insurance and health care costs over a 6-year period.  
An improved understanding of the role of insurance in driving health care costs 
should increase transparency for not only the patient but also for policymakers. The 
results of the study will be disseminated through publication in a scholarly journal to 
increase transparency of health care costs and to aid in the effort to reduce health care 
costs. The information regarding the relationship between health care costs and the type 
of health insurance may allow policymakers to determine whether additional legislation 
may be necessary to address health care costs. For example, legislation may be needed to 
require providers to disclose the costs of health care services to potential patients.  
Literature Search Strategy 
 The search for appropriate literature included Google Scholar and library 
databases such as MEDLINE, PubMed, ScienceDirect, Academic Search Complete, 
ProQuest Central, ScienceDirect, Business Source Premier, ABI/INFORM Complete, and 
Wiley Online Library. Key words included Affordable Care Act, bundled payments, 
capitation, hospital chargemaster, exemptions from ACA, fee-for-service, health care 
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consumption, health care costs, health care legislation, health care reform, health 
economics, health expenditures, health insurance coverage, health spending, hospital 
charges, Medicare, Medicaid, politics of health care, transparency, and third-party 
payers. Various combinations of the key words were used during the search process. A 
summary of the search terms and results is presented in Table 1. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 The theoretical foundation for this study was mechanism theory combined with 
game theory. Mechanism theory suggests that an organization uses incentives to obtain a 
specific behavior, objective, or outcome from a participant (Jackson, 2014). Game theory 
refers to a situation in which one party has incomplete information regarding the 
willingness of a second party to pay a specific price to maximize personal benefits rather 
than follow historical reasoning (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1993). Mechanism theory is 
coupled with game theory to determine whether an organization can achieve a desired 
result by implementing specific strategies and incentives to obtain a desired outcome 
(Jackson, 2014). In the case of health insurance, the U.S. government mandated universal 
health insurance coverage for all citizens, as identified in the provisions of the ACA 
(Rosenbaum, 2011). Health insurance reform and financial penalties for failure to obtain 
health insurance became the incentives to compel individuals to act and increase the 
number of citizens with health insurance (Sommers et al., 2013). 
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Table 1 
 
Chart of Research 
Key terms searched Books 
Scholarly 
journals 
Secondary 
sources Reviewed Used 
Affordable Care Act, 
bundled payments  17  8 1 
Affordable Care Act, 
capitation  6  3  
Affordable Care Act, 
health expenditures 2 175 14 27 6 
Affordable Care Act, 
health insurance 
coverage 6 209 1 16 4 
Affordable Care Act, 
health spending 2 87 1 14 3 
Affordable Care Act, 
hospital charges  15 3 4  
Bundled payments  174 4 12 1 
Bundled payments, 
health expenditures  18 1 6  
Capitation 
reimbursement  34 1 9 2 
Exemptions from the 
ACA  1  1  
Fee for service 
reimbursement  135 1 23 2 
Health care 
consumption  401 1 17 2 
Health care costs 7 25,102 623 48 2 
Health care 
legislation  338 6 35 14 
Health care reform 11 17,310 1,781 26 17 
Health care reform, 
health care costs  1,143 73 47 5 
Health care reform, 
health expenditures  731 46 18 3 
Health care reform, 
third-party payers  123 12 21 7 
Health care reform, 
transparency  92 2 8 2 
(table continues) 
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Key terms searched Books 
Scholarly 
journals 
Secondary 
sources Reviewed Used 
Health expenditures 8 9,194 453 63 18 
Health insurance 
coverage  2,245 9 22 24 
Health spending 3 1,922 66 42 3 
Health spending, 
transparency  10  6  
Hospital 
chargemaster  2  2 1 
Politics of health care 2 208 7 14 2 
Transparency, 
Medicaid  57 4 17 1 
Transparency, 
Medicare  95 6 27 3 
Total sources 41 59,844 3,115 536 123 
 
 Carter et al. (2014) determined that mechanism theory could be applied to cost-
effectiveness measures to prioritize health care services using quality-adjusted life years 
and available resources. Grennan (2014) applied game theory to health insurance pricing 
models and found that costs for the same services from a single provider varied by up to 
79%. These two examples provide additional evidence that mechanism and game theory 
can support a framework to explain the complex nature of health care costs.  
Complexities of decision-making can inhibit the effectiveness of a single 
incentive. Jackson (2014) suggested that the simplest solution is an implementation of a 
tax to achieve the desired result. The ACA established a tax for not obtaining health 
insurance, which becomes increasingly higher each year (Eastman & Eastman, 2013). 
According to mechanism design theory, the tax penalties established by the ACA should 
significantly influence the choice of health insurance and produce a shift in health 
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insurance from self-pay to the most cost-effective health insurance for U.S. citizens: 
private health insurance. 
Development of the Health Care Industry 
Health care has a history that predates the creation of the United States. In 1900, 
the health care industry was viewed as medieval, consisting primarily of concoctions to 
drink or bathe. The average American spent less than $5 per year on health care services 
(approximately $100 today), which did not facilitate the need for medical insurance 
(Byrd & Clayton, 2015). Hospitals began to develop as a place for the indigent and ill to 
die. As information began to be collected from hospitals to evaluate health outcomes, 
policymakers began to recognize the need for health policy to regulate the health care 
industry. The Sheppard-Towner Act, passed in 1921 as P.L. 67-97, was the first major 
effort to develop a national health care program to improve maternal health outcomes. 
The program was established, after considerable lobbying by the Women’s Joint 
Congressional Committee, and provided $1.48 million for Fiscal Year 1922 and $1.24 
million for each of the next 5 years (Lemons, 1969). Funds were allocated to each state 
and included $5,000 outright, a $5,000 match of state funds, and the remaining amount to 
be allocated based on the population to provide for maternal and child health centers 
(Lemons, 1969).  
By the late 1920s, health care services began to develop further and hospitals 
started to market obstetric services. Baylor University Hospital in Dallas, Texas 
determined that an individual could afford to pay a small monthly premium, but a large 
hospital bill could take up to 20 years of savings. Hospital administrators approached a 
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group of teachers in the Dallas area and offered to pay for hospital stays in exchange for a 
monthly premium of $0.50. The plan was derived from the Marine Hospital Services, 
which originated in the late 1700s and charged $0.20 per person on each ship that ported 
(Lobachev, 2013). This plan grew rapidly and eventually developed into Blue Cross as 
the effects of the great depression took hold across the United States (Brill, 2015). 
 The Social Security Act, P.L. 74-271, was passed by Congress in 1935 (Social 
Security Administration, 1937). The regulation was the first social insurance policy that 
required all states to participate and focused on what was commonly referred to as old-
age insurance. The original Act lacked provisions for national health services. However, 
programs were included that were previously established by the Sheppard-Towner Act. 
The original bill provided benefits to individuals who were retired, unemployed, or 
deceased. All citizens of the United States were eligible to participate with the exception 
of agricultural and domestic workers, and the Act was funded through a required match 
of 50% from each individual state (Davies & Derthick, 1997). The exclusion of 
agricultural and domestic workers was added to induce support from the South, resulting 
in many individuals opposing the Act because it excluded more than 60% of the Black 
population from receiving benefits (Davies & Derthick, 1997). This provision was 
eliminated in 1950, and agricultural and domestic workers became eligible for Social 
Security benefits (Davies & Derthick, 1997). 
 World War II led to wage and price controls during the 1940s. Employers turned 
to benefit packages as a method to attract employees. Wage freezes and a severe shortage 
of available workers during World War II led to a ruling by the War Labor Board that 
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employers could use fringe benefits, including health insurance, to attract and retain 
employees. The Revenue Act of 1954, P.L. 83-591, provided further incentives for 
employer-sponsored health plans by making employer contributions tax exempt 
(Thomasson, 2000). The regulation improved access to health insurance from 48% in 
1953 to more than 67% in 1958, resulting in the development of employer-sponsored 
health insurance in the United States (Thomasson, 2000). Prepaid group medical plans 
were created, and the model of employer-paid health insurance began (Fox & 
Kongstvedt, 2013).  
The pressures of the war challenged resources to provide health care services. To 
encourage a correction in the number of hospital beds available, the Hill-Burton Act, also 
known as the Hospital Survey and Construction Act or Public Law 79-275, passed in 
1946 (Brinker & Walker, 1962). The act provided grants to fund the construction of 
hospitals. The regulation allowed for separate but equal facilities but prohibited 
discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin when providing services 
(Brinker & Walker, 1962). In addition, hospitals were required to provide a reasonable 
volume of charity care. The Hill-Burton Act funded approximately 23% of all hospital 
construction between 1948 and 1954, which significantly increased the number of 
hospital beds available to 73% of the estimated need (Brinker & Walker, 1962). An 
amendment was adopted in 1954 that added other areas of need including diagnostic and 
treatment centers, chronic illness hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, and nursing homes 
(Brinker & Walker, 1962).  
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The 1950’s were a decade of medical advancement. Medications became 
available to treat infections, glaucoma, and arthritis. Immunizations were developed to 
prevent childhood diseases, including polio. The first successful organ transplant was 
performed. Health care costs were approximately 4.5% of GDP (Alexander, 2013). 
Numerous legislative proposals were introduced to provide hospital insurance but all 
were eventually defeated. Federal responsibility for providing health care to the poor was 
established (Alexander, 2013). The Kerr-Mills Act was passed in 1960 as Public Law 86-
778. The act provided federal funds to state programs that provided medical care to the 
poor over age 65 (Moore & Smith, 2005). This regulation would lay the foundation for 
the Medicaid program. The law included inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing 
facilities, physician services, outpatient hospital and clinic services, home health services, 
private nursing services, physical therapy dental services, laboratory and x-ray services, 
prescription drugs, eyeglasses, dentures, preventive services, diagnostic and screening 
services, and any other medical care recognized by state law (Moore & Smith, 2005). 
 Medicare and Medicaid became law in 1965 as part of Social Security 
Amendments of 1965, commonly referred to as Title XIX of Public Law 89-97, in an 
effort to control health care costs, provide affordable insurance for the elderly, and 
provide care to the poor (CMS, n.d.c). Both Medicare and Medicaid have evolved 
throughout history as numerous amendments by various acts have altered the legislation 
including the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA), the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), the Federal Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), 
33 
 
and the Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 
(MMA).  
Medicare was designed to provide medical coverage for individuals over the age 
of 65 or disabled individuals. Medicare originally included Part A and Part B. Medicare 
Part A provided hospital care, skilled nursing services, and home health care. Medicare 
Part B was an optional portion of the program designed to provide physician services for 
individuals that were willing to pay an additional premium.  
Medicaid was established as a separate program to assist states in providing health 
care services, including long-term care and health insurance, for the poor (CMS, n.d.c). 
In 1967, amendments to the Act add optional categories of health services for individuals 
not receiving cash assistance, including Early and Periodic Screening and Diagnostic 
Testing (EPSDT). In 1972, states were required to provide benefits to any individuals 
receiving cash assistance from Medicare or apply the 1972 eligibility requirements for 
both elderly and disabled. 
The increased demand for health care services created a shortage of physicians. In 
addition, there was a significant shift to specialty practices resulting in an increase from 
55% of physicians reporting as specialists in 1960 to more than 69% in 1969 (Alexander, 
2013). Congress enacted legislation to improve and expand medical education in an effort 
to reduce the shortage. The Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan was created in 1960 
to provide health insurance coverage to federal employees (Moses, Matheson, Dorsey, 
George, Sadoff, & Yoshimura, 2013). 
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 In response to a continued rise in health care costs and a shortage of physicians, 
policymakers enacted several new regulations. Neighborhood Health Centers were 
established as part of the Office of Economic Opportunity, which was created by the 
Economic Opportunity Act in 1964, P.L. 88-452, to provide health care services to the 
poor and assist communities that were identified as medically underserved (Rosen, 1971). 
Wage and price freezes began in 1971 restricting increases in physician and hospital 
charges (Blumenthal, Stremikis, & Cutler, 2013). These restrictions were lifted in 1974. 
Additional resources were also provided to medical schools to increase enrollment. A 
shift began to occur in the enrollment of women in medical school accounting for an 
increase from 7% of all medical students in 1970 to more than 25% in 1979 (Bailey & 
Goodman-Bacon, 2015). 
As efforts to reduce costs began to become a priority in the 1980’s, new 
reimbursement models were introduced. One major change was a switch to capitation 
reimbursement models versus fee for service. Capitation models were based on a set 
monthly payment per member covered. This model reduced the exploitation of health 
care providers encouraging unnecessary utilization of services; however, many 
individuals were not receiving necessary services to improve population health. Medicare 
also changed from a fee for service model to a DRG reimbursement model in 1983 
(Santo, 2013).  
 Another significant regulation was Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA), which found roots in a health care industry practice known as 
patient dumping and was created when the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
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Act, P.L. 99-272, was passed in 1986. Private hospitals would transfer uninsured patients 
to public hospitals without regard to the condition or stability of the patient (Zibulewsky, 
2001). Industry studies showed that patients were more than twice as likely to die when 
transferred to another hospital (Zibulewsky, 2001). In order to facilitate compliance, the 
Office of the Inspector General can levy fines in the amount of $50,000 per patient for 
hospitals with more than 100 beds, while smaller hospitals can be fined $25,000 
(Zibulewsky, 2001).  
Managed care organizations continued to implement cost-saving measures due to 
the rapid rise of health care costs during the 1990’s. The National Committee on Quality 
Assurance (NCQA) was established in 1990 to oversee and accredit managed care health 
plans (Essock, Olfson, & Hogan, 2015). Health care costs grew at more than twice the 
rate of inflation during the decade prompting additional efforts to pass federal health care 
reform. More than 16% (approximately 44 million individuals) of the U.S. population 
lacked health insurance, primarily due to affordability (Oliver, 2014). Coupled with the 
challenge of HIV/AIDS, which impacted almost 140,000 individuals with a 60% 
mortality rate, the health care crisis continued to accelerate (Oliver, 2014). The Vaccines 
for Children program was established in 1993 using federal funding to allow individual 
states to promote vaccination programs for children (Okonko et al., 2013). The expansion 
of vaccinations resulted in a significant reduction of childhood diseases and improved 
population health. 
In 1996, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) was designed to result in 
the ongoing collection of information and provide annual information related to health 
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insurance coverage, access to care, utilization of health services, and health costs 
(Berdahl, Friedman, McCormick, & Simpson, 2013). This was a significant improvement 
upon the NMCES conducted in 1977 and the NMES conducted in 1987 (Berdahl et al., 
2013). The Census Bureau conducted the current population survey in 1997 and 
estimated that 42.4 million individuals (15.7% of the population) were without insurance 
(Murphy et al., 2016). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 included a number of provisions 
to change health provider reimbursement methods to slow the growth in health care 
spending (Manchikanti, Staats, Boswell, & Hirsch, 2015). 
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was passed in 1996 
as P.L. 104-191 in an effort for individuals to maintain health coverage between jobs, 
restrict the use of pre-existing condition provisions by health insurers, establish standards 
for medical record privacy, and establish tax benefits for long-term care insurance 
(HIPAA of 1996). The act has generated an enormous burden of compliance and has 
become one of the most heavily regulated areas within the health care industry. The 
regulation requires that providers, health insurance companies, and financial institutions 
adopt standards that protect personal health information and develop practices to ensure 
that information is only utilized by authorized individuals for specific purposes (HIPAA 
of 1996). Significant financial penalties can be imposed, $100 per violation up to $25,000 
per year, if the information is wrongfully disclosed to any party (HIPAA of 1996). 
 As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), P.L. 
111-5, a significant amount of funding was provided to the health care industry. 
Approximately $155 billion was provided to assist with improvements that included 
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$86.8 billion for Medicaid, $25.8 billion for information technology, $25.1 billion to 
subsidize health insurance premiums under COBRA, $10 billion for health research, $2 
billion for community health centers, $1.3 billion for construction of military hospitals, 
$1.1 billion to study the effectiveness of health care treatments, $1 billion for prevention 
and wellness, $1 billion for the Veterans Health Administration, $500 million for health 
care services on Indian reservations, $300 million to train workers in the National Health 
Service Corps, and $202 million for a temporary moratorium on specific Medicare 
regulations (ARRA of 2009). 
During the 2000’s, health care costs continued to rise at rates that were 
determined to be unsustainable. Medicare costs were expanding at a rate that would 
bankrupt the program within 20 years and private employers began to reduce health 
insurance benefits in an effort to maintain competitiveness (Altman & Frist, 2015). The 
rise of the Internet was adding to the problem as consumers became more educated and 
demanded expanded health care services. Medical devices and medications were being 
advertised directly to consumers, further driving the increase in health care costs 
(Mackert & Guadagno, 2013). The expansion of technology and an increase in treatment 
options brought about further increases in health care expenditures. The Census Bureau 
estimated that the number of uninsured individuals had grown to approximately 45.6 
million individuals, just over 15% of the United States population (Fronstin, 2013). 
A number of states and local governments began to enact legislation in an effort 
to achieve health care reform and reduce the number of individuals uninsured. Just a few 
examples included Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, and the City of San Francisco. 
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Maine passed the Dirigo Health Reform Act in 2003 that created subsidized insurance 
coverage to individuals and small employers, expanded Medicare coverage, and created 
the Maine Quality Forum (Riley, 2013). Massachusetts passed legislation in 2006 
requiring all individual residents to obtain health insurance and funded the plan through 
shared responsibility of individuals, employers, and government, which resulted in a 50% 
reduction of uninsured residents within two years (Girasa, 2013). In 2006, Vermont 
modeled the plan of Massachusetts and created Blueprint for Health, which focused on 
improved quality of care and management of chronic health conditions (Hong, Siegel, & 
Ferris, 2014). The City of San Francisco created the Healthy San Francisco program in 
2006 that provided universal access to health services for residents within the city 
(Hutson, 2015). In addition, the city mandated a minimum amount per hour to be spent 
on health care for employees. This provision was challenged in court in 2008, but the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the legislation (Hutson, 2015). 
 Many health care experts agreed that the industry needed to be overhauled in 
order to control costs and provide the services necessary to promote a healthy population. 
President Obama created the Office of Health Reform to provide recommendations and 
coordinate efforts for national health reform. On March 23, 2010 the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, commonly referred to as ACA or P.L. 111-148, was signed into 
law in an effort to provide affordable health care to all individuals within the United 
States, reduce overall health care spending, and provide reforms within the health care 
industry (Kominski, 2013). The law included provisions to reform a variety of concerns 
related to the delivery of health care services such as guaranteed issue health insurance, 
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minimum standards for health insurance policies, an individual mandate to secure health 
insurance, provide subsidies to individuals that could not afford health insurance 
coverage, expand Medicaid eligibility based upon increased income levels, provide 
coverage for dependents to age 26, elimination of lifetime limits on health insurance 
policies, providing coverage for preventive care and screenings, reduce hospital 
readmissions, and require employers to offer insurance coverage or be penalized 
(Elmendorf, 2011).  
Because of the far-reaching impacts of the ACA, Vicini and Stempel (2013) 
recognized the legislation as the most significant law to affect the health care industry 
since the passing of Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965. According to estimates 
from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the number of uninsured individuals has 
been reduced by 43% since the implementation of the program (Obama, 2016). Insurance 
policies contain standard provision across all offered plans from an organization and 
merely differentiate based upon out of pocket costs and deductible amounts (Buttorff, 
Andersen, Riggs, & Alexander, 2015). According to Heim, Hunter, Lurie, and Ramnath 
(2015), more than 70% of all individuals have experienced a decrease in health insurance 
premiums when considering tax benefits and subsidies offered since the implementation 
of the ACA. In addition, overall health care costs have stabilized at 17.9% of GDP and 
the change in overall health expenditures are at the lowest levels in more than a decade 
(Frean, Gruber, & Sommers, 2016). The CBO’s estimate of a net deficit reduction of 
$200 billion from 2012 to 2021 has been revised to approximately $110 billion (Kilgour, 
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2016). Even with the adjusted amount of savings, the ACA is having an impact on the 
overall costs of health care. 
Summary 
The health care industry has evolved throughout history based upon societal 
expectations and evolution that has determined that access to basic health care services 
are a fundamental right. This evolution has created an industry that is extremely complex 
and highly regulated, and yet highly secretive. As a country, the United States is in a 
health care crisis in which expenditure levels cannot be sustained. The challenges of 
providing efficient and effective health care services at an affordable cost continue to 
divide policymakers on the most appropriate solutions. The legislation that has been 
discussed has developed the current practices within the health care industry and 
influenced consumers regarding purchase decisions. Unfortunately, the lack of 
transparency has inhibited the disclosure of pertinent information that is needed for the 
decision-making process. In order to correct the course of the industry, a shift in thinking, 
expectations, and business models must be implemented to arrive at innovative solutions 
to provide a balance between access, quality, and cost. 
Current Industry Practices 
 The health care industry has developed into a complex $3.8 trillion industry 
(Prabhu, 2016). Social expectations and previous legislation have influenced the 
development of current industry practices that are unique. The inclusion of a third-party 
payer has created an environment that has been built upon principles of confidentiality 
between payer and provider and requirements for patients to utilize networks that provide 
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the most cost-effective care based upon contractual negotiations rather than quality 
outcomes. In order to more fully understand these challenges, the sections that follow, 
including the role of consumers, the role of third-party payers, and the role of health care 
service providers includes an in-depth analysis focused on the lack of transparency that 
leads to an overall increase in health expenditures. 
Role of Consumers 
The role of consumers has become more and more limited due to the current 
structure of the industry. Consumers are largely limited to selecting a health plan, either 
private or government, based upon eligibility and availability determined by criteria that 
cannot be controlled (Handel & Kolstad, 2015). For example, more than 53% of all 
individuals obtain health insurance through an employer-sponsored plan, which typically 
restricts the choice of the consumer to two or three options, usually from one insurance 
company, that varies primarily based upon deductibles and coinsurance payments (Frean 
et al., 2016). Although the options within the chosen health plan established the provider 
network, deductibles, coinsurance payments, and access to services, almost 80% of 
employees could not even correctly identify the proper amount of the deductible (Handel 
& Kolstad, 2015). The results of this study indicate that many consumers are making 
complex decisions based upon coinsurance amounts and the availability of a provider in 
the provider network of the selected health insurance plan. 
In the Netherlands, the ability of a consumer to switch health insurance plans 
without interference led to a reduction in overall health costs (Duijmelinck, Mosca, & 
van de Ven, 2015). The authors noted that most consumers that made a change did so to 
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reduce the monthly health insurance premium, improve customer service, changing 
provider networks, to enhance the benefits of supplemental insurance, or obtain a 
welcome gift. Almost 64% of all individuals that made a change in health plans did so to 
achieve a lower health insurance premium (Duijmelinck et al., 2015).  
Consumer driven health care is driven by reduced health care costs while 
improving access and quality (Hilsenrath, Eakin, & Fischer, 2015). Information regarding 
costs is an essential component to influence purchase decisions. Consumers are basing 
purchasing decisions using the best available information, the amount of coinsurance. 
Hilsenrath et al. (2015) found that consumer and provider behaviors varied greatly when 
price transparency increased. In addition, the authors noted that the increased utilization 
of high deductible plans and cost-sharing mechanisms increased the desire for more 
information (Hilsenrath et al., 2015). Consumer behavior can be influenced by 
appropriate models and incentives, ultimately achieving cost savings and lifestyle 
modification. 
As health expenditures continue to rise, total health care costs are a concern to 
consumers and policymakers. Koijen, Philipson, and Uhlig (2016) found that several 
models predicted overall health expenditures to level out at approximately 34% of GDP. 
As consumers and policymakers continue to look for cost savings within the health care 
industry additional transparency, accountability, and reimbursement models must drive 
innovation in achieving sustainability within the industry. 
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Role of Third-Party Payers 
Third-party payers, primarily insurance companies, have historically paid the 
majority of health care costs. This relationship has a direct impact on the decision-making 
process when a consumer purchases health care. According to Buff and Terrell (2014), 
patients are less likely to be concerned about the price of health care services because 
third-party payers (insurers) pay the majority of the cost. Cost-sharing between third-
party payers and patients for hospital services was approximately 97% for the insurance 
company and 3% for the patient while total health care expenditures averaged 88% for 
third-party payers and 12% for the consumer (Herrick, 2010). Herrick provided an 
example of the cost of cosmetic surgery, which is not typically covered by insurance, 
increased 21% since 1992 while health care costs rose 98% and the Consumer Price 
Index for all goods increased 53% (Herrick, 2010). The involvement of third-party payers 
has significantly influenced consumer decisions and reduced the traditional economic 
relationships between a supplier and purchaser (Rice, Rice, & Wedig, 2015). 
The provisions of the ACA were aimed at increasing the role of third-party payers 
in providing health care services. The additional regulation has increased the cost of 
health care services rather than allowing the free market to encourage price sensitivity by 
the consumer because the cost continues to be shifted to a third-party payer (Buff & 
Terrell, 2014). Martin et al. (2016) reported that in 2014 health care spending increased 
5.3%, fueled primarily by coverage expansions required by the ACA and the increased 
cost of prescription drugs. The largest increase in spending came directly from an 
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increase in spending within the federal government, resulting in a 2% market share from 
private insurance to government spending (Martin et al., 2016). 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) established a three-
tiered approach to address the challenges associated with a continued increase in costs: 1) 
provide incentives for high-quality care, 2) increased coordination of care, and 3) 
increased information to providers and consumers to improve decision-making abilities, 
which have reduced Medicare spending growth to 2% per year per patient from 2010 to 
2014 (Burwell, 2015). This represents a significant reduction from the overall growth in 
health care expenditures. Unfortunately, the areas focus established by HHS are having 
minimal impact on health care costs. 
As the growth in health expenditures continue, consumers are becoming more 
educated and engaged when purchasing health services. The trend is also changing the 
perspective about the role of third-party payers. Consumers and policymakers are 
becoming more demanding about the role of a third-party payer in curbing fraud and 
waste. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that fraudulent billings to public and 
private insurance amounted to as much as 10% of total billings, accounting for as much 
as $380 billion in health care costs today (Byrd Jr, Smith, & Helms, 2015). Third-party 
payers are in a unique position that increases the potential for detecting and averting 
fraud prior to claims being paid (Byrd Jr et al., 2015). Consumers and policymakers are 
looking to third-party payers to increase fraud detection and prevention activities in order 
to reduce unnecessary costs. 
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Another area that is garnering the attention of consumers and policymakers is 
waste within the health care industry. Estimates of fraud within the health care industry 
range from $75 billion to almost $1 trillion in total expenditures. Doyle, Graves, and 
Gruber (2015) developed an analysis of consensus from numerous studies and arrived at 
an amount of 5% of GDP, more than 30% of all health care expenditures. The authors 
identified a number of factors that increased the likelihood of increased spending and 
poor quality outcomes including 90-day total spending, inpatient versus non-inpatient 
spending, and post-acute care. Third-party payers have the ability to quickly access and 
analyze provider data in an effort to identify key indicators of waste, which could lead to 
quicker interventions and reduce a significant amount of waste within the industry (Doyle 
et al., 2015). 
Liu et al. (2015) developed a graph analysis technique that could be utilized by 
third-party payers to evaluate claims data and identify patterns associated with higher 
levels of fraud, waste, and abuse. Key indicators could provide third-party payers with 
essential information that would lead to deeper levels of investigation prior to paying 
claims, resulting in a reduction of health expenditures that could save hundreds of billions 
of dollars annually (Liu et al., 2015). 
Type of Health Insurance 
Health insurance refers to a program that protects against the cost of medical 
insurance. Franklin Health Assurance Company of Massachusetts was the first 
organization to offer accident insurance in 1850 to cover individuals working in the 
railroad or steamboat industries (Green, 2016). Hospitals began offering individual 
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coverage during the 1920’s (Oberlander, 2015). Teachers in Dallas, Texas created the 
first employer-sponsored health insurance plan in 1929. Blue Cross was organized in the 
1930’s to consolidate hospital insurance plans and pool the risk to a larger group 
(Oberlander, 2015). Blue Shield followed shortly thereafter to provide medical insurance. 
Medicare and Medicaid were created in 1965 through the Kerr-Mills Act to provide 
hospital and medical coverage to the elderly and poor (Oberlander, 2015). 
Type of health insurance organizations can be grouped into two categories 
including government insurance and private insurance. Approximately 84% of the U.S. 
population had some form of health insurance in 2010, leaving approximately 49 million 
Americans uninsured (Shi & Singh, 2015). Uninsured individuals are classified into a 
separate category referred to as self-pay. In 2010, government insurance covered 
approximately 31% of the population but accounted for 44% of total health care 
expenditures (Shi & Singh, 2015). Each category of insurance is treated slightly different, 
based upon the evolution of the health care industry and the demands placed upon health 
insurance companies. 
Government insurance. Government insurance can be broken down into three 
payers: Medicare, Medicaid, and military insurance. In 2010, Medicare covered 
approximately 14.5% (approximately 45 million individuals) of the population, Medicaid 
covered approximately 15.9% (approximately 49 million individuals) of the population, 
and military insurance covered approximately 4.2% (approximately 13 million 
individuals) of the population (Fronstin, 2013). The totals exceed 31% of the population 
because a number of individuals were covered by more than one government plan. 
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Medicare. Medicare is a federal government health insurance program provided 
to individuals over 65 years of age, individuals with disabilities, and those with 
permanent kidney disease requiring dialysis or a transplant (ESRD) (CMS, n.d.b). The 
program consists of hospital insurance (Part A), medical insurance (Part B), managed 
care plans (Part C), and prescription drug coverage (Part D) (CMS, n.d.b).  
Medicare reimbursement methodology has been derived from a long history of 
public policy that has evolved into primarily a fee-for-service model with set 
reimbursement rates for specific DRG codes with the associated costs increasing from 
$385 per beneficiary in 1970 to more than $12,200 per beneficiary in 2013 (Blumenthal, 
Davis, & Guterman, 2015). In an effort to control costs, legislation was passed in 2001 
that limited the growth of expenditures to a sustainable-growth-rate formula, which has 
subsequently been deferred every year due to a concern over access to care (Blumenthal 
et al., 2015). Additional measures were adopted beginning in 2007 that provided 
incentives and penalties to providers to electronically report quality data and implement 
electronic health records (Blumenthal et al., 2015). The authors surmise that continued 
challenges associated with access to care, a gap in funding for long-term care services, an 
aging population, and responsibilities of cost-sharing measures through large copayments 
will continue to stress an already overburdened and underfunded program. 
Medicaid. Medicaid is a joint partnership between federal and state government 
to provide health care services to individuals that qualify based upon income levels and 
available assets (CMS, n.d.a). Funding is shared based upon Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentages (FMAP), which are determined based upon program criteria and need (CMS, 
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n.d.a). The rapid growth in health care costs and an increased demand for services has 
propelled Medicaid expenditures beyond $475 billion (Keehan et al., 2016). A number of 
states are spending more than half of total state expenditures on Medicaid services 
(Keehan et al., 2016).  
Reimbursement models for Medicaid have relied heavily upon fee-for-service 
structures until the last few years. More states are moving to a capitated model in order to 
provide access to services while controlling costs (Zuvekas & Cohen, 2016). 
Unfortunately, the capitation model has had limited effectiveness in controlling overall 
health expenditures, which have prompted a number of states to abandon the capitation 
model resulting in approximately 95% of all physician services in 2013 being paid 
through a fee-for-service reimbursement model (Zuvekas & Cohen, 2016). Patel, Presser, 
George, and McClellan (2016) advocate for a variety of alternative payment models to 
improve quality and reduce waste. For example, gastroenterological care has seen 
significant cost savings when utilizing bundled payments for an episode of care combined 
with a capitation model to treat chronic conditions (Patel et al., 2016). Similar 
adjustments to reimbursement models across a variety of specialties could lead to 
substantial cost savings while improving the quality outcomes and population health. 
Military insurance. Military insurance accounts for a very small portion of total 
government insurance expenditures (Carman, Eibner, & Paddock, 2015). According to 
Sorensen, Nonzee, and Kominski (2016) military insurance covers approximately 10 
million beneficiaries at an annualized cost of approximately $40 billion. The military 
insurance program also referred to as TRICARE, has been operating similarly to other 
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insurance organizations by providing access to services through a network of providers 
that typically includes full-time military facilities when available (Sorensen et al., 2016). 
The primary advantage of the TRICARE system has been the availability of 
military personnel and facilities, which has led to significant cost reductions with the 
network. TRICARE operates more as a single payer system in areas that have military 
hospitals and clinics (Sorensen et al., 2016). Another example of innovation within the 
TRICARE system is the implementation of split benefit practices. This practice reduces 
the utilization of high cost, low value services by increasing the cost sharing burden of 
the beneficiary. Robertson, Yokum, Sheth, and Joiner (2015) found that regardless of the 
type or amount of the split, patients consuming high-cost, low-value services decreased 
from 69% to 42%, resulting in immediate savings to the third-party payer. In addition, the 
authors noted that there was overwhelming support (more than 70%), regardless of 
political affiliation, for implementing this type of benefit within Medicare and Medicaid 
(Robertson et al., 2015). 
Private insurance. Private insurance has been modeled in various forms in the 
United States since as early as the 1700’s when Maritime Hospital Services established a 
payment system for each individual arriving on a ship was provided necessary health care 
services in exchange for a set fee. As a major stakeholder in the health care industry, 
private insurance companies have an established history of assuming the risk associated 
with individual health and appropriately compensating health providers in exchange for a 
monthly premium (Cifuentes & Fernandez, 2016). Because of the reliance on private 
health insurance companies, policymakers were heavily influenced in developing 
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coverage mandates established by the ACA. 
The ACA has resulted in approximately 16.9 million uninsured individuals to 
obtain health insurance (Carman, Eibner, & Paddock, 2015). Of the uninsured individuals 
that obtained coverage, almost 9.6 million achieved coverage through Medicaid. Frean et 
al. (2016) reported that 40% of the net gains in coverage could be attributed to private 
insurance, while the remaining 60% was attributed to individuals obtaining coverage 
through Medicaid. Approximately 16% of the U.S. population continues to remain 
uninsured. According to Mach (2015), many individuals have chosen not to obtain 
coverage due to a qualifying exemption provided by the ACA. Exemptions include 
religious conscience, hardship, membership in a health care sharing ministry, Indian tribe 
membership, incarceration, affordability, unlawful resident, coverage gap, filing 
threshold, and living abroad (Mach, 2015). In addition, the penalty amount continues to 
be substantially lower than the cost of health insurance for most individuals. The penalty 
has increased from $285 in 2014, $975 in 2015, and $2,085 in 2016 (Mach, 2015). 
Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2015) found that the optimal penalty for not 
obtaining coverage was $1,461, which equaled approximately 24.9% of the cost of an 
individual health policy. 
Although various reimbursement models have evolved within the health care 
industry, health insurance is used as the primary gateway for accessing services from 
providers (Cifuentes & Fernandez, 2016). As the primary gatekeepers, private insurance 
has the ability to influence individual health status. Cifuentes and Fernandez (2016) 
found that over 70% of health insurance coverage was directly linked to socioeconomic 
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indicators including earning, wages, interests, rentals, retirement income, social security 
income, and poverty level. The relationship links were even more pronounced at income 
levels below 147% of the federal poverty level (Cifuentes & Fernandez, 2016). The 
authors acknowledged that health care coverage is merely a reproduction of income 
distribution and does not equate to improved population health and development. 
The role of the private sector in achieving universal health coverage has increased 
significantly over the last decade (McPake & Hanson, 2016). In order to achieve 
sustainable goals and improve health care quality measures, six primary objectives were 
found to be essential components of public policy including encouraging the availability 
of good quality and affordable services, reducing the number of unqualified and low-
quality providers, optimizing the mix of public and private services, developing an 
increased role for private providers, increasing regulation to prevent predatory practices 
within the industry, ensuring that public subsidies are provided to the most vulnerable 
individuals within the population (McPake & Hanson, 2016). 
Private health insurance companies will continue to be key stakeholders in the 
health care industry. In addition, as one of the most influence lobbying groups with the 
country, policymakers will continue to adhere to the essential provisions in obtaining 
universal health coverage, as determined by private insurance companies (Jacobs & 
Skocpol, 2015).  
Role of Health Care Service Providers 
 The practices of health care service providers have been heavily influenced by 
third-party payers. Contracts with third-party payers dictate reimbursement methodology 
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and specify allowable services. This contractual relationship has reduced the ability of the 
provider to act in the best interest of the consumer. The following sections have been 
provided to improve the understanding of the relationship between provider, third-party 
payer, and consumer within the health care industry. 
Reimbursement models. Payment models typically consist of four common 
components that include basis of payment, rate of payment, other design details, and the 
role of chance (Friedberg et al., 2015). Basis of payment includes a component of a 
service provided, a member covered for a period of time, an episode of care, or services 
for a specified period of time (Friedberg et al., 2015). Rate of payment can vary from a 
flat rate, variable rates such as relative value units (RVU), outcomes of care, and 
processes of care such as a diagnostic related group (DRG) (Friedberg et al., 2015). Other 
design details include provider requirements to be eligible to participate, the individual or 
organization that is to receive payment, the timing of payments, and the participation in 
costs directly from the consumer (Friedberg et al., 2015). Role of chance focuses on the 
likelihood that an individual needs health care services and is based upon a mathematical 
calculation, typically undertaken by an actuary (Friedberg et al., 2015). Each of these 
components combine to form a reimbursement model that may range from fee for service 
in which a provider is paid based upon the services provided to capitation in which a 
provider is paid a monthly fee for each member of a given plan (Brunoni, Dolinger, 
Walker, Wood, & Coustasse, 2015). 
The reimbursement model is determined primarily by the third-party payer and 
health care services provider based upon a contractual agreement. Contracts provide the 
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requirements of providing services and the level and type of reimbursement (Mikkers & 
Ryan, 2016). Additional provisions direct performance, levels of responsibility, and 
penalties associated with the contractual relationship (Mikkers & Ryan, 2016). The 
consumer has no involvement in the development of contractual provisions, resulting in 
minimal influence on the selection or performance of a health care provider (Mikkers & 
Ryan, 2016). Ketelaar (2015). Found that the availability of comparative performance 
measures to consumers increased patient engagement, directly influenced provider 
selection, and improved the overall quality of care. 
Chargemaster rates. The health care prices charged to consumers are determined 
by a number of factors. Hospitals and other providers develop a retail price list for 
services based upon a common set of procedure codes (Bai & Anderson, 2015). The price 
list is known as the chargemaster rate. This allows the provider to prepare a bill for 
services provided to a patient. Chargemaster rates were used to determine the rate of 
reimbursement for Medicare under old reimbursement models but no longer influence 
reimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance (Bai & Anderson, 2016). 
Chargemaster rates were used to determine the price of services for individuals that are 
uninsured and as a starting point for negotiation with third-party payers (Bai & Anderson, 
2016). Bai and Anderson (2016) found that although these rates were no longer relevant 
for Medicare billings, a one-unit increase in the charge-to-cost ratio resulted in $64 
higher revenue per adjusted discharge, resulting in significantly higher revenue for the 
hospital. Average charge ratios varied between 2.07 and 2.30 times higher for a for-profit 
hospital when compared to a non-profit or government hospital (Bai & Anderson, 2016).  
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Although chargemaster rates are required to be related to the overall cost structure 
within the organization, many individuals compare the structure to manufacturer 
suggested retail prices. Meisel, VonHoltz, and Merchant (2016) shared information 
regarding a viral post of a bill for a surgery. The authors noted that although there has 
been an increase in regulations regarding the availability of cost data, the information is 
based on chargemaster rates, which has little relationship to the actual cost of service. 
Contractual allowances. Contractual allowances are the discount for services 
from the chargemaster rate to the contracted rate to be paid as established in the contract 
between the provider and third-party payer. Based on a review of health insurance claims 
between 2007 and 2011, Cooper, Craig, Gaynor, and Van Reenen (2015) found that 
health care costs for MRIs varied by more than 12 times across the nation, averaging 
more than 100% within the same region. Additionally, in geographic areas that had fewer 
than four hospitals, the average price of health care costs was more than 15.3% higher 
than monopolistic markets (Cooper et al., 2015). Unfortunately, the information being 
evaluated may not provide accurate information to consumers. The proposed study is 
focused on chargemaster rates, as opposed to the actual price of health care services. 
 Third-party payers have long negotiated contractual rates in order to obtain cost 
savings, risk management, and leverage the provisioning of health services (Rice et al., 
2015). As the health care industry has evolved, the traditional functioning of market-
based economic principles have not held true (Rice et al., 2015). According to the 
authors, the minimal amount of consumer participation in the cost of services has 
significantly reduced the consumer motivation to maximize utility. In an effort to 
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increase transparency of health costs, regulators implemented a requirement for third-
party payers to provide an explanation of benefits (EOB) (Green, 2016). Green (2016) 
summarized the information on an EOB to include the payee, payer, patient, service 
performed, the fee charged, the amount the patient was responsible for paying, and any 
adjustments to the cost. In essence, each time a third-party payer paid a provider for 
services, a detailed statement was provided in which a patient could determine the 
discount level from the chargemaster rate and identify the amount that was actually paid 
for the services provided.  
 While the EOB improved the transparency of health expenditures, Stern (2015) 
found that most consumers did not have a sufficient level of health literacy to understand 
the information provided on the EOB. The consumer only focused on the amount that 
she/he was responsible for paying. Nation (2016) presented the legal perspective of 
chargemaster rates across the country are grossly inflated and unfair because of the 
reflection of a price that is meant to be discounted, not paid. The lack of understanding 
presents in industry reform legislation, including the ACA, as policymakers refer to 
provider gross charges, clearly referring to chargemaster rates (Nation, 2016). According 
to Nation (2016), the solution “requires price and quality transparency so that consumers 
can actively choose the best value in healthcare” (p. 168). 
Ratanatawan, Elifnur Yay Donderici, Miller, and Morgan (2016) found that the 
use of an all-payer claims database providing cost and quality measures is growing 
rapidly. Unfortunately, many of the databases focus on either cost or quality measures, 
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not both resulting in assumptions being made about the quality of health care services for 
a low price (Ratanatawan et al., 2016). 
Meisel et al. (2016) indicate that the collection of information directly from 
consumers may be the most effective method of solving the problem of transparency of 
costs within the health care industry. One challenge with this approach is the inability to 
verify the accuracy of the information being provided, which may continue to exacerbate 
the problem (Meisel et al., 2016). 
Consumer information. Many consumers are unaware of the process of 
determining the price of health care services. The problem is being compounded by the 
evolution of reimbursement models being developed under the ACA and pressure on 
CMS to reduce overall costs of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Jiang et al. (2016) 
noted that a lack of understanding regarding health care industry practices and a societal 
norm of not asking about the cost for services has created an environment in which 
patients are discouraged from becoming informed prior to receiving health care services 
resulting in selecting providers with a history of poor outcomes and higher readmission 
rates. In addition, reduced transparency and third-party payer requirements have 
increased the perception of consumers that there are few choices to be made when 
making decisions related to health care (Baier, Wysocki, Gravenstein, Cooper, Mor, & 
Clark, 2015). Consumers are left with few options that require a provider to be selected 
from a network of individuals and organizations that have established contractual 
arrangements with the third-party payer based upon criteria that may not align with the 
consumer’s best interests (Jiang et al., 2016).  
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Complexity in the Health Care System 
 The current health care system has become a maze of complexity that even the 
most astute consumer struggles to navigate. The methods of determining the price for 
services is veiled behind contractual agreements, confidential arrangements, provider 
incentives, trade secrets, and other practices that hinder transparency for the consumer. In 
the rare case that a consumer is able to obtain information, the information is often 
misused due to the inherent complexity of the system that includes practices of cost-
shifting and reimbursement models that are not understood (Piña et al., 2015). Price is 
just one factor needed to make an informed decision about health care services. Others 
factors, including access and quality, are shielded from the consumer in an effort to 
maintain the confidentiality of information between the health care service provider and 
third-party payer (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2015).  
 Access is largely determined by the third-party payer that has established a 
contractually obligated provider network. In addition, the third-party payer is typically 
selected by an employer based on the amount of the monthly health insurance premium 
charged. Ultimately, the environment for selecting a provider is largely placed outside the 
reach of the consumer. Even if the consumer were provided with the information 
necessary to make an informed decision, the consumer does not have the ability to select 
a provider unless the provider is part of the third-party payer approved network (Jacobs & 
Skocpol, 2015). 
 Quality measures remain largely unknown to the consumer. The emergence of 
information from websites, such as Hospital Compare or Leapfrog, are starting to provide 
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limited information regarding quality outcomes for individual providers. Leyenaar et al. 
(2016) suggested that quality outcome measures are a significant factor in the risk that a 
patient assumes when receiving health care services. Providers need to provide quality 
measures in order for a patient to make an informed decision. In addition, the self-
reporting of quality measures has been found to significantly improve the quality of care 
(Höög, Lysholm, Garvare, Weinehall, & Nyström, 2016). 
With the increasing use of high-deductible health plans and availability of 
information, health care providers must develop new strategies to attract and retain 
consumers (Kirby & Cameron, 2016). One comprehensive strategy that will continue to 
evolve as the demand for information increases in order to make decisions is the 
combined transparency of health care costs and quality outcomes. 
Summary 
A review of the literature has highlighted the continued concern related to the 
rapidly rising cost of health care. The history of the health care industry has increased the 
complexity within the third-party payer system and eroded the transparency available to 
the consumer, leading to a decision-making process with less than adequate information. 
Policymakers have implemented numerous policies, as indicated in the section outlining 
significant health care regulations, in an attempt to control health expenditures and 
influence population health. Nevertheless, costs have continued to escalate and consume 
an ever-increasing amount of GDP with relatively little impact on overall quality 
outcomes. Current industry practices continue to hold a veil of secrecy over the purchase 
of health care services. The involvement of third-party payers has increased the 
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complexity of the process and reduced transparency for consumers. Type of health 
insurance continues to be a reflection of socioeconomic factors in which consumer choice 
is predicated upon income levels. Ultimately, the consumer is faced with purchasing 
decisions based primarily upon the network of providers contracted with the insurance 
company and the associated coinsurance with each visit, leading to a lack of information 
related to the quality of care. 
A review of the literature has provided an extensive evaluation of the rising costs 
within the health care industry. Numerous studies have concluded that the rise in health 
care costs in the United States does not correspond to common measures of health. Many 
other countries have been able to achieve improved outcomes with significantly smaller 
expenditures. A review of the literature also suggests that a lack of transparency within 
the industry has contributed to the increase in health expenditures. Consumers are unable 
to include information about the cost of services as a part of the decision-making process. 
The lack of transparency may provide a significant break-through in altering consumer 
behavior and reducing health care costs.  
In addition, there is a lack of literature related to the cost of health care and type 
of health insurance. Type of health insurance can be a direct reflection of the 
socioeconomic status of an individual. Medicare and Medicaid have been extremely 
aggressive in reducing expenditures, resulting in pressure on providers to reduce costs 
and develop alternative reimbursement models. Bundled payment initiatives are forcing 
providers to take on an ever-expanding role in risk management within the industry. This 
expanded role will utilize trickle down effects in cost-sharing and risk management 
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initiatives among health care organizations. It is imperative that organizations understand 
the influence of health insurance on health costs in order to properly manage risk and 
implement accountability among providers. 
The need to better understand the relationship between the consumer, health care 
services provider and third-party payer requires increased transparency and access to 
information. Studying the relationship between health care costs and type of health 
insurance may provide additional information that could increase the transparency 
associated with the health care industry. The following three research questions have 
been identified in an effort to increase transparency and promote the distribution of 
information that is needed for consumers to make informed decisions. 
1. To what extent, if any, does the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-
pay) affect the average cost of health care services? 
2. To what extent, if any, does transparency of health care costs affect the average 
cost of health care services. 
3. To what extent, if any, does the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-
pay) modify the effect of transparency on the average cost of health care services? 
Modify the effect refers to a change in transparency based on the type of 
insurance. More specifically, is there a difference in the level of transparency of 
costs based upon the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay)? 
The associated variables include the cost of health care as the dependent variable and the 
type of health insurance as the independent variable. Answering these three questions 
will result in increased transparency for consumers and policymakers by providing 
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additional information that can be utilized in supporting decisions related to health 
insurance coverage. 
The results of this study may provide a unique contribution to the literature in 
several ways. First, the study may provide unique insight into the cost of health care 
services based on the type of insurance. This could allow consumers, policymakers, and 
providers to better understand the importance of insurance and the role in affecting health 
expenditures. Second, conducting the proposed study may provide comparative data in a 
number of markets that in turn could increase transparency of the cost of health services 
within various geographic areas, highlighting the effectiveness of a specific area in 
controlling health care costs. Third, the study may provide insight into the importance of 
transparency in influencing the cost of health care services. Although a significant 
amount of research has been conducted related to health care costs, this study may 
provide unique insight into the relationship of health insurance on costs and the 
importance of increased transparency within the health care industry. 
The details related to the methodology that will be utilized within the proposed 
study are presented in Chapter 3. The chapter also includes a discussion of the sample 
selection, data collection, instrumentation, operational definitions, methods of data 
analysis, and measures for protection for ethical considerations that provide a framework 
to evaluate the relationship between health care costs and type of health insurance.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
As health care costs continue to be a major concern for consumers, providers, 
payers, and policymakers in the United States, additional research is necessary to assist in 
identifying areas of focus for developing sustainable changes in the industry (Muir et al., 
2013). The purpose of this study was to provide a better understanding of the relationship 
between the type of health insurance and health care costs and to increase transparency in 
an effort to influence the cost of health care services. This chapter includes the research 
methods employed to complete the study of the relationship between the type of health 
insurance and the cost of health care services. More specifically, the chapter includes 
explanations of the research design, selection of data, manipulation of the data set, 
analysis of the data, concerns about validity, and potential ethical dilemmas in the study. 
The research questions presented in Chapter 1 provide an outline of concerns related to 
the type of insurance, transparency, and cost of health care services. The literature review 
highlighted the need for additional transparency in the health care industry and the 
importance of accurate information during the decision-making process. The study was 
needed to improve transparency and assist in identifying a solution that can be 
implemented to create a sustainable health care system. 
Research Methodology and Design  
I used a quantitative longitudinal design and data from a 6-year period to evaluate 
the relationship between health care costs and type of insurance. A quantitative approach 
was identified as the most appropriate method to better understand the factors that 
influence the cost of health care services (see Creswell, 2009). A qualitative approach is 
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used when the “research is exploratory and is useful when the researcher does not know 
the important variables to examine” (Creswell, 2009, p. 18). The important variables 
were identified in the research questions, and the NIS HCUP data provided the 
information necessary to develop a better understanding of the relationship between the 
type of health insurance and health care costs. 
Various research designs were considered for this study. An experimental design 
requires a control group and an experimental group in which an intervention or treatment 
is introduced that allows for a pretest and posttest measurement (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). The NIS HCUP data did not allow for the introduction of an 
intervention or treatment for two reasons. First, the data had been de-identified, which 
prevented a pretest and posttest for the same individual. Second, the NIS HCUP data did 
not allow for a control group. All individuals had been subjected to the same market 
conditions, including the adoption of the ACA, which prevented a comparison of two 
different groups based on the independent variables. 
Time-series designs, including longitudinal designs, are quasi-experiments that 
allow a researcher to evaluate the dependent variable over a period of time (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Longitudinal designs allow a researcher to evaluate the 
relationship between variables when a control group is not available (Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Nachmias, 2008). In the current study, the relationship between type of insurance and 
cost of health care services was evaluated over a period of 6 years without the presence of 
a control group. In addition, random selection was not required, which allowed for a 
purposeful sample in the study. The purposeful sample included the 10 most frequent 
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procedures, the 10 most expensive procedures, and the 10 least expensive procedures 
identified in the NIS HCUP data. 
Researchers who use a longitudinal design control for maturation and reduce the 
likelihood of making invalid causal inferences (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
However, researchers using a longitudinal design cannot control for other factors that 
occur over time that may reduce validity. For example, researchers may not take into 
consideration new technology that influences the cost of health care services. Other 
factors that may have contributed to the change in health care costs over time needed to 
be considered to reduce the likelihood of making an invalid causal inference. 
Supplementary data were gathered including information related to inflation and 
geographic location. 
A longitudinal research design has the advantage of allowing the study to be 
carried out in an actual setting and does not require randomized sample selection 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). However, the design does not allow the 
researcher to explain other potential causes of the change in the dependent variable and 
does not allow for manipulation (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). These 
disadvantages reduce the internal validity of the study and require additional steps be 
taken to ensure the reliability of the results. One step taken in the current study was an 
increase in sample size to increase the internal validity of the study. 
Setting and Sample 
This study included secondary data obtained from the HCUP (n.d.) that provides a 
comprehensive data set of hospital inpatient discharges for a national, regional, state, and 
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community level. The data set also includes an average contractual allowance that 
enables analysis of the net charges to a patient. The project is managed by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. The data provided in the National Inpatient Sample database included 
both clinical and nonclinical data regarding a typical discharge. The data set had been de-
identified to comply with the Health Insurance Protection and Portability Act to protect 
the privacy of patients, physicians, and hospitals.  
Each record in the database is based on a specific hospital inpatient discharge and 
contains primary and secondary diagnoses and procedures (DRG) codes, patient 
demographic characteristics (e.g., sex, age, race, and median household income based on 
zip code), hospital characteristics, expected payment source (type of insurance), total 
charges, discharge status, length of stay, and severity and comorbidity measures (HCUP, 
n.d.). Although the data set provides individual level data, the HCUP requires that any 
reported data be aggregated with a minimum of 10 individual records; therefore, the data 
were aggregated using DRG codes and the type of insurance by zip code. 
The longitudinal design in this study included a number of limitations, including 
both internal and external threats to validity. Internal threats included history, maturation, 
regression, selection, and instrumentation. External threats included the interaction of 
selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and treatment, and the interaction of 
history and treatment. Each threat to validity presented unique challenges that required 
additional steps to increase the overall validity of the study. For example, the threat of 
history related to the time that passed during the study and the external events, such as 
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inflation, that could have influenced the cost of health care services (see Creswell, 2009). 
Maturation referred to changes that could have occurred over time to a specific DRG 
code. For example, the services in a bypass procedure conducted in 2005 may have been 
different than a bypass procedure conducted in 2009.  
Regression threat referred to the possibility that outliers were chosen and 
indicated a trend over time that was not reflective of the actual change in cost. For 
example, if a major technological advance was implemented in treating a kidney disorder 
and resulted in a significant decrease in the cost of the treatment during the second year 
of data included in the study, the overall change would have resulted in findings that 
should not have been generalized to all health care costs because this was an outlier 
event. 
Selection referred to the possibility that the DRG codes selected for analysis had 
specific characteristics that predisposed them to certain outcomes (see Creswell, 2009). 
For example, the 10 least expensive procedures may have been predisposed to little or no 
change over time. Instrumentation referred to a change in the data collection process or 
instrument during the time being studied. This threat to validity was of concern due to a 
change in the NIS HCUP data in 2012 (HCUP, n.d.). Procedures to overcome the change 
in the data collection process were presented by HCUP and needed to be followed to 
reduce this threat to validity. 
The threats to external validity prevented the results from being generalized to the 
larger population. Specifically, limitations were specified for population members who 
did not have the same characteristics or function in different settings. The study included 
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only the DRG codes in specific metropolitan areas for the years specified in the data 
collection process. Although results of this study cannot be generalized to the general 
population, the information provided should allow the reader to better understand the 
relationships between health care costs and type of health insurance. 
Additional limitations of the current study included the lack of transparency and 
the use of a purposeful sample. The lack of transparency for health care costs prevented 
an analysis of exact costs, and average amounts needed to be used. Although this limited 
the usability of the study, the intent was to improve transparency in the health care 
industry to improve the decision-making process for individuals and policymakers. The 
use of a purposeful sample decreased the reliability and validity related to generalizations 
about the cost of health care services. The limitations of the study prevented 
generalizability to the entire population. The intent of the study was not to develop an 
overall understanding of health care costs, but rather to understand the relationship 
between the type of insurance and health care costs. The study findings may be used to 
initiate additional conversations and research that will help to reduce health care costs in 
the future. 
Data Collection 
Because I relied on secondary data, additional contact with human subjects was 
not necessary. Because human participants were included in the original data collection 
process, an IRB application was completed and approved; 02-20-17-0548488. Although 
IRB approval was required, this process was more of a formality rather than a primary 
concern for completing the study given the de-identified nature of the data. Additional 
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efforts were made to comply with NIS HCUP data use requirements for publishing 
information. The basic requirements included not identifying individual persons, not 
identifying individual hospitals, and avoiding publication of cell sizes less than or equal 
to 10 (HCUP, n.d.). In addition, specific citations were required in the study to properly 
cite the HCUP data and acknowledge NIS HCUP data partners. These requirements were 
reviewed by me and HCUP support staff.  NIS HCUP data partners included the 
following states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 
The NIS HCUP data had already been screened and tested for validity by AHRQ. 
This study included an analysis of the data prior to and after filtering for the 10 most 
populous cities in the United States. The analysis included a record count by zip code, an 
average amount of the total charge, and record counts by DRG code. This analysis 
ensured that the filtering process had not eliminated records, created data outliers, or 
generated additional problems with the data set. 
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Instrumentation and Materials 
The NIS HCUP data was used as a secondary data source to conduct this study. 
The NIS HCUP data contains longitudinal data from 1988 through the current year 
(HCUP, n.d.). The data set has been developed through partnerships with hospitals across 
the United States in an effort to provide researchers with data that can be used to 
“identify, track, and analyze national trends in health care utilization, access, charges, 
quality, and outcomes” (HCUP, n.d., para. 1). In addition to the National Inpatient 
Sample, the cost-to-charge ratio files were used to calculate the average amount received 
for services provided for a specific DRG code. This allowed for a more accurate health 
care cost figure to be used when analyzing the data for this study. Because gross charges 
reflected some association with the cost of a procedure and could have varied greatly 
between health care organizations, the average net cost may improve transparency and 
more accurately reflect health care costs across the United States. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The NIS HCUP data were obtained for data analysis. The health care data has 
been collected since 1988 through partnerships with providers in 47 states and the 
District of Columbia with Idaho, Alabama, and Delaware choosing not to participate 
(HCUP, n.d.). The National Inpatient Sample (NIS) is the largest publicly available 
database and includes more than 7 million inpatient stays annually (HCUP, n.d.).  
The dataset will be filtered to include data from the 10 largest cities, by 
population, within the United States including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, 
Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, and San Jose (United 
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States Census Bureau, n.d.). The postal zip codes associated with each city will be 
identified through the United States Postal Office. Data will be aggregated by city for 
each of the selected DRG codes and the type of insurance. Individual records will be 
identified for selection by comparing the hospital zip code identified on the American 
Hospital Association annual survey to ensure that data is aggregated based on where the 
service was provided and not based upon where the patient resides (HCUP, n.d.). 
In order to manage the available information from the dataset, it has been 
determined that the data will be limited to the 10 most expensive DRG codes, the 10 least 
expensive DRG codes, and the 10 most frequently reported DRG codes. The 
identification of the DRG codes, based upon the identified selection criteria, will be made 
subsequent to filtering the information based upon inclusion in one of the 10 largest cities 
that has been previously described. Selection of the least and most expensive DRG codes 
will be based upon the average total charge for the service. The identification of the most 
frequently reported DRG codes will be made subsequent to the least and most expensive 
procedures. If a DRG code is selected as a most frequent procedure and has already been 
identified as one of the least or most expensive DRG codes, the DRG code will be 
replaced with the next most frequent procedure. This process will allow 30 DRG codes to 
remain in the analysis being conducted for the study. 
Type of insurance will be limited to the availability of information with the NIS 
HCUP data. The data includes a field to identify the expected payer as Medicare, 
Medicaid, private including HMO, self-pay, no charge, and other (HCUP, n.d.). Because 
the NIS HCUP data include up to two expected payers for each record, the primary and 
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secondary payer, the study will involve only the expected primary payer to establish the 
type of insurance for the services provided. 
Measures for Protection 
As previously discussed, the longitudinal design utilized in this proposed study 
includes a number of limitations including both internal and external threats to validity. 
Various internal and external threats to validity have been identified. Each threat to 
validity presents unique challenges that required additional steps in order to increase the 
overall validity of the study. For example, the threat of history identified inflation as a 
factor that may have influenced the cost of health care services and maturation identified 
the inclusion of services in a bypass conducted in 2005 may be different than a bypass 
conducted in 2009.  
The threats to external validity prevent the results from being generalized to the 
population. Specifically, limitations are specified for population members that do not 
have the same characteristics or function in different settings. The study will present 
results only for the DRG codes selected in specific metropolitan areas for the years 
specified in the data collection process. Although this study will not be able to be 
generalized to the population, the information provided should allow the reader to better 
understand the relationship of health care costs and type of health insurance. 
Additional limitations of the proposed study include the lack of transparency and 
the use of a purposeful sample. The lack of transparency for health care costs will prevent 
an analysis of exact costs and average amounts will need to be used. Although this will 
limit the usability of the study, the intent is to improve transparency within the health 
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care industry in an effort to improve the decision-making process for individuals and 
policymakers. The use of a purposeful sample will decrease the reliability and validity 
related to generalizations about the cost of all health care services. As previously 
indicated, the limitations of the study prevent the ability of the results to be generalized to 
the entire population. The intent of the proposed study is not to develop an overall 
understanding of health care costs but to further understand the relationship between the 
type of insurance and health care costs. The proposed study may be used to initiate 
additional conversations and research that will help to reduce health care costs in the 
future. 
 Ethical procedures are minimal due to the utilization of de-identified secondary 
data. One potential issue is the possible identification of an individual in a rural area with 
a rare disorder or illness. The HCUP data use agreement prohibits any disclosure or 
reporting of information that includes fewer than 10 records (HCUP, n.d.). Because the 
study is focused on the 10 most populous cities within the United States, it is not 
expected that there will be fewer than 10 records for any reporting information. If it is 
determined during the selection of DRG codes that this issue exists, the DRG code will 
be replaced prior to analysis. For example, if it is determined that one of the most 
expensive DRG codes has less than 10 procedures, the next most expensive DRG code 
will be selected. This process will ensure that there is not a potential ethical violation 
within the study or a violation of the HCUP use agreement. 
The results of the study will include a summary of health care costs by DRG by 
Type of Insurance. A separate table will be presented for each year. A separate analysis 
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will be conducted to determine if each city will need to be presented separately. Table 9 
in Appendix A provides an example of the table to be used to provide comparative 
information. An additional table will provide the frequency of each DRG by location and 
a few descriptive statistics for each of the largest cities. Table 10 in Appendix A provides 
an example of the table that will be presented in the results section of the study. 
Summary 
 This chapter included a discussion of the research methods utilized to evaluate the 
relationship between the type of health insurance, transparency, and the cost of health 
care services. The NIS HCUP data were analyzed by calculating an average amount 
collected for 30 DRG codes in the 10 most populous cities within the United States. The 
data analysis will enable a comparison to be made, by location, of the amount being 
charged for specific health care procedures to determine whether or not health care costs 
vary based on the type of insurance being utilized by the consumer. The results of the 
data analysis are presented in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
The continued growth in health care costs has resulted in numerous challenges 
related to the overall sustainability of the health care industry. Current trends have 
indicated that more than 20% of total GDP in the United States will be spent on health 
care services, accounting for more than $3 trillion in total health care expenditures 
(Hartman et al., 2015). Although the United States leads the world in total health care 
expenditures, numerous measures of health status, including quality adjusted life years, 
indicate that the United States ranks between 34 and 50 in various measures compared to 
other countries (World Health Organization, 2015). The United States has the most 
complex health care industry in the world due to the participation of government, third-
party payers, private organizations, and individuals in making decisions related to 
consumer health care services. The complex nature of the health care system increases 
cost, reduces transparency, and inhibits the ability of individuals to make decisions based 
on meaningful and accurate information. 
The purpose of this quantitative longitudinal study was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between health insurance and the cost of health care 
services. Numerous authors have presented studies that have addressed the cost of health 
care services, but few have focused on net charges as a measure of analysis. The 
evaluation of the cost of health care services has little meaning when using the gross 
charges developed by each individual provider and published in chargemaster tables. 
Contractual allowances can account for a significant discount and vary widely among 
providers. Net charges provide a more accurate reflection of the actual charges being paid 
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by third-party payers and consumers for specific health care services. This study included 
an evaluation of the net charge for specific health care services based on the expected 
primary payer. Primary payers included Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay, 
and other third-party payers. 
The results of this study provide information to consumers, providers, and 
policymakers to increase transparency of health care costs. Data from NIS HCUP were 
analyzed to evaluate the relationship between the type of insurance and health care costs 
over an 8-year period. The results of the study will be disseminated through publication 
to increase transparency of health care costs and potentially assist in reducing overall 
health expenditures. The information may provide additional information to aid decision-
making for consumers, providers, and policymakers that may result in lower health care 
costs.  
The research questions and hypotheses in this study focused on the relationship 
between health insurance and health care costs. The specific research questions and 
hypotheses are listed below. 
1. To what extent, if any, does the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-
pay) affect the average cost of health care services? 
Ho1: Type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) is not related to the 
average cost of health care services. 
Ha1: Type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) is related to the 
average cost of health care services. 
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2. To what extent, if any, does transparency of health care costs affect the average 
cost of health care services? 
Ho2: There is not a relationship between transparency of the type of health 
insurance (public, private, or self-pay) and the average cost of health care 
services. 
Ha2: There is a relationship between transparency of the type of health insurance 
(public, private, or self-pay) and the average cost of health care services. 
3. To what extent, if any, does the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-
pay) modify the effect of transparency on the average cost of health care services? 
Modify the effect refers to a change in transparency based on the type of 
insurance. More specifically, is there a difference in the level of transparency of 
costs based upon the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay)? 
Ho3: There is not a relationship between the type of health insurance (public, 
private, or self-pay) and transparency of the average cost of health care services. 
Ha3: There is a relationship between the type of health insurance (public, private, 
or self-pay) and transparency of the average cost of health care services. 
 This chapter includes the details related to the collection of data and the results of 
the data analysis. Although secondary data were used for the study, there were several 
deviations from the initial plan presented in Chapter 3. The details of these deviations are 
provided in the data collection section. The results from the data analysis included an 
enormous amount of information that presented significant challenges to providing 
meaningful information to the reader. Although the results of the analysis are presented in 
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this chapter, additional information is provided in Appendix B through Appendix F that 
provides a breakdown of the analysis by individual DRG code. 
Data Collection 
The data collection process from HCUP required the completion of the HCUP 
Data Use Training Course and completion of the HCUP Data Use Agreement. The 
training course consisted of a number of modules that focused on data protection, 
violations, and individual responsibility (HCUP, n.d.). The course took approximately 20 
minutes to complete. Once the course was completed, a data use agreement had to be 
signed and approved by HCUP. A copy of the data use agreement can be found in 
Appendix G. Once these steps were completed, the data set was purchased and 
downloaded in an electronic format. The entire process took several days to complete. 
In addition to the National Inpatient Sample (NIS) files for 2007 through 2014, 
HCUP provided supplemental files that included cost-to-charge ratio files, hospital 
market structure files, discharge-level files, hospital ownership files, and SPSS load 
programs. The SPSS load programs were used to load each individual NIS file into SPSS 
for analysis. The NIS files in SPSS were merged with the cost-to-charge ratios files using 
the HCUP hospital identification number. The result was an SPSS file for each year that 
contained the information necessary to conduct the data analysis. 
Upon initial examination of the NIS HCUP files, I determined that the city 
information for each hospital had been removed from the NIS files for 2012, 2013, and 
2014. Without this information, the analysis could not be conducted using the 10 most 
populous cities in the United States. The data administrator indicated that a change had 
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been made at the request of numerous participants to prevent disclosure of individual 
hospital information. All years of data contained information related to U.S. Census 
Bureau regions and divisions. Regions included West, Midwest, South, and Northeast. 
Each region was divided into multiple divisions. For example, the South region was 
broken into the West South Central, East South Central, and South Atlantic divisions. 
The primary concern in conducting the analysis by region was the variation in costs based 
on geographic area. For example, it was much more expensive to deliver care in Illinois 
compared to Kansas, both of which are included in the Midwest region. After evaluating 
the situation, I decided to conduct the analysis based on division. The Pacific division in 
the West region was selected for the analysis. The Pacific division included Alaska, 
Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, and California. Alaska did not participate in the NIS 
HCUP program during the years being evaluated, so data included Hawaii, Washington, 
Oregon, and California. Each SPSS file was filtered to include only records from the 
Pacific division. 
A frequencies and descriptive table was generated for each year. The tables were 
loaded into Excel and a pivot table was used to summarize each of the DRG codes. To 
comply with HCUP data use requirements, any DRG codes that had 10 or fewer cases by 
payer were eliminated from the table. The remaining DRG codes were used to identify 
the 10 most expensive, 10 least expensive, and 10 most frequent DRG codes. Table 2 
provides a list of the DRG codes that were identified to be included in the analysis. The 
DRG codes are sorted numerically. 
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Table 2 
 
DRG Codes Selected for Analysis 
Category DRG 
 
Description 
Most Expensive 3 ECMO or tracheostomy with mv >96 hours or PDX except 
face, mouth and neck with major O.R. procedure 
 23 Craniotomy with major device implant or acute complex 
CNS PDX with mcc or chemotherapy implant 
 26 Craniotomy and endovascular intracranial procedures with 
cc 
 203 Bronchitis and asthma without cc/mcc 
 207 Respiratory system diagnosis with ventilator support >96 
hours 
 233 Coronary bypass with cardiac catheterization with mcc 
 234 Coronary bypass with cardiac catheterization without mcc 
 326 Stomach, esophageal and duodenal procedures with mcc 
 329 Major small and large bowel procedures with mcc 
 853 Infectious and parasitic diseases with o.r. procedure with 
mcc 
Least Expensive 153 Otitis media and URI without mcc 
 311 Angina pectoris 
 390 G.I. obstruction without cc/mcc 
 464 Wound debridement and skin graft except hand for 
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue disorders 
with cc 
 639 Diabetes without cc/mcc 
 690 Kidney and urinary tract infections without mcc 
 775 Vaginal delivery without complicating diagnoses 
 881 Depressive neuroses 
 882 Neuroses except depressive 
 894 Alcohol, drug abuse or dependence, left AMA 
Most Frequent 313 Chest pain 
 373 Major gastrointestinal disorders and peritoneal infections 
without cc/mcc 
 391 Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous digestive 
disorders with mcc 
 392 Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous digestive 
disorders without mcc 
 470 Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity 
without mcc 
   
(table continues) 
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Category DRG 
 
Description 
 603 Cellulitis without mcc 
 765 Cesarean section with cc/mcc 
 766 Cesarean section without cc/mcc 
 871 Septicemia or severe sepsis without mv >96 hours with 
mcc 
 885 Psychoses 
 
SPSS was used to select all cases with a DRG code that was identified to be 
included in the analysis. The selected cases were saved into a new file. The final step in 
filtering the NIS HCUP data was to eliminate records that were not applicable to third-
party payers. The data set identified the expected primary payer as shown in Table 3. The 
data contained records with the expected primary payer assigned as missing, invalid, or 
unavailable from source. These records and those that included an expected primary 
payer of five, no charge, were eliminated from the data because there was not an 
expectation of payment from a third-party payer. The number of records in each file was 
reduced significantly from the original data set as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 3 
 
Expected Primary Payer, Uniform 
Value 
 
Value description 
1 Medicare 
2 Medicaid 
3 Private insurance 
4 Self-pay 
5 No charge 
6 Other 
. Missing 
.A Invalid 
.B Unavailable from source 
 
Table 4 
 
Number of Records in Data Files 
Year 
 
Original records Filtered records Records for analysis 
2007 8,043,415 279,792 233,163 
2008 8,158,381 284,812 240,687 
2009 7,810,762 303,840 270,096 
2010 7,800,441 280,846 244,099 
2011 8,023,590 277,773 232,762 
2012 7,296,968 270,259 245,072 
2013 7,119,563 269,960 244,284 
2014 7,071,762 272,826 246,627 
 
The NIS HCUP data set is a stratified sample that includes approximately 20% of 
all inpatient discharges in the United States (HCUP, n.d.). Based on this estimate, there 
are approximately 35 to 40 million inpatient stays during any given year throughout the 
United States. G*Power was used to calculate an appropriate sample size. A small effect 
size was used with an alpha of 0.05, power of 0.95, and five groups in an effort to achieve 
the largest sample size possible. The resulting calculation for the sample size was 1,865. 
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The filtered records used in the analysis included between 232,762 and 270,096 records 
for each year, so the sample size was determined to be sufficient. 
Baseline descriptive and demographic characteristics of the sample included 
gender, age, race, median household income, expected primary payer, and length of stay. 
Each of these characteristics is reported by year and presented in Table 5. The 
demographics of the sample size are not representative of the population due to the 
methodological choice of using select specific DRG codes. For example, two of the most 
frequent DRG codes selected were natural childbirth and cesarean childbirth, both 
specific to female patients. 
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive and Demographic Characteristics 
 2007 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Average age 21.07 43.13 41.78 43.24 44.69 44.07 44.50 44.87 
Length of 
stay 2.78 4.28 4.15 4.30 4.19 4.15 4.20 4.23 
Gender         
Male 29.7% 23.6% 25.3% 26.9% 26.4% 27.7% 28.0% 28.1% 
Female 70.3% 76.5% 74.7% 73.1% 73.6% 72.3% 72.0% 71.9% 
Race         
White 36.8% 49.6% 50.2% 48.8% 51.1% 49.8% 50.4% 50.2% 
Black 4.1% 6.1% 7.2% 7.1% 7.1% 7.6% 7.4% 7.3% 
Hispanic 43.5% 27.9% 30.5% 29.8% 30.5% 28.8% 28.8% 28.5% 
Asian or 
Pacific 
Islander 12.5% 12.1% 8.7% 10.7% 7.9% 9.8% 10.0% 10.6% 
Native 
American 0.2% 0.3% 1.1% 0.3% 0.6% 1.1% 0.6% 0.5% 
Other 2.8% 3.9% 2.3% 3.3% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 3.0% 
Household income        
0-$25K 18.3% 15.4% 19.2% 16.1% 17.2% 18.6% 15.4% 19.4% 
$25K-$35K 25.5% 25.0% 23.1% 20.5% 21.7% 21.3% 22.5% 25.1% 
$35K-$45K 26.5% 28.9% 29.9% 31.7% 29.9% 29.5% 32.3% 27.9% 
Over $45K 29.7% 30.7% 27.9% 31.6% 31.2% 30.6% 29.8% 27.7% 
Expected primary payer       
Medicare 7.6% 24.0% 21.7% 23.3% 26.0% 25.5% 26.3% 26.5% 
Medicaid 39.4% 28.2% 36.2% 31.6% 28.5% 30.6% 30.2% 33.7% 
Private 47.5% 42.0% 35.7% 35.6% 38.5% 35.1% 34.3% 34.0% 
Self 3.1% 2.8% 3.3% 5.0% 3.3% 4.1% 4.1% 3.0% 
Other 2.3% 3.0% 3.1% 4.4% 3.7% 4.8% 5.1% 2.8% 
 
The final sample size represented approximately 0.7% of the total number of 
inpatient hospital stays for each year being evaluated. Because the sample was selected 
using convenience methods, the results should not be generalized to the population due to 
concerns related to external validity. However, the results of the study provide 
meaningful information drawn from a large sample size that may improve the 
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transparency of health care costs and could provide a foundation for additional research 
or policy changes to reduce overall expenditures on health care services. The dataset 
indicates that the complexity of an inpatient stay should also consider other covariates in 
evaluating the wide range of charges associated with many of the DRG codes. For 
example, the number of procedures performed during an inpatient stay, the number of 
DRG codes assigned to an individual stay, complicating conditions, and major 
complicating conditions are all important factors. Many of these factors can be identified 
within the NIS HCUP data, but are beyond the scope of this study. Numerous 
opportunities exist to expand upon the initial research and further identify factors that 
influence the cost of delivering health care services. 
Results 
Each of the research questions and the associated hypotheses was evaluated 
following completion of the ANOVA analysis. Prior to the interpretation of the results, 
consideration must be given to the assumptions that are associated with the use of 
ANOVA; the resulting statistics, confidence intervals, and effect sizes; and the 
appropriate posthoc analysis of tests. Each of these areas is discussed in detail prior to the 
reporting of the ANOVA results. 
Assumptions 
There are three primary assumptions that apply to an analysis of variance, the 
dependent variable is normally distributed in the population, the variances are the same 
for all populations (homogeneity of variance), and the cases represent random samples 
from the population (Green & Salkind, 2014). According to Field (2013), normality can 
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be overcome by using a large sample size and the least squares method and more robust 
testing of the data. Homogeneity of variance can be evaluated using Levene’s test, and if 
the assumption is violated, one can use Welch’s F to determine the significance in the 
variance of the means (Field, 2013). In addition, posthoc tests can be utilized to evaluate 
the data, if assumptions have been violated. Field (2013) recommends using the Games-
Howell procedure “because of the uncertainty of knowing whether the population 
variances are equivalent” (p. 459).  
Each year of data was evaluated for meeting the assumptions of an ANOVA 
analysis. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to test for normality of the dependent 
variable, cost of health care. The results of the test are reported in Table 101 through 
Table 108 in Appendix E. For 2007, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic ranged from .093 
to .297 and degrees of freedom ranged from 129 to 83,401, while significance remained 
at .000 for all DRG codes, indicating that the assumption of normality had been violated. 
The results of the normality test for 2008 showed similar outcomes with the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic ranging from 0.060 to 0.324 with degrees of freedom 
ranging from 441 to 70,332 while significance remained at .000 for all DRG codes. The 
pattern repeated in 2009 with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic ranging from 0.073 to 
0.266 with degrees of freedom ranging from 379 to 76,426 while significance remained 
at .000 for all DRG codes. The results for 2010 produced a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 
ranging from 0.102 to 0.255 with degrees of freedom ranging from 493 to 67,455 while 
significance remained at .000 for all DRG codes. The results were similar in 2011 with 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic ranging from 0.096 to 0.293 with degrees of freedom 
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ranging from 400 to 61,897 while significance remained at .000 for all DRG codes. The 
continued in 2012 with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic ranging from 0.115 to 0.302 
with degrees of freedom ranging from 504 to 62,934 while significance remained at .000 
for all DRG codes. For 2013, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic ranged from .092 to .255 
and degrees of freedom ranged from 544 to 62,516, while significance remained at .000 
for all DRG codes, indicating that the assumption of normality had been violated. The 
results of the normality test for 2014 showed similar results with the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic ranging from 0.100 to 0.255 with degrees of freedom ranging from 548 
to 63,548 while significance remained at .000 for all DRG codes. The results of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicate that the assumption of normality for the dependent 
variable, cost of health care, has been violated for each year included in the study. This 
study relied on a large sample size to overcome the violation of normality. The sample 
size calculated using G*Power was 1,865. The sample utilized for this analysis was 
2,033,822, which is more than one thousand times the required sample.  
Levene’s test was utilized to test the assumption of homogeneity of variance. The 
test was run for each year and for each year by DRG code. The results are reported here 
for the tests that were run for each year. The results for each year by DRG code are 
reported in Table 109 through Table 138 in Appendix F. For 2007, F(4;233,158) = 
4,114.58, p < .001, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not 
met. For 2008, F(4;240,682) = 1,679.44, p < .001, indicating that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was not met. For 2009, F(4;270,091) = 2,013.85, p < .001, 
indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. For 2010, 
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F(4;244,094) = 1,501.06, p < .001, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was not met. For 2011, F(4;232,757) = 1,160.35, p < .001, indicating that the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. For 2012, F(4;245,067) = 895.39, p 
< .001, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. For 2013, 
F(4;244,279) = 809.66, p < .001, indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was not met. For 2014, F(4;246,622) = 590.97, p < .001, indicating that the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. Based upon the Levene’s test 
conducted for each year, it was determined the data does not meet the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance. The same conclusion can be reached through evaluation of the 
Levene’s statistic calculated for each individual DRG code provide in Table 109 through 
Table 138 in Appendix F. Due to the violation of the homogeneity of variance, Welch’s F 
test was used for the analysis. 
The third assumption requires a random sampling of the populations. Because the 
dataset is a stratified sample of inpatient stays during a given year and the dataset has 
been filtered to a convenience sample of a specific geographic location and further 
limited based upon data use requirements, this assumption is deemed to have been 
violated. Field (2013) recommends conducting the analysis using a multilevel linear 
model that assumes hierarchical data relationships when the assumption of independence 
is violated. Using a multilevel linear model may or may not overcome the assumption of 
independence (Field, 2013). For purposes of this study, the inability of the results to be 
extrapolated to the entire population will be a limitation of the analysis and an area that 
will require additional research in the future. 
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In evaluating the primary assumptions related to this ANOVA analysis, e.g. the 
dependent variable is normally distributed in the population, the variances are the same 
for all populations (homogeneity of variance), and the cases represent random samples 
from the population, all were found to be violated. Although additional testing can 
provide additional validity to the final analysis, including using a larger sample size, the 
violation of the assumptions prevent the results of the ANOVA from being generalized to 
the population of all inpatient hospital stays. The analysis does provide an improved 
understanding of the relationship between the type of health insurance and the cost of 
services; however, the results must be approached with a full understanding that the final 
analysis is limited to the dataset being analyzed. 
ANOVA Analysis 
 A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to evaluate the relationship 
between the type of health insurance and the cost of health care services for 30 DRG 
codes. The dependent variable, cost of health care services, was based upon the gross 
charges for an individual hospital inpatient stay for each DRG reduced by the average 
cost-to-charge ratio for the hospital providing the services. The independent variable was 
the type of health insurance that included Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, self-
pay, and other third-party payers. The ANOVA was conducted for each year from 2007 
thru 2014. Table 6 lists the descriptive information for the dependent variable for each 
year analyzed. See Table 11 through Table 40 in Appendix B for the means and standard 
deviations for each of the individual DRG codes analyzed.  
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Table 6 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs by Payer 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  18,403   14,005.73   22,048.07  
 Medicaid  99,935   2,658.17   6,729.05  
 Private insurance  102,757   3,348.10   7,931.65  
 Self-Pay  6,738   3,514.49   10,534.43  
 Other payer  5,330   5,382.49   13,232.49  
2008 Medicare  58,889   16,204.83   24,984.78  
 Medicaid  77,698   7,090.30   17,852.31  
 Private insurance  88,315   7,871.92   16,094.59  
 Self-Pay  7,355   7,550.81   16,786.41  
 Other payer  8,430   11,955.22   24,868.95  
2009 Medicare  59,197   16,469.35   24,813.27  
 Medicaid  101,391   6,848.26   15,746.15  
 Private insurance  92,753   8,851.70   18,618.25  
 Self-Pay  8,989   8,104.88   15,950.60  
 Other payer  7,766   11,235.04   22,047.85  
2010 Medicare  56,327   17,453.86   24,668.42  
 Medicaid  83,491   7,624.26   18,236.98  
 Private insurance  80,848   9,094.83   17,671.21  
 Self-Pay  13,124   7,810.67   16,998.73  
 Other payer  10,309   10,875.57   23,507.87  
2011 Medicare  60,271   17,137.87   26,215.53  
 Medicaid  75,896   7,873.89   20,657.61  
 Private insurance  78,250   8,637.07   18,085.29  
 Self-Pay  8,346   9,286.26   14,547.25  
 Other payer  9,999   11,315.91   21,421.98  
2012 Medicare  61,896   18,160.39   29,177.55  
 Medicaid  81,341   8,519.54   23,677.03  
 Private insurance  78,312   10,084.56   22,222.75  
 Self-Pay  10,652   8,692.74   18,095.24  
 Other payer  12,871   12,252.92   29,964.02  
2013 Medicare  63,584   18,590.79   29,397.48  
 Medicaid  80,056   8,863.37   24,732.20  
 Private insurance  76,150   10,322.48   22,935.25  
 Self-Pay  10,722   8,496.02   16,134.12  
 Other payer  13,772   12,653.11   31,965.63  
2014 Medicare  64,499   18,727.00   27,987.69  
 Medicaid  90,113   9,693.74   25,124.59  
 Private insurance  76,552   10,633.02   25,227.39  
 Self-Pay  7,816   7,862.21   18,846.39  
 Other payer  7,647   14,937.41   42,126.27  
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Table 7 provides the results of the ANOVA for 2007 thru 2014. Table 41 through 
Table 70 in Appendix B provide the results of the ANOVA for 2007 thru 2014 for each 
of the individual DRG codes. Because of the violation of the assumption of homogeneity, 
Welch’s F statistic is reported for the results of the ANOVA. Table 7 includes the F 
statistic for comparative purposes. The one-way ANOVA of the cost of health services 
based upon the type of insurance revealed a statistically significant main effect in 2007 
using a 95% confidence interval, Welch’s F(4; 20,652.27) = 1,200.36, p <. 0001. The 
estimated omega squared (w2=0.09) indicated that approximately 9% of the total 
variation in the average cost of health care services can be attributed to the type of 
insurance.  
In 2008, the one-way ANOVA of the cost of health services based upon the type 
of insurance revealed a statistically significant main effect, Welch’s F(4; 30,530.68) = 
1,588.53, p < 0.001. The estimated omega squared (w2=0.03) indicated that 
approximately 3% of the total variation in the average cost of health care services can be 
attributed to the type of insurance. A similar pattern resulted for 2009, Welch’s F(4; 
32,472.94) = 1,830.93, p < 0.001, and 2010, Welch’s F(4; 44,376.35) = 1,732.06, p < 
0.001. The estimated omega squared was the same for all three of these years. 
There was a statistically significant main effect in 2011 for the one-way ANOVA 
of the cost of health services based on the type of insurance, Welch’s F(4; 36,615.33) = 
1,440.84, p < 0.001. Results for 2012, Welch’s F(4; 45,997.92) = 1,236.17, p < 0.001, 
2013, Welch’s F(4; 48,572.31) = 1,293.37, p < 0.001, and 2014, Welch’s F(4; 30,697.05) 
= 1,280.74, p < 0.001, also indicated a statistically significant main effect while the 
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estimated omega squared (w2=0.02) indicated that approximately 2% of the total 
variation in the average cost of health care services can be attributed to the type of 
insurance. 
Table 7 
 
One-Way Analysis of Variance of Health Care Costs by Type of Insurance 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  2.077E+12 5.193E+11 5,601.088 0.000 
 Within groups  233,158  2.162E+13 9.271E+07   
 Total  233,162  2.369E+13    
2008 Between groups  4  3.391E+12 8.477E+11  2,225.369  0.000 
 Within groups  240,682  9.168E+13 3.809E+08   
 Total  240,686  9.508E+13    
2009 Between groups  4  3.642E+12 9.104E+11 2,463.926 0.000 
 Within groups  270,091  9.980E+13 3.695E+08   
 Total  270,095  1.034E+14    
2010 Between groups  4  3.670E+12 9.175E+11 2,314.145 0.000 
 Within groups  244,094  9.678E+13 3.965E+08   
 Total  244,098  1.004E+14    
2011 Between groups  4  3.457E+12 8.644E+11 1,902.390 0.000 
 Within groups  232,757  1.058E+14 4.544E+08   
 Total  232,761  1.092E+14    
2012 Between groups  4  3.710E+12 9.276E+11  1,495.435  0.000 
 Within groups  245,067  1.520E+14 6.203E+08   
 Total  245,071  1.557E+14    
2013 Between groups  4  3.901E+12 9.752E+11  1,481.174  0.000 
 Within groups  244,279  1.608E+14 6.584E+08   
 Total  244,283  1.647E+14    
2014 Between groups  4  3.690E+12 9.226E+11  1,319.295  0.000 
 Within groups  246,622  1.725E+14 6.993E+08   
 Total  246,626  1.762E+14    
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Post Hoc Analysis of Statistical Tests 
 Post hoc comparisons, using the Games-Howell post hoc procedure, were 
conducted to determine which pairs of the five groups of insurance means differed 
significantly. These results are provided in Table 8 and indicate that, in most cases, the 
cost of health services varied significantly by type of health insurance. The effect sizes 
for each of the mean differences have been included in Table 8 when the difference is 
statistically significant. 
Results 
The results of the ANOVA indicate there was a statistically significant 
relationship between the type of health insurance and the cost of health care services. 
Thus, the null hypothesis, type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) is not 
related to the average cost of health care services, should be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis should be accepted for the first research question. Type of health insurance 
(public, private, or self-pay) is related to the average cost of health care services. 
Further analysis of the relationship between health care costs and type of 
insurance produced several items of interest. Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between 
the cost of health care services based upon the type of health insurance from 2007 thru 
2014. The data suggest that Medicare supports the highest level of reimbursement rates, 
followed by other payers, private insurance, self-pay, and Medicaid. Historically, 
providers have claimed that rates of reimbursement were highest from self-pay, followed 
by other payers, private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid respectively. Reimbursement 
by payer is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
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Table 8 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs by Payer 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 14,005.73 --     
 2. Medicaid 2,658.17 11,347.56* 
(0.70) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,348.10 10,657.63* 
(0.64) 
-689.93* 
(-0.09) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,514.49 10,491.24* 
(0.61) 
-856.32* 
(-0.10) 
-166.39 --  
 5. Other payers 5,382.49 8,623.23* 
(0.47) 
-
2,724.33* 
(-0.26) 
-
2,034.39* 
(-0.02) 
-
1,868.01* 
(-0.16) 
-- 
2008 1 Medicare 16,204.83 --     
 2 Medicaid 7,090.30 9,114.53* 
(0.42) 
--    
 3 Private 
insurance 
7,871.92 8,332.91* 
(0.40) 
-781.62* 
(-0.05) 
--   
 4 Self-Pay 7,550.81 8,654.02* 
(0.41) 
-460.51 321.11 --  
 5 Other payer 11,955.22 4,249.61* 
(0.17) 
-
4,864.92* 
(-0.22) 
-
4,083.30* 
(-0.19) 
-
4,404.41* 
(-0.21) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 16,469.35 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,848.26 9,621.09* 
(0.46) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
8,851.70 7,617.64* 
(0.35) 
-
2,003.45* 
(-0.12) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 8,104.88 8,364.47* 
(0.40) 
-
1,256.62* 
(-0.08) 
746.83* 
(0.04) 
--  
 5. Other payer 11,235.04 5,234.31* 
(0.22) 
-
4,386.78* 
(-0.23) 
-
2,383.34* 
(-0.12) 
-
3,130.16* 
(-0.16) 
-- 
2010 6. Medicare 17,453.86 --     
 7. Medicaid 7,624.26 9,829.60* 
(0.45) 
--    
 8. Private 
insurance 
9,094.83 8,359.03* 
(0.39) 
-
1,470.57* 
(-0.08) 
--   
 9. Self-Pay 7,810.67 9,643.19* 
(0.46) 
-186.41 1,284.16* 
(0.07) 
--  
 10. Other payer 10,875.57 6,578.29* 
(0.27) 
-
3,251.31* 
(-0.15) 
-
1,780.74* 
(-0.09) 
-
3,064.90* 
(-0.15) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 17,137.87 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,873.89 9,263.99* 
(0.39) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
8,637.07 8,500.81* 
(0.38) 
-763.18* 
(-0.04) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 9,286.26 7,851.62* 
(0.37) 
-
1,412.37* 
(-0.08) 
-649.19* 
(-0.04) 
--  
 5. Other payer 11,315.91 5,821.97* 
(0.24) 
-
3,442.02* 
(-0.16) 
-
2,678.84* 
(-0.14) 
-
2,029.65* 
(-0.11) 
-- 
2012 1. Medicare 18,160.39 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,519.54 9,640.85* 
(0.36) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,084.56 8,075.83* 
(0.31) 
-
1,565.02* 
(-0.07) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 8,692.74 9,467.65* 
(0.39) 
-173.20 1,391.82* 
(0.07) 
--  
 5. Other payer 12,252.92 5,907.47* 
(0.20) 
-
3,733.38* 
(-0.14) 
-
2,168.36* 
(-0.08) 
-
3,560.18* 
(-0.14) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 18,590.79 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,863.37 9,727.42* 
(0.36) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,322.48 8,268.31* 
(0.31) 
-
1,459.11* 
(-0.06) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 8,496.02 10,094.77* 
(0.43) 
367.35 1,826.46* 
(0.09) 
--  
 5. Other payer 12,653.11 5,937.68* 
(0.19) 
-
3,789.74* 
(-0.13) 
-
2,330.63* 
(-0.08) 
-
4,157.09* 
(-0.16) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 18,727.00 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,693.74 9,033.26* 
(0.34) 
--   
 
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,633.02 8,093.98* 
(0.30) 
-939.28* 
(-0.04) 
--  
 
 4. Self-Pay 7,862.21 10,864.79* 
(0.46) 
1,831.53* 
(0.08) 
2,770.82* 
(0.12) 
-- 
 
 5. Other payer 14,937.41 3,789.59* 
(0.11) 
-
5,243.67* 
(-0.15) 
-
4,304.38* 
(-0.12) 
-
7,075.20* 
(-0.22)  
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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The data also indicate a significant increase in the cost of health care services 
from 2007 to 2008 with some stabilization of prices over the next six years. According to 
a number of sources including The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2007) and 
Blendon, R. J., Altman, D. E., Deane, C., Benson, J. M., Brodie, M., and Buhr, T. (2008), 
much of this increase can be attributed to the uncertain political environment surrounding 
the future of the health care industry. Both political parties had presented proposals to 
reform the health care industry to address the rapidly increasing costs associated with 
high utilization rates, an increase in chronic conditions, and a need to improve outcomes. 
Both proposals included government involvement in price setting based upon current 
reimbursement rates. The authors speculate that health care organizations increased costs 
in order to offset a potential reduction in rates that would be implemented by future 
health care legislation. The data support this conclusion with the price stabilization that 
occurred over the next eight years. 
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Figure 1. Average cost of health care services. 
Although this figure is representative of the averages of the 30 DRG codes being 
analyzed, an evaluation of an individual DRG suggests a much different result. Figure 4.2 
depicts the relationship discussed above for DRG 3, the most expensive health care 
service being analyzed for this study. The data show the same pattern in the increase from 
2007 to 2008, but indicate more stabilization in self-pay costs while Medicaid and other 
payers experienced disproportionate increases in costs. It is important to look at 
individual DRG’s in order to more accurately evaluate the relationship between the cost 
of health care services and the type of insurance. In order to better understand the 
relationship between the type of insurance and the cost of health care services, a ranking 
of one to five was determined for each DRG to determine how often an insurance type 
paid the most for health care services. In evaluating individual DRG codes, other payers 
paid the most for health care services 40% of the time and averaged a ranking of 2.3, 
Medicare paid the most for health care services 33.3% of the time and averaged a ranking 
of 2.5, Medicaid paid the most for health care services 20.0% of the time and averaged a 
ranking of 2.6, Self-Pay paid the most for health care services 6.7% of the time and 
averaged a ranking of 4.0, while private insurance did not pay the most for health care 
services for any DRG code and averaged a ranking of 3.5.  
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Figure 2. Average cost of health care services DRG 3. 
 The second research question posed whether or not there was a relationship 
between transparency of the type of health insurance and the average cost of health care 
services. The previous discussion identified the difference between the type of insurance 
and the cost of health care services. Based upon the transparency of costs, including the 
publicly available information for Medicare and Medicaid pricing, one would surmise 
that the average cost of health care services would be highest for Self-Pay, followed 
respectively by other payers, private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. However, when 
evaluating this information more fully, and considering the information from the 
perspective of the provider, a different conclusion is supported. Providers have 
established rates for reimbursement from Medicare and Medicaid. The reimbursement 
from CMS was much more certain than from other payers, which would indicate more 
confidence in billing practices and ultimately, less willingness to negotiate actual 
payment amounts. In addition, due to the perceived low reimbursement rates, many of the 
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inpatient records associated with Medicare and Medicaid indicated a greater number of 
additional DRG’s and complicating factors. This may indicate that providers are more 
conscious of the need to document cases more thoroughly to obtain reimbursement for 
the services provided. This issue requires additional research to determine whether or not 
this should be factored into the overall analysis of health care costs.  
The additional types of insurance provide more uncertainty for the third-party 
payer. For example, private insurance has higher rates of audit and denial of claims due 
to poor documentation or other contractual obligations. Self-pay customers may or may 
not have the ability to pay, making reimbursement uncertain. When evaluating the data 
from the perspective of the provider, the overall results do support the positive effect of 
transparency on the type of insurance and the cost of health care services. Based upon the 
existence of a statistically significant relationship, the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between transparency of the type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) and the 
average cost of health care services should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis 
accepted. Additional research needs to be conducted to evaluate the specific impact of 
transparency on the cost of health care services. Specific research should evaluate the use 
of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates in negotiating reimbursement rated by 
private insurers. Additional consideration should be made regarding the availability of 
reimbursement information for self-pay customers and the impact on agreed upon prices. 
The final research question related to whether or not the type of health insurance 
modified the effect of transparency on the average cost of health care services. The 
results of the analysis indicate there was a change in the level of transparency, based on 
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the type of health insurance, that influences the cost of health care services. The ANOVA 
results indicated the level of transparency was statistically related to the average cost of 
health care services, based on the type of insurance. This would indicate that the null 
hypothesis (there is not a relationship between the type of health insurance (public, 
private, or self-pay) and transparency of the average cost of health care services) should 
be rejected, and the alternative hypothesis should be accepted. 
Summary 
This quantitative, longitudinal study was conducted to develop a better 
understanding of the relationship between the type of health insurance and the cost of 
health care services. The study involved data analysis for 30 DRG codes from a sampling 
of inpatient hospital stays in Hawaii, California, Oregon, and Washington that occurred 
between 2007 and 2014. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship 
between the type of health insurance and the cost of health care services. The overall 
analysis indicated there was a statistically significant relationship between the type of 
health insurance and the cost of health care services. Although the analysis shows a 
statistically significant relationship, deeper analysis of individual DRG codes provides 
meaningful information that should be considered when evaluating the relationship 
between the cost of health care services and type of health insurance. The number of 
inpatient stays and the cost variation among DRG codes can present concerns related to 
internal validity. Evaluation of individual DRG codes allows more precise analysis of the 
relationship to be considered. This information is presented in Appendix A through 
Appendix E. 
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The results of the analysis indicated that the null hypothesis for each of the three 
research questions should be rejected. The rejected null hypotheses are as follows: 
• Type of health insurance (public, private, or self-pay) is not related to the 
average cost of health care services. 
• There is not a relationship between transparency of the type of health 
insurance (public, private, or self-pay) and the average cost of health care 
services. 
• There is not a relationship between the type of health insurance (public, 
private, or self-pay) and transparency of the average cost of health care 
services. 
In addition to providing meaningful information related to the relationship 
between the cost of health care services and type of health insurance, the analysis 
provided meaningful information regarding the effectiveness of the ACA in stabilizing 
health care costs and reimbursement rates of various payer types. Other payers paid the 
highest for health care services followed by Medicare, Medicaid, and self-pay, while 
private insurance consistently paid the least amount for health care services. 
Chapter 5 will include an interpretation of the findings, summarize limitations and 
delimitations of the study, include recommendations for additional research and future 
actions, and summarize the implications of the study. The chapter will conclude with the 
implications for positive social change. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Increasing health care costs continue to pose a significant challenge to individuals 
in accessing health care services in the United States. Schoen et al. (2013) found that 
individuals living in the United States were more likely to forego necessary services due 
to costs than individuals living in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Expenditures for 
health care services in the United States exceeded 17.4% of GDP in 2013 and are 
expected to exceed 20% by 2020 (Hartman et al., 2015). Although waste accounts for as 
much as 47% of total expenditures (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012), the primary factor for 
high costs in the United States is the complexity of the health care industry (Schoen et al., 
2013). 
Substantial research has been conducted to evaluate access to health care services 
and quality of care received by patients (Barr, 2014). The trifecta model indicates that the 
third influence on health care is cost (Dai, 2015). Little research has been conducted to 
evaluate the underlying influences that impact health care costs. Jevsevar (2015) cited a 
lack of transparency as a major factor that inhibited studies regarding health care costs.  
This quantitative longitudinal study was conducted to evaluate two factors that 
may play a significant role in the cost of health care services: type of health insurance and 
lack of transparency in the health care industry. The NIS HCUP data set was used to 
conduct an evaluation of the net charges for specific DRG codes to determine the impact 
of the type of health insurance on the costs of health care services. After eliminating 
DRG codes that could not be reported due to data use agreement terms, 30 DRG codes 
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were selected for evaluation. The DRG codes selected included the 10 most frequently 
used codes, the 10 most expensive codes, and the 10 least expensive codes. Total charges 
were reduced to net charges based on the average contractual allowances provided in the 
cost-to-charge supplementary files. A comparison of the net charges was conducted over 
an 8-year period, 2007 through 2014, based on the expected primary payer (the type of 
health insurance) that included Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay, and other 
payers. The time period evaluated included pre and post implementation of the ACA. 
This allowed an evaluation to be made regarding the overall effectiveness of the policy in 
increasing the number of individuals covered by health insurance and reducing health 
care costs (Rosenbaum, 2011). In addition, the impact of transparency on the cost of 
health care services and type of insurance was included to evaluate the potential influence 
that additional information might have had on decision-making capabilities for patients, 
providers, and payers.  
The results of this study provided insight into the role of health insurance on 
health care costs but did not include findings that could be generalized to all health care 
costs. Due to the sample selection methodology employed in the study, the results may 
not be representative of all DRG codes or inpatient hospital stays. Specific concerns 
related to methodology and generalizability of the results are discussed in the limitations 
section. This chapter also includes a review of the findings and a discussion of the 
conclusions that were drawn from the data analysis. In addition, I provide 
recommendations for further research, practice, and policy, and discuss implications for 
positive social change.  
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Interpretation of the Findings 
This study focused on three research questions and six hypotheses. The primary 
focus of the study involved the relationship between health insurance and the cost of 
health care services and the influence of transparency on overall expenditures. The results 
of this study led to all three null hypotheses being rejected. Each research question is 
answered in more detail later in this chapter. 
The process of conducting the analysis provided some surprising yet useful 
information related to the costs of health care services. Four items that were of particular 
interest were chargemaster rates, reimbursement rates based on the type of insurance, a 
significant price increase in 2008 and 2011, and the influence of the ACA on overall 
costs of health care services. Each of these four items is discussed in more detail. 
Chargemaster Rates 
Significant variation among providers in chargemaster rates is common in the 
health care industry. An analysis of chargemaster rates for DRG 3 in 2014 showed a 
range of $106.00 to $4,948,490.00 with a mean of $51,603.25 and standard deviation of 
$115,296.44. The analysis for net charges indicated a range of $24.38 to $1,874,121.70 
with a mean of $12,452.25 and standard deviation of $26,725.89. Although the 
information regarding net charges showed that the gap in the variation among prices 
being charged to individual consumers decreased when evaluating the actual cost of 
services, there was still little consistency within the industry regarding how much to bill 
an individual consumer. This fact can be confirmed by the large standard deviation 
associated with each type of insurance and DRG code presented in Appendix B.  
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The analysis confirmed the need to provide meaningful information to consumers 
and policymakers to aid in the decision-making process. The amount collected for 
specific health care services provides information that may allow consumers to compare 
prices and quality measures to aid in the decision regarding the value provided by a 
specific provider. The results of this study also confirmed the need for additional 
transparency related to cost of health care services to provide consumers with the 
information necessary to make an informed decision. 
Reimbursement Rates  
Experts in the health care industry have commonly discussed the need to improve 
reimbursement rates for government health insurance programs, specifically Medicare 
and Medicaid. Barr (2016) discussed the perceptions of reimbursement rates for health 
insurance companies and reported that private insurance reimburses providers at the 
highest rate, followed by other payers, Medicare, and Medicaid. Self-pay is associated 
with the highest level of payment for services but also has the highest amount of bad debt 
associated with the rate of collection (Barr, 2016).  
The results of the analysis indicated some surprising information related to the 
reimbursement rates associated with health insurance. Although Medicare and Medicaid 
are commonly cited as having the lowest reimbursement rate for DRG codes, the current 
analysis indicated that self-pay reimbursement rates were consistently the lowest of all 
payers. According to the ranking of health insurance reimbursement rates, other payers 
paid the highest amount followed by Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance.  
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The most surprising information was that private insurance paid the lowest rate 
for health care services. The common perception of Medicaid paying the lowest 
reimbursement rates of all payers led to the creation of disproportionate share payments 
to compensate providers that experienced a high Medicaid payer mix for low 
reimbursement rates (Barr, 2016). The results of the current study directly contradicted 
this information and indicated that private insurance and self-pay commonly pay the 
lowest rates for services. The results highlighted the need for policymakers to have 
additional transparency and accurate information to develop policies that are consistent 
with the facts. Without this information, policymakers support policy decisions that add 
to the waste and inefficiencies in the health care industry that exceed more than one 
trillion dollars (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012). 
Price Increases 
Another surprising element appeared in the longitudinal analysis of the data. 
When evaluating individual DRG codes, I found unusually large price increases in 2008 
and 2011. The price increase from 2007 to 2008 can be largely attributed to the uncertain 
political environment surrounding the health care industry (Blendon et al., 2008; Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007). Americans had grown frustrated with the cost of health 
care services and wanted reform that addressed poor quality (Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2007). Health care organizations, including health insurance companies, 
wanted increased accountability to address chronic health conditions and poor choices 
related to healthy behavior (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2007).  
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To attract support during the presidential election, both major political parties 
presented proposals that included significant reforms in the health care industry. Both 
proposals included government involvement in setting prices and increased regulation 
over health insurance companies. Due to the uncertainty related to future pricing in the 
health care industry, many individuals speculated that health care organizations increased 
prices so that any future reduction imposed by regulation would have minimal impact on 
organizational performance and profitability (Blendon et al., 2008).  
Price increases from 2010 to 2011 can be attributed to the specific provisions of 
the ACA including the requirement that preexisting conditions be covered, individuals 
cannot be denied health insurance, removal of lifetime limits on health insurance policies, 
mandated coverage of preventive services, and mandated medical loss ratios of 80% for 
small groups and 85% for large groups (Barr, 2016; Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act). The increased regulation on health insurance companies provided an 
opportunity for health service providers to increase costs of services due to favorable 
market conditions, including an increase in the number of individuals being insured. 
The primary purpose of this study was not to identify specific factors that 
influenced increases in health care costs. The focus was limited to the relationship 
between the cost of health care services and type of health insurance over a period of 8 
years. Results of the analysis indicate additional research should be conducted to evaluate 
specific factors that influence total health care expenditures. 
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Influence of the ACA 
A primary goal of the ACA is a reduction in the overall cost of health care in the 
United States. The results of the current study indicated some price stabilization after the 
implementation of the ACA. The average increase in the cost of health care services 
between 2007 and 2010 was approximately 38.6%. After the implementation of the ACA, 
the average increase in the cost of health care services between 2011 and 2014 was 
approximately 4.3%. Although this reduction in cost increase might be attributed to a 
number of factors, the increase in the number of individuals with health insurance, due to 
the requirements of the ACA, appears to have had an impact on the overall stability of 
prices on health care expenditures from 2010 through 2014.  
Another goal of the ACA was to reduce the number of individuals who did not 
have health coverage. The number of individuals reported as self-pay should have 
decreased through the implementation period. In 2007, self-pay individuals accounted for 
approximately 3.1% of the inpatient stays included in the analysis. The number increased 
to approximately 5.0% in 2010 and decreased to approximately 3.0% in 2014. Overall, 
the percentage of individuals without insurance remained about the same, indicating that 
the ACA did not achieve the goal of reducing the number of individuals not covered by 
insurance. There were several interesting trends in the number of individuals being 
covered by insurance. The percentage covered by Medicare increased from 
approximately 7.6% in 2007 to approximately 26.5% in 2014. This may be attributed to 
the growth in the number of baby boomers reaching retirement age and becoming eligible 
for Medicare. Those covered by Medicaid decreased from approximately 39.4% in 2007 
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to approximate 33.7% in 2014. This trend seemed to contradict efforts to expand 
Medicaid coverage by most states and increase federal participation in funding. 
Individuals covered by private insurance decreased from approximate 47.5% in 2007 to 
approximately 34.0% in 2014. Again, this was a surprising trend considering the efforts 
to expand insurance coverage through the ACA. Some of this decline may be attributed 
to individuals reaching retirement age and switching to Medicare, but this would not 
account for the entire amount of the decrease. 
Mechanism theory and game theory were combined to develop the underlying 
theoretical framework for evaluating the relationship between type of health insurance 
and the cost of health care services. The longitudinal analysis supported the notion that 
underlying incentives and penalties of the ACA are having the desired effect. The number 
of uninsured individuals in the United States has been reduced, and the increasing cost of 
health care has been slowed. Although there are still significant improvements that must 
be made to ensure the sustainability of the health care industry, the current system 
supports modifications, not abandonment. To continue to see benefits associated from 
mechanism and game theory, additional information must be made available to 
consumers and should be coupled with additional incentives to encourage compliance 
and improve behaviors that increase population health. 
Research Questions 
The study involved a longitudinal analysis of the relationship between health care 
costs and type of health insurance. The evaluation included an analysis of 30 DRG codes 
selected from the NIS HCUP for services provided in the Pacific division. DRG codes 
109 
 
were selected after eliminating codes that could not be reported due to groupings smaller 
than 10. DRG codes included the 10 most frequently used codes, the 10 most expensive 
codes, and the 10 least expensive codes. Type of insurance was determined from the 
primary expected payer for each inpatient stay and included Medicare, Medicaid, private 
insurance, self-pay, and other payers.  
Research Question 1: To what extent, if any, does the type of health 
insurance (public, private, or self-pay) affect the average cost of health care 
services? The analysis of the effect of the type of insurance on the cost of health care 
services produced a statistically significant relationship for each of the 8 years included 
in the study. Depending on the year evaluated, the type of health insurance affected the 
average cost of health care services between approximately 2% and 9%. In 2007, prior to 
a large increase in health care prices, the estimated amount of variation in health care 
costs that could be attributed to the type of insurance was approximately 9%. The 
estimated impact fell to approximately 3% in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The variation fell to 
approximately 2% in 2011, another year that had a significant price increase, and 
remained steady through 2014. 
Although there was a statistically significant relationship between health care 
costs and type of insurance, the variation in cost that can be attributed to the type of 
insurance was relatively small. An inpatient hospital stay can be extremely complex and 
vary greatly from patient to patient. For example, two patients that have a hospital stay 
for a knee replacement might have completely different medical needs. One might be an 
obese elderly patient with a chronic condition, such as diabetes, that needed a joint 
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replaced while the second patient might be a young adult that sustained a serious injury in 
a car accident. Both patients would be listed under the same DRG code, but receive very 
different treatments. Future research needs to evaluate the complexity of each inpatient 
stay and include a comprehensive analysis of more similar cases.  
Reimbursement rates for Medicare and Medicaid are established prior to the 
beginning of the federal and state fiscal years in which services are provided. According 
to Gaughn (2016), Medicare contractual adjustments averaged 72.84% for the Pacific 
region while Medicaid contractual adjustments averaged 68.71%. This study relied upon 
the average contractual adjustment rates across all payers. Future research should 
compare the estimated reimbursement rate to the actual reimbursement rate established 
and published by Medicare and Medicaid. This would allow a more detailed analysis to 
be conducted on the relationship between the type of insurance and the cost of health care 
services. 
Actual reimbursement amounts for private insurance and other payers can vary 
significantly due to the negotiated contractual rates established between the provider and 
payer. Contractual allowances for managed care averaged approximately 56.94% and 
approximately 42.54% for commercial insurance for the Pacific region (Gaughan, 2016). 
The lower average contractual allowances presented by Gaughn (2016) vary from the 
findings of this study. The results of the study indicate that the contractual allowances for 
private insurance are higher than Medicare and Medicaid because private insurance 
reimbursement averages the lowest of all third-party payers. 
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Gaughn (2016) reported an average contractual allowance of approximately 
70.35% for all payers. The average contractual allowances for the sample analyzed in this 
study averaged approximately 72.7%. The variation may be attributed to the method of 
selection utilized to identify the DRG codes to be used in the analysis. Additional 
research needs to be conducted to evaluate the contractual allowance adjustments that 
need to be made in order to evaluate the actual cost of health care services. 
Overall, the results of the study indicate a statistically significant relationship 
between the type of health insurance and cost of health care services that, from 2011 to 
2014, accounted for approximately 2% of the variation in total cost. Contractual 
allowances play a significant role in determining the cost of health care services. 
Unfortunately, this area has become an extremely complex and a less than transparent 
process that inhibits consumers and policymakers from having access to the information 
necessary to make well-informed decisions. The effect of transparency on health care 
costs is associated with the remaining research questions. 
Research Question 2: To what extent, if any, does transparency of health 
care costs affect the average cost of health care services? Transparency of health care 
costs was found to have an effect on the average cost of health care services. 
Nonetheless, transparency continues to be a significant obstacle when conducting 
research on health care costs. Transparency can take on a multitude of perspectives 
depending on whether the evaluation considers the point of view of the patient, health 
care provider, or third-party payer. Each perspective should be considered when 
discussing the posed research question. 
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Patient perspective. Patients and providers do not understand the cost of health 
care services prior to making a decision related to treatment. Patients did not evaluate the 
cost of health care services because of the limited financial impact to the patient. In one 
example, Bearak, Finer, Jerman, and Kavanaugh (2016) found that the variation in 
pricing to the patient for hormonal intrauterine devices in the first quarter of 2012 ranged 
from $20 to $844, depending on the cost-sharing agreement with the third-party payer. 
Most patients only considered the amount of the copayment when making the decision 
regarding services and ignored the total cost incurred by the third-party payer. This was 
consistent with a study undertaken to evaluate the communications about health care 
costs between patients and providers. According to Ubel et al. (2016), many discussions 
about treatment plans center around the possibilities of disease and outcomes, but most 
providers do not discuss the financial implications of treatments due to a lack of 
information and complexities of the billing process. The authors did find that patients 
with high-deductible health plans and an expectation of large out-of-pocket costs were 
more likely to discuss health care costs and seek out less costly treatment alternatives. 
In essence, transparency can influence the cost of health care services when a 
patient makes a decision regarding the utilization of health care services and two 
conditions exist. First, the patient must have personal accountability for the decision 
being made regarding the services. In the examples provided, patients were more likely to 
discuss the cost of health care services if the patient had a high-deductible health plan and 
was expected to have to pay for a portion of the services out-of-pocket. An understanding 
of the actual cost of health care services being paid by the individual initiated a change in 
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behavior that included inquiry and understanding of the services being provided and the 
necessity of treatment. Second, providers must be able to provide information regarding 
the quality of treatment options and alternatives that are less expensive. Patients rely on 
health professionals for education and information about treatments that are effective, 
achieve quality outcomes, and save money. Merely providing information about costs of 
a particular service will improve the decision-making process (Alonso-Coello et al., 
2016), but does not go far enough in providing the information needed to make a well-
informed decision.  
Health care provider perspective. Health care providers have not been taught 
about the cost of health care services. Providers have been taught to identify, diagnose, 
and treat injuries and disease in a manner that protects the health care organization from 
further liability. Discussions related to best practices and cost are a relatively new 
development within the industry that are being considered due to the increased 
understanding that the current health care industry in the United States cannot be 
sustained (Golden, Hager, Gould, Mathioudakis, & Pronovost, 2017). As providers 
develop a better understanding of the cost of health care services related to the various 
third-party payers, more and more discussions with patients will involve the cost of 
health care services and the necessity of treatment options. The use of best practices will 
also aid in the reduction of waste within the health care industry, which accounts for as 
much as one-third of total expenditures (Doyle, Graves, & Gruber, 2017). 
Providers will be able to influence health care costs through an increase in 
transparency through two primary methods that include reduction of waste and 
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identifying more cost-effective treatment plans. A reduction of waste includes the 
elimination of unnecessary treatments and services. Many of these services are performed 
due to the request of patients or in an effort to reduce the future liability of the health care 
organization. Medical malpractice reform is an essential component of freeing up 
providers to practice medicine without the unnecessary threat of legal action. Pai, 
Kennedy, and Hahn (2016) found that 1 in 14 physicians face a malpractice suit in 2011. 
Schaffer, Jena, Seabury, Singh, Chalasani, and Kachalia (2017) evaluated medical 
malpractice claims from 2009 to 2014. During this time period, 280,368 claims were paid 
at an average amount of $329,565. This amounted to approximately $15,399,913,320 per 
year in settled malpractice claims. This does not include legal costs or other costs 
associated with claims being filed. Although there are times when a provider must be 
held responsible for inappropriate behavior, malpractice reform needs to be addressed if 
providers are going to be enabled to practice medicine in a manner that contributes to 
overall expenditure reduction. 
The second method of contributing to a reduction of costs relates to the 
identification of more cost-effective methods of treatment. As previously discussed, 
because providers have not been active participants in the discussions related to the cost 
of health care services, the costs associated with many treatment options are not 
considered when developing a treatment plan (Ubel et al., 2016). According to Busack, 
Christopher, and Fox (2016), physicians lack the training necessary to provide financial 
counseling to assist patients in navigating the financial challenges within the health care 
system that accounts for the majority of bankruptcies in the United States. Physicians 
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need to be given the information that is necessary to facilitate an effective treatment plan 
that considers the financial implications to the patient so that an informed decision can be 
agreed upon by the patient and provider. 
Third-party payer perspective. Third-party payers are most influenced by the 
available information related to the cost of health care services. Pricing for health care 
services is typically based upon reimbursement levels established for Medicare and 
Medicaid. Medicare and Medicaid establish published rates for reimbursement prior to 
the start of the fiscal year in which services are to be provided. Rates for Medicare are 
determined by CMS, which oversees both Medicare and Medicaid programs. Medicaid 
rates can be adjusted by individual states in order to ensure providers are willing to 
provide services to Medicaid eligible patients, but Federal Medical Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP) does not apply to the modified reimbursement rate. Because of this program 
regulation, most states adopt the reimbursement rates for Medicaid that are recommended 
by CMS. Rates are attributed to a combination of prior year reimbursement levels, cost 
reporting information from providers, and targeted reform initiatives. The reimbursement 
rates focus on historical data that has been verified through a variety of methods and 
processes, including financial audits. In addition, the rates take into consideration RVUs, 
established by the American Medical Association Relative Value Scale Update 
Committee, that determines the amount of time that a physician spends in order to 
provide a specific service (Haddad, 2017). 
Private insurance companies and other payers have the benefit of knowing the 
reimbursement rates established by CMS when negotiating contracts with health care 
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providers. Although there is a general perception that private insurance reimburses at the 
highest rates, the results of this study indicated that private insurance reimbursement rates 
ranked the lowest of all third-party payers, with only self-pay reimbursement rates 
accounting for lower reimbursement rates. On average, private insurance reimbursement 
rates were approximately 28.1% lower than Medicare, Medicaid, and other payers. This 
was very surprising, considering that type of insurance accounted for approximately 2% 
of the total variation in health care costs. Future research needs to consider other possible 
factors that might influence this variation; however, according to the results of the 
analysis conducted during this study, transparency plays a significant role in the cost of 
health services. 
Research Question 3: To what extent, if any, does the type of health 
insurance (public, private, or self-pay) modify the effect of transparency on the 
average cost of health care services? Modify the effect refers to a change in 
transparency based upon the type of insurance. More specifically, is there a 
difference in the level of transparency of costs based on the type of health insurance 
(public, private, or self-pay)? Type of health insurance is directly related to 
transparency of costs. The most significant effect of transparency on health care costs 
relies upon the party that is responsible for the majority of the costs. In the current 
environment, the third-party payer is the party that holds the majority of the responsibility 
for paying for health care services. Economic behavior dictates that the purchaser will try 
to maximize utility. In the case of purchasing health care services, the third-party payer 
tries to purchase the minimum amount of goods or services to meet the contractual 
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obligations established in the health insurance policy for the smallest amount possible. 
The more transparency the third-party payer has regarding the available supply of 
services and the cost of producing the services, the more likely that the third-party payer 
has to establish utility. 
Medicare and Medicaid are known, within the health care industry, as the price 
setters. CMS is required by law to publish reimbursement rates by DRG code (Bowling, 
Newman, White, & Wood, 2017). According to the authors, this information is publicly 
available but is rarely accessed by consumers due to the limited personal accountability 
and responsibility of the patient. Providers are required to document the medical 
necessity of services within the patient health record. Recent trends in the recapture of 
provider fees through the Recovery Audit Contractor (RAC) program has resulted in 
behavior changes that have improved documentation and increased billing codes that 
support more complex cases and treatment plans (Lee, Abbey, Heim, & Abbey, 2016). 
This process may likely be a factor that might account for higher reimbursement rates for 
Medicare and Medicaid inpatient stays.  
Providers are not able to negotiate the rates for services provided for CMS 
recipients. The provider either chooses to accept or not accept the established rates. 
Anderson, Glasheen, Anoff, Pierce, Lane, and Jones (2016) found that approximately 
48.3% of hospital revenue was associated with Medicare and approximately 23.2% of 
hospital revenue was associated with Medicaid, accounting for a total of approximately 
71.5% of total hospital revenue across the United States. Most hospitals would cease to 
exist if opting to not accept Medicare and Medicaid patients. CMS is well aware of its 
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market share and the ability to dictate reimbursement rates and implement industry 
reform (Anderson et al., 2016). 
Although private insurance covers approximately 66% of the population within 
the United States (Mossialos, Wenzl, Osborn, & Anderson, 2016), hospital revenue 
attributed to private insurance is approximately 23.2% (Anderson et al., 2016). 
Competition for market share for private insurance companies is one of the most fiercely 
competitive markets in the country. Combined with the fact that private insurance has the 
benefit of utilizing published CMS reimbursement rates when negotiating contracts with 
health care organizations, private insurance companies are able to maintain some of the 
lowest reimbursement rates of all third-party payers. This position is supported by the 
analysis conducted in this study. 
One additional factor that may account for some of the variation in lower costs for 
private insurance is related-party transactions. A related party transaction is defined as a 
business arrangement between two parties that are joined by a special relationship prior 
to the deal (Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2016). An example of a related party that could impact 
this study is an insurance company owned or operated by an integrated health care 
system, such as Kaiser Permanente. The purpose of this study is not to evaluate or 
determine whether this type of relationship is good or bad, it is merely mentioned as an 
area of future research that may impact the cost of health care services. 
Limitations of the Study 
A number of the limitations and delimitations of the study that were discussed in 
Chapter 1 were presented in the actual analysis. Limitations included both internal and 
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external threats to validity. Threats to internal validity included factors such as history, 
maturation, regression, selection, and instrumentation. External threats to validity 
included the interaction of selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and 
treatment, and the interaction of history and treatment. Delimitations included the 
selection of DRG codes to be included in the analysis, the geographic focus of the study, 
and the utilization of average contractual allowances in calculating net health care costs. 
Other limitations of the study included an inability to evaluate the complexity of each 
individual inpatient stay, variation in cost based upon the setting of the service (rural vs. 
urban), and consideration of other covariates, such as related party transactions, that 
might influence the cost of health care services. Each limitation and delimitation are 
discussed in more detail in the sections that follow. 
Threats to Validity 
Threats to validity can be broken down into two categories, internal threats and 
external threats. Internal threats identified for this study included history, maturation, 
regression, selection, and instrumentation. External threats identified in this study 
included the interaction of selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and 
treatment, and the interaction of history and treatment. Each factor is discussed more 
fully below with the potential implications of the results of the study and any overall 
concern that the user should be aware of when considering the results of the study.  
Historical threats that influence the cost of health care services included inflation. 
From 2007 to 2014, the cumulative rate of inflation was 14.2%, averaging approximately 
1.78% per year (United States Department of Labor, n.d.). In other words, a service that 
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cost $10 in 2007 would cost $11.42 in 2014 due solely to the rate of inflation. An 
adjustment can be made to the total cost of health care services to reflect the increase that 
can be attributed to inflation. Overall, the adjustment will not have an impact on the 
relationship between the type of insurance and health care costs. 
Due to specific provisions of health care reform mandated by the ACA, CMS 
revised a number of policies related to billing policies and procedures. The revised 
regulations resulted in a reduction in reimbursement rates to correspond more closely to 
fee-for-service costs (Hartman et al., 2015). The changes in CMS reimbursement rates 
are followed closely by the private sector. While the reduction in reimbursement rates 
will influence the longitudinal analysis, the evaluation between the type of insurance and 
health care costs will not be impacted for any given year. 
Regression, the possibility that outliers were selected in the sample, was a 
significant challenge within the sample selection. The concern related to the selection of 
outliers became more important because the data lacked normality. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to test for normality of the dependent 
variable, cost of health care. The results of the test, reported in Table 101 through Table 
108 in Appendix E, indicated that the assumption of normality had been violated. Even 
though additional robust procedures were conducted to minimize threats to validity, such 
as the calculation of Welch’s F, an increased sample size, and post hoc procedures that 
included the Games-Howell test, the violation of regression limits the ability of the results 
of the study to be generalized to all health care costs. 
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Sample selection can raise concerns that the data is predisposed to specific 
characteristics that lead to certain outcomes. The process of sample selection, as 
described in Chapter 4, increased the likelihood that violation had occurred for this 
measure of internal validity. Because of limitations with the data, specifically not being 
able to report on a group smaller than 10, the selection of DRG codes may not be 
representative of all health care costs. For example, three of the selected DRG codes, 775 
- vaginal delivery without complications, 765 - cesarean section with complications, and 
766 - cesarean section without complications, resulted in a sample selection of 
approximately 70% female and 30% male inpatient hospital stays. This is not reflective 
of the overall number of inpatient hospital stays to be approximately 57% female and 
43% male. The difference in gender was just one example that suggested that the sample 
should not be generalized to the overall population. 
The discussion in chapter 1 indicated the change in data collection procedures 
implemented by NIS HCUP in 2011. The data restructuring in the present study required 
a number of changes in methodology, including a change from reviewing the 10 largest 
metropolitan cities in the United States to reviewing the Pacific region. Although the 
same methodology was applied to each year included in the study, some variation in the 
analysis may have occurred due to the change in data collection procedures. An overall 
determination cannot be made regarding the impact on the results of the longitudinal 
analysis instrumentation; however, the results of the relationship between the type of 
insurance and health care costs from year to year appear to be unaffected by the 
instrumentation change. 
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Previous discussions regarding threats to external validity included the lack of 
transparency and use of a purposeful sample. The lack of transparency of health care 
costs resulted in estimates being used, as expected. In a number of cases, contractual 
allowances were not available for individual hospitals and an estimate for a region had to 
be used to calculate the net health care charge. The use of estimates will limit the 
generalizability of the study and present opportunities for future research to be conducted 
that may provide more precise measures. The expected use of a purposeful sample 
presented another limitation in generalizing the results of this study to the larger 
population. In addition, the data use agreement prevented the reporting of any 
information in groups smaller than 10. This required further adjustments to be made in 
the sample selection process. In short, although the results of this study provide a 
foundation for understanding the relationship between the type of insurance and cost of 
health care services, the results should not be generalized to the population due to 
concerns regarding external validity. 
Additional challenges arose when testing the assumptions associated with a one-
way ANOVA, including normality of data, homogeneity of data, and a random sample 
selection. Although additional robust procedures were undertaken to reduce the threats to 
validity, the failure of the study to meet these assumptions provide further concerns about 
the ability of the study to be generalized to the population or make other assumptions 
regarding health care costs. 
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Delimitations 
Chapter 1 identified potential delimitations that may be present in this study. As 
expected, the following delimitations were present in the study, the selection of DRG 
codes to be included in the analysis, the geographic focus of the study, and the utilization 
of average contractual allowances in calculating net health care costs.  
The selection of the DRG codes was more of a concern than originally 
anticipated. The data use agreement for HCUP prohibited the reporting of any 
information in cells smaller than 10. This meant that any DRG codes that included fewer 
than 10 inpatient stays for a specific type of payer had to be excluded from the analysis. 
Although there was a sufficient number of DRG codes to select from, the sample 
selection process further limited the ability of the results to be applied to a larger 
population. 
The initial design of the study included a selection of inpatient hospital stays from 
the 10 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. Because of a change in the 
reporting of information made by NIS HCUP in 2011, the zip code of a hospital could not 
be identified. The revised dataset allowed hospitals to be identified by census region. The 
change in the dataset presented a further, unintended delimitation that required a revision 
in methodology. The inclusion of inpatient stays for a census region presents an 
additional concern related to health care costs. Health care services in a rural setting can 
vary greatly from a large metropolitan area. For example, inpatient stays evaluated in the 
study included such disparate locations as Enterprise, Oregon and San Francisco, 
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California. These two markets are very different and pricing for health care services 
would vary due to the setting.  
Although there was an expectation that average contractual allowances would 
need to be used in the study, the use of average contractual allowances presented in an 
unexpected manner in the study. While most organizations reported an average 
contractual allowance for the organization, some did not report this information to NIS 
HCUP. When this information was not reported, NIS HCUP calculated an average 
contractual allowance for similar hospitals in the census region. As indicated in chapter 1, 
the lack of transparency of actual costs prohibits generalizations to be made regarding 
health care costs throughout the country. 
Other Limitations 
A number of other limitations of this study should be noted. Although there are 
numerous limitations, the most significant included a failure to evaluate the complexity 
of each individual inpatient stay, variation in cost based upon the setting of the service 
(rural vs. urban), and consideration of other covariates, such as related party transactions, 
that might influence the cost of health care services. 
This study relied on the DRG code that was in effect upon discharge. Each 
inpatient stay could have as many as 15 different DRG codes that were associated with 
treatment. The scope of this study did not include an evaluation of the complexity of the 
inpatient stay. The complexity of each stay may account for the large standard deviation 
calculation in many of the DRG codes. While the results of this study provide a 
foundation for evaluating the relationship between the type of health insurance and cost 
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of health care services, additional research should be conducted to account for the 
complexity of an individual stay.  
The setting in which health care services are provided can play a significant role 
in the overall cost of treatment (Zhang, Mason, Boyd, Sikich, & Baranek, 2016). The 
inability to segregate the NIS HCUP data by setting prevented a more precise comparison 
of health care costs. Information was available in the NIS HCUP data that provided a 
wage adjustment ratio that would enable the identification of less expensive settings for 
receiving care but may or may not be related to the amount charged for health care 
services. 
Related party transactions were not identified as a concern in the development of 
this study. However, upon evaluating the results that indicated private insurance 
reimbursement rates were the lowest among the third-party payers. Additional focus was 
given to potential factors that might help explain this variation. According to Jacobson 
(2016), more and more providers are offering provider-sponsored health plans. This is 
being done in an effort to capture market share and control a larger portion of the revenue 
stream within the health care industry. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the 
relationship of provider-sponsored health plans and reimbursement rates to providers, but 
this is a factor that needs to be considered when conducting future research. 
Recommendations 
The results of this study provide a foundation for understanding the relationship 
between the type of health insurance and health care costs. Based on the results of the 
study, recommendations have been developed to offer insight into future research, 
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industry practice for consumers, providers, and third-party payers, and health policy for 
policy makers. Each is discussed in more detail below. 
Future Research 
Additional research needs to be conducted that can further explain the results of 
the study and reduce the limitations associated with the research. Future research needs to 
include an evaluation of inpatient stays with similar levels of complexity, comparison of 
services in similar settings, identification of actual contractual allowances instead of 
averages, and the inclusion of other potential covariates. 
First, the dataset includes additional DRG codes associated with each inpatient 
stay and complicating factors. Two patients could be listed under the same DRG code, 
but receive very different treatments. Future research needs to evaluate the complexity of 
each inpatient stay and include a comprehensive analysis of more similar cases. Health 
care costs should be evaluated based upon a comparison of similar conditions and factors, 
which could lead to less variance in the cost of health care services. An evaluation of 
specific DRG codes could be conducted that included matching complications and other 
DRG codes associated with the stay. This would provide a comparison that would be 
more representative of patients that received similar services. 
Second, consideration should be given to the cost of providing service in a 
specific area. The NIS HCUP data includes a wage adjustment factor that could provide 
additional information regarding the underlying costs of providing care and may factor 
into the overall cost of health care services. A future study should include an evaluation 
of costs by location as a condition of the variance in the cost of services. 
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Third, future studies should include the actual contractual allowance based upon 
the type of insurance. The present study relied upon the average contractual adjustment 
rates across all payers. The contractual allowance could be determined for Medicare and 
Medicaid by comparing the NIS HCUP data to the actual reimbursement rate established 
and published by Medicare and Medicaid. Additional research would be required to 
determine the actual contractual allowance for private insurance, self-pay, and other 
payers. A sampling of explanation of benefits and other hospital records might provide 
the necessary information. In addition, voluntary participation in a survey from specific 
hospitals across the country might provide sufficient detail to include a more robust 
analysis of the net charges for health care costs.  
Although this type of study would be a significant undertaking, the resulting 
information would provide a significant amount of information that would benefit all 
stakeholders in making informed health care decisions. The lower average contractual 
allowances presented by Gaughn (2016) vary from the findings of this study. The results 
of the study indicated that the contractual allowances for private insurance are higher 
than Medicare and Medicaid because private insurance reimbursement averages the 
lowest of all third-party payers. 
Lastly, although this study did not evaluate factors that might influence increases 
or variances other than the type of insurance, one might surmise that promises of health 
care reform made during the presidential election campaign of 2007 and the ACA 
influenced providers to increase prices in anticipation of additional oversight and health 
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care industry reform. In essence, an element of increasing prices while the option was on 
the table could have resulted in an increase in overall health expenditures.  
Industry Practice 
Each of the major stakeholder groups impacted by the cost of health care, 
consumers, providers, and third-party payers, can benefit from the research conducted in 
this study. All three major groups of stakeholders are tasked with making decisions 
regarding a very complicated industry with emotional implications. The more factual data 
that is available when undertaking major decisions, the more likely that emotional factors 
will be reduced and empirical evidence will guide the decision-making process. 
Consumers can benefit by understanding that the cost of health care services can 
and should impact health care related decisions. Although the impact of high costs is not 
fully understood by the consumer due to the role of the third-party payer, the consumer 
has the ultimate responsibility for determining whether or not health care services are 
performed. Ultimate responsibility and accountability come in the form of paying for 
services, whether in the form of health care premiums or direct payments to providers. As 
a society, we have grown accustomed to ignoring the relevant discussion related to the 
cost of the services that are recommended by the health care professional. Health care 
professionals have largely ignored the cost component of health care because consumers 
have not included this factor in the decision-making process. The trend of moving 
towards high-deductible health plans, which requires more cost-sharing responsibility 
from the consumer, has increased consumer demand for information regarding costs for 
health care services. As consumers, we must continue to advance our knowledge 
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regarding the financial aspects of health care in order to evaluate more cost-effective 
treatment methods and reduce total health care expenditures. In addition, as health care 
cost information becomes more transparent, more informed decisions can be made 
regarding the appropriateness of treatment and the quality of services being provided. 
These factors influence consumer behavior in other major service industries and must 
become part of the decision-making process if we are to influence purchasing behavior in 
the health care industry. 
Providers need to understand the role of health insurance in the setting of health 
care prices in order to provide information regarding treatment options to patients. The 
complexity of the health care industry, coupled with a defensive medicine practice model, 
has led to an industry that spends almost $1 trillion per year in waste. If we were to 
reduce our GDP spending by one-third, we would spend approximately 13% to 14%, 
which is still far above other countries, but more reasonable that current spending levels. 
Consumers rely on the expertise of health care providers to develop treatment plans that 
are appropriate. It is often assumed that treatment plans have considered not only 
outcomes but the cost of treatment. In most situations, health care professionals are not 
even aware of how much a service costs or how much the patient will be responsible for 
paying. More and more health care organizations are discussing payment responsibilities 
before providing services in order to establish expectations. We cannot expect a clinician 
to understand all aspects of health care, including costs. It is essential that an integrated 
care team that includes a clinician and financial specialist work together to develop a 
comprehensive treatment plan that considers less costly alternatives. 
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Providers need to also find methods that ensure consistency in billing for similar 
services. It is not uncommon for contractual discounts to be in place for volume discounts 
in other industries. Two individuals receiving the same services should be charged the 
same amount. As health care costs become more transparent, it will be an essential 
component of business practices to ensure that there is consistency in billing practices. 
Without this consistency, providers will be subject to discrimination claims, price fixing, 
and other unfair business practices that will increase the potential for litigation. Although 
there is some variation in specific services received by an individual, the industry shift to 
bundled billing rates will eliminate the ability of an organization to differentiate between 
services provided among patients. Altering billing practices to achieve consistency will 
allow an organization to be well positioned for trends that are occurring within the 
industry. 
Third-party payers are in the strongest position to benefit from the results of this 
study. Current industry practice allows third-party payers to negotiate contractual 
allowances that allow health insurance premiums to remain at the lowest level possible. 
The results of this study indicate that private insurance is achieving the lowest health care 
costs of all third-party payers. The information in this study could be utilized to evaluate 
specific DRG codes and compare the third-party payers negotiated rates with the average 
being paid by other private insurance carriers. Because the ACA mandates a cost claim 
ratio of 80% that must be maintained by all private insurance providers, a comparative 
analysis may provide beneficial information that would allow the negotiation of lower 
reimbursement rates. 
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Health Policy  
Policymakers can benefit from the results of this study in a number of ways 
including a better understanding of health care costs, the impact of the type of insurance 
on reimbursement rates, and the effectiveness of the ACA in meeting targeted objectives. 
These benefits have the ability to guide future health policy in achieving key objectives to 
improve the health care industry. In addition, policymakers are able to use the results of 
the study to make informed decisions about the necessity of additional health care reform. 
The results of this study provide policymakers with empirical evidence regarding 
health care costs based on the type of health insurance. This is important because 
historically, most decisions have been based upon chargemaster rates, which are not an 
accurate reflection of health care costs. Decisions regarding health policy can now be 
focused on data that reflects more precise information. Although, as discussed in the 
limitations, caution needs to be taken when utilizing the results of this study, the 
information provides  
One of the surprising outcomes of this study was the reimbursement levels of 
Medicare and Medicaid compared to private insurance. Policymakers are continually 
being pressured to increase reimbursement levels in order to compensate providers at a 
competitive rate. According to the data, private insurance reimbursement rates are 
significantly lower than Medicare and Medicaid. Policymakers need to obtain additional 
evidence to support or refute this finding. If the finding can be generalized, future health 
care policy may need to address the overall reimbursement rates provided by CMS 
programs and prohibit private insurance contractual allowances from dropping below this 
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level. This type of provision would prevent cost shifting from private insurance 
companies to public programs, eliminating an unintended use of taxpayer funds. 
Policymakers can evaluate the effectiveness of the ACA in achieving key 
objectives including reducing the number of individuals not covered by health insurance 
and reducing overall health care costs. Although the ACA mandated coverage for all 
individuals and there was an increase in the number of individuals covered by health 
insurance, there was not a significant change in those individuals relying upon self-pay 
for hospital inpatient stays. In 2007, approximately 2.9% of the sample expected was 
expected to be self-paid. In 2014, this number increased slightly to 3.2%. This is an 
important finding because it establishes that individuals continue to forego health 
insurance even though it is available.  
Another notable result indicates that more individuals are relying upon public 
insurance. In 2007, approximately 47% of the inpatient claims evaluated in this study 
were expected to be paid by Medicare and Medicaid compared to 47.5% of the claims 
expected to be paid by private insurance. In 2014, after implementation of the ACA, the 
number of claims expected to be paid by Medicare and Medicaid increased to 
approximately 60.2% compared to 34.0% for private insurance. The shift highlights the 
increased reliance upon public health insurance programs. In reviewing the original goals 
and objectives of the ACA, policymakers expected that private insurance would take on 
an increased role. This unintended consequence needs to be evaluated and understood 
further in order to determine future actions. 
133 
 
 An additional factor that should be considered by policymakers is the 
effectiveness of the ACA in stabilizing health care costs. As previously discussed, 
between 2007 and 2010, health care costs increased approximately 38.6% per year. 
Between 2011 and 2014, the average increase in health care costs declined to 
approximately 4.3% per year. After accounting for inflation, the average increase in 
health care costs was less than 3%. As the political discussion ramps up for repealing the 
ACA, policymakers need to take note of the improvements being made and should 
consider modifications to the current policy, as opposed to a complete repeal of the 
legislation. The facts surrounding the effectiveness of the policy indicate improvement. 
While additional changes must be made to increase sustainability, the path has improved 
significantly. 
Policymakers should also take note of the impact that transparency has on the cost 
of health care services. As future health policy is contemplated, increasing transparency 
should become a primary goal in order to facilitate an improved decision-making process. 
Rather than making decisions or changes based upon perceptions, policymakers can 
utilize empirical evidence to support key provisions of policy changes. In addition, 
removing the cloud of secrecy that envelopes the health care industry will allow 
consumers and providers to make more informed decisions as cost-sharing and personal 
accountability shift to the patient. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
The results of this study highlight several key aspects that may result in positive 
social change. The initial implications for positive social changes included a better 
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understanding of the relationship of health care costs and type of health insurance over a 
period of time that included the implementation of the ACA. The results of this study 
may provide some useful insight for consumers, providers, and policymakers.  
First, consumers will continue to experience an increase in personal 
accountability for health care decisions. This will come in the form of higher cost-sharing 
agreements and incentives or penalties associated with lifestyle behavior choices. For 
example, we have already seen an increase in health insurance premiums for tobacco 
users, increased premiums for individuals with obesity and diabetes conditions are likely 
to follow. Increased engagement, including discussions about the financial implications 
of treatment plans, we help minimize costs and maximize utility for consumers. 
Second, providers must become aware of the financial implications of treatment 
plans. Although the health care system is complex, providers have an obligation to help 
consumers make informed decisions. Reforms in reimbursement models, such as the shift 
from fee-for-service to bundled payment initiatives, will help reinforce the importance of 
reducing costs for the provider to maintain profitability. Additional reform is necessary to 
continue to reduce the amount of unnecessary costs within the industry. Reforms, 
including litigation reform, increased penalties for fraud and abuse, and utilization of best 
practices, can all help to reduce the approximately $1 trillion annual spending on waste. 
Third, policymakers need to understand the effectiveness of health policy in 
achieving key objectives in order to determine whether or not additional reform is 
necessary. The results of this study indicate that health care costs have stabilized, but 
additional changes are still needed. Although more individuals are covered by insurance, 
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the number of individuals paying for services out-of-pocket has remained relatively 
stable. A larger concern is the increase in the number of individuals that are relying on 
Medicare and Medicaid. CMS is reimbursed at rates that are almost one-third higher than 
private insurance. Additional reform needs to address the reliance upon public programs 
and reduce the reimbursement rates to levels comparable to the private industry to ensure 
that the programs are sustainable. 
The improved understanding of this relationship should provide patients, 
providers, and policymakers with key data that may improve decision-making related to 
health care due to increased transparency and reduced cost of health care services. Each 
group of stakeholders must now take the information that has been provided and take 
action. Consumers and providers must become more engaged in discussions related to the 
financial impact of treatment plans and alternatives. Policymakers must become more 
educated and be willing to stand up to special interest groups and make difficult choices 
that will continue to reform the health care industry in a manner that will increase access 
and quality while continuing to address the cost of care. 
Summary 
The continued escalation in health care expenditures within the United States has 
led to an unsustainable model that consumes more than $3 trillion annually, amounting to 
almost 20% of GDP (Hartman et al., 2015). Between 21% and 47% of total health care 
expenditures can be attributed to overtreatment, failure to coordinate care, industry 
complexity, and fraud and abuse (Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012). Policymakers have 
recognized the need for industry reform and have taken action through the passage of the 
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ACA, aimed at improving access by providing health insurance coverage, increasing 
quality of care through innovative reimbursement methods, and reducing costs 
(Rosenbaum, 2011). 
Decision-making processes for consumers, providers, and policymakers are 
inhibited due to the lack of transparency of financial information within the industry and 
the role of third-party payers. Consumers tend to focus on cost-sharing responsibility, 
rather than total health care cost, and equate low cost to low quality (Hibbard et al., 
2012). Providers focus treatment plans on consumer directives and defensive medicine 
practices to reduce potential liability with little attention given to the cost of services. 
This is partly due to the complexity of the numerous third-party payer plans and the lack 
of engagement from patients related to financial concerns. Policymakers derive 
information from personal interaction with the health care industry. In addition, 
information that is available tends to be limited to the perspective of the stakeholder 
seeking specific action from the legislative representative. For example, providers focus 
on low reimbursement rates of Medicaid when asking for increased budgets to cover 
higher rates for services. Empirical evidence is not readily available from disinterested 
third-parties. 
The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal study was to provide empirical 
evidence regarding the relationship of the type of health insurance and health care costs. 
The results of the study may provide increased transparency of health care costs that can 
be used to increase engagement between the patient, provider, and policymaker in the 
decision-making process. In addition, the results may provide some insight into the 
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effectiveness of recent health policy, including the ACA, in meeting core objectives and 
measures. The significance of the study lies in the reduced health care costs associated 
with increased transparency noted by Muir et al. (2013) and the need for increased 
transparency to remove barriers that inhibited a reduction in health care costs. The 
primary goals of the study were to evaluate the relationship between health care costs and 
type of insurance, evaluate the changes in this relationship during the implementation 
period of the ACA, and to determine the influence of transparency on the cost of health 
care services. 
The literature review provided background information related to the 
development of billing practices within the health care industry. Current industry 
practices shield consumers and providers from key information that can influence 
decisions related to health care costs. As more and more third-party payers modify cost-
sharing models to ask for more participation from the consumer and add personal 
accountability for unhealthy lifestyle behavior choices, consumers will demand higher 
levels of engagement and information regarding treatment plans and cost of health care 
services before decisions are finalized. Mechanism theory coupled with game theory 
provided a realistic lens in which to evaluate this changing relationship. Incentives being 
applied by third-party payers include the increased responsibility for costs being borne by 
the consumer, incentive payments for wellness program participation, and reduction in 
premiums for meeting specific health related goals. Although consumers and providers 
do not have all the information needed to make decisions, there is a growing trend to 
consumer demands being met in patient-centered care models. 
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This study utilized secondary data from NIS HCUP that provided a sampling of 
inpatient hospital stays. The dataset has been in existence since 1998 and continues to be 
collected on an annual basis. The analysis included an evaluation of data from 2007 to 
2014, in order to include the implementation of the ACA. The sample selection included 
30 DRG codes from the Pacific division, including inpatient stays from Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. DRG codes were limited to inpatient stays 
that had a minimum of 10 occurrences for each type of insurance in order to comply with 
the HCUP data use agreement. The sample selection and methodology utilized for this 
study resulted in a number of limitations and delimitations, which prevent the results 
from being generalized to the population. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between the type 
of insurance and health care costs. The results of the analysis indicate that each of the 
three null hypotheses should be rejected, as there is evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between type of insurance and health care costs and transparency influences 
this relationship. The results of the study indicate that between 2% and 9% of health care 
costs can be attributed to the type of health insurance. Variation of health care costs can 
be evaluated more precisely when considering individual DRG codes. This information 
can be found in Appendix A thru Appendix E. 
The analysis also provided some significant information regarding the 
effectiveness of the ACA in meeting key objectives. Although there was not a significant 
reduction in the number of individuals paying for services out-of-pocket, there was an 
increase in the percentage of individuals relying upon public insurance, specifically 
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Medicare and Medicaid, to provide access to health care services. Health care rates 
stabilized after implementation of ACA. The average rate of increases were 
approximately 38.6% between 2007 and 2010 and decreased to approximately 4.3% 
between 2011 and 2014. One additional item to note was that the reimbursement rates of 
payers varied from common perception. Other payers paid the highest for health care 
services followed by Medicare, Medicaid, and self-pay, while private insurance 
consistently paid the least amount for health care services. 
The results of the study may provide a foundation for consumers, providers, and 
policymakers to increase engagement regarding the financial implications associated with 
health care decisions. As individuals participate in higher levels of cost-sharing 
arrangements, information regarding health care costs can become an important aspect of 
the decision-making process. Providers will be required to understand the costs 
associated with developing a treatment plan and engage with patients about the 
appropriateness of health care services. Policymakers can use this information to better 
understand the effectiveness of health policy and continue to formulate regulations that 
will achieve the desired objectives in increasing access to care while reducing the overall 
expenditures related to health care services. 
Conclusion 
Expenditures related to health care costs will soon surpass 20% of total GDP 
within the United States. Approximately one-third of this spending is represented by 
unnecessary services brought about by overtreatment, failure to coordinate care, industry 
complexity, and fraud and abuse. An increased understanding of financial implications 
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related to health care spending is an essential component of industry reform. Consumers, 
providers, and policymakers must develop a better understanding of health care costs and 
methods that can be undertaken to reduce overall expenditures to a sustainable level. 
Increased understanding must be developed from empirical evidence, rather than 
perceptions or misunderstood practices that have been developed over many years. 
There is a statistically significant relationship between the type of health 
insurance and health care costs that account for between two and nine percent of the total 
cost of health care. Even more important are two conclusions that can be drawn from the 
results of this study, health care costs have stabilized since the implementation of the 
ACA and private insurance is benefiting from reimbursement rates that are approximately 
28% lower than Medicare and Medicaid payments. These two findings highlight the fact 
that although health policy is achieving some key objectives, additional regulation reform 
is needed. 
Self-pay reimbursement rates indicate a willingness of health care providers to 
negotiate lower fees for services being provided. Educated consumers can benefit from 
this information by negotiating the portion of cost-sharing that has been shifted to the 
patient through the use of high-deductible health plans. Knowledge regarding the net 
amount being charged to other consumers can provide additional information that will 
allow consumers to make a well-informed decision regarding treatment plans being 
recommended by providers and maximize the value received. 
Providers will now be in a position to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of treatment 
options when discussing alternatives with consumers. Previously, financial considerations 
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have not been regularly evaluated when determining the appropriate services that a 
consumer needs. By making health care costs part of the discussion, providers can guide 
consumers in the decision-making process and help reduce the amount being spent on 
waste. 
Although improvements have been made, more needs to be done to improve the 
sustainability of the industry. As we look for methods to improve access, quality, and 
reduce costs, stakeholders must identify innovative methods to approach solutions within 
the industry. Stakeholders must work together to increase transparency and improve the 
sustainability of the health care industry. Individual patients, providers, and policymakers 
must take a new approach to the decision-making process and engage in discussions that 
include the financial implications of health care services. This process must be 
collaborative, inclusive, and free of emotion, all of which require improved access to 
information. This study provides the foundation for transparent information that is an 
essential ingredient to achieve success. Traditional perceptions must be set aside and we 
must work together to find solutions if we are to continue to increase access to care, 
improve quality outcomes, and reduce health care costs. 
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Appendix A: Results Sample Tables 
 
Table 9 
 
Sample Table DRG Code and Description by Year 
  Type of insurance 
DRG 
code 
Description Medicare Medicaid Commercial Self-pay No charge 
 
Table 10 
 
Sample Table DRG Code and Description by Location 
City Payer Frequency Range Mean Median Mode 
Standard 
deviation 
Variance 
Chicago Medicare        
 Medicaid        
 Commercial        
 Self-Pay        
 No Charge        
San Jose Medicare        
 Medicaid        
 Commercial        
 Self-Pay        
 No Charge        
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Appendix B: Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs 
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Table 11 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 3 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  118   161,645.54   85,805.02  
 Medicaid  163   75,713.29   86,304.98  
 Private insurance  163   83,439.11   94,586.76  
 Self-Pay  12   180,362.65   101,711.31  
 Other payer  26   70,910.31   72,995.17  
2008 Medicare  615   154,148.33   79,746.37  
 Medicaid  281   184,079.71   104,608.34  
 Private insurance  406   149,944.85   82,792.80  
 Self-Pay  50   137,745.76   75,877.05  
 Other payer  82   165,016.78   87,415.88  
2009 Medicare  575   150,744.60   82,067.77  
 Medicaid  320   167,880.90   94,550.09  
 Private insurance  424   171,339.99   101,289.32  
 Self-Pay  52   116,945.86   62,807.57  
 Other payer  68   158,426.08   90,128.84  
2010 Medicare  414   159,768.10   88,705.26  
 Medicaid  267   194,307.36   114,499.56  
 Private insurance  307   168,175.46   105,230.11  
 Self-Pay  48   153,783.26   112,648.30  
 Other payer  71   181,323.17   98,016.36  
2011 Medicare  400   186,789.99   130,551.57  
 Medicaid  179   265,795.32   180,785.13  
 Private insurance  180   224,728.37   185,263.63  
 Self-Pay  17   149,004.25   82,414.07  
 Other payer  42   176,966.78   126,835.41  
2012 Medicare  447   192,309.45   149,019.05  
 Medicaid  288   246,206.00   197,217.41  
 Private insurance  305   227,139.08   165,932.99  
 Self-Pay  41   169,894.36   81,571.82  
 Other payer  68   228,993.50   170,557.82  
2013 Medicare  445   197,310.19   147,318.93  
 Medicaid  294   254,363.22   199,891.62  
 Private insurance  289   233,578.83   190,877.77  
 Self-Pay  24   183,052.39   119,709.66  
 Other payer  62   241,192.78   212,654.86  
2014 Medicare  412   190,033.66   141,247.07  
 Medicaid  346   244,768.73   167,989.18  
 Private insurance  279   254,794.12   229,078.80  
 Self-Pay  21   144,063.02   94,944.78  
 Other payer  61   271,958.84   229,903.15  
170 
 
Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 23 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  520   9,831.84   17,660.55  
 Medicaid  129   10,744.77   18,680.04  
 Private insurance  169   11,378.55   17,857.06  
 Self-Pay  35   16,120.40   18,569.73  
 Other payer  37   15,613.55   25,744.47  
2008 Medicare  189   55,547.21   34,531.38  
 Medicaid  78   62,952.32   46,441.61  
 Private insurance  133   54,000.19   34,499.68  
 Self-Pay  24   51,715.89   28,346.04  
 Other payer  17   54,314.85   27,207.47  
2009 Medicare  229   57,214.64   35,353.05  
 Medicaid  81   72,135.28   68,963.63  
 Private insurance  171   54,193.48   32,413.21  
 Self-Pay  24   45,461.49   31,839.81  
 Other payer  24   43,496.88   27,900.65  
2010 Medicare  269   56,181.99   32,491.73  
 Medicaid  112   83,336.58   63,666.74  
 Private insurance  199   67,484.82   46,003.34  
 Self-Pay  40   73,016.15   64,945.66  
 Other payer  37   69,441.97   48,100.30  
2011 Medicare  173   57,246.03   34,565.09  
 Medicaid  75   111,647.08   117,398.57  
 Private insurance  121   54,785.15   39,543.05  
 Self-Pay  20   74,662.64   63,707.84  
 Other payer  11   97,699.84   71,771.39  
2012 Medicare  212   60,392.65   46,390.75  
 Medicaid  80   94,572.84   97,247.47  
 Private insurance  141   68,957.71   44,714.67  
 Self-Pay  35   53,326.50   40,294.04  
 Other payer  36   67,402.86   44,233.88  
2013 Medicare  251   60,202.18   38,295.00  
 Medicaid  99   74,634.24   75,108.57  
 Private insurance  136   66,471.78   42,503.80  
 Self-Pay  30   51,698.46   39,476.62  
 Other payer  28   50,696.32   38,040.00  
2014 Medicare  252   59,139.12   43,654.41  
 Medicaid  151   87,955.27   72,003.51  
 Private insurance  136   81,034.41   67,356.19  
 Self-Pay  17   58,231.29   33,885.92  
 Other payer  24   75,054.94   61,043.49  
 
171 
 
Table 13 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 26 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  82   25,837.87   18,224.14  
 Medicaid  466   6,268.47   10,679.57  
 Private insurance  555   9,365.54   13,495.55  
 Self-Pay  33   8,849.53   13,737.00  
 Other payer  75   5,981.05   7,067.26  
2008 Medicare  437   27,457.30   15,036.63  
 Medicaid  193   38,333.50   34,131.48  
 Private insurance  569   31,995.06   22,752.67  
 Self-Pay  29   28,964.30   12,786.04  
 Other payer  74   35,122.85   21,595.71  
2009 Medicare  504   26,270.42   14,140.70  
 Medicaid  225   38,228.28   34,952.08  
 Private insurance  656   29,041.38   17,542.66  
 Self-Pay  47   33,407.27   24,646.67  
 Other payer  43   25,804.18   12,338.18  
2010 Medicare  404   29,046.89   16,755.69  
 Medicaid  202   39,854.89   29,485.42  
 Private insurance  514   35,675.87   23,558.05  
 Self-Pay  54   34,562.35   22,276.05  
 Other payer  78   50,774.00   50,541.94  
2011 Medicare  298   30,958.42   18,254.43  
 Medicaid  90   44,948.10   31,115.85  
 Private insurance  265   29,248.62   16,438.91  
 Self-Pay  20   29,424.74   13,056.04  
 Other payer  32   42,755.97   35,072.13  
2012 Medicare  330   32,299.98   22,760.92  
 Medicaid  157   44,064.61   41,122.03  
 Private insurance  361   36,042.20   27,239.29  
 Self-Pay  38   41,513.39   20,956.57  
 Other payer  56   52,803.50   47,073.79  
2013 Medicare  305   35,486.03   20,551.25  
 Medicaid  163   42,109.51   29,496.52  
 Private insurance  347   36,671.16   29,843.88  
 Self-Pay  31   39,009.74   19,555.23  
 Other payer  57   50,319.90   34,797.39  
2014 Medicare  303   33,262.49   18,452.16  
 Medicaid  195   46,716.54   44,233.77  
 Private insurance  339   38,868.70   25,868.57  
 Self-Pay  21   42,626.95   22,339.63  
 Other payer  45   39,005.76   34,312.68  
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Table 14 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 153 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  99   6,979.55   4,124.84  
 Medicaid  257   3,863.48   4,060.14  
 Private insurance  352   5,362.17   4,564.25  
 Self-Pay  38   4,730.63   3,122.10  
 Other payer  23   6,374.93   5,044.51  
2008 Medicare  309   5,661.88   3,880.74  
 Medicaid  671   3,995.80   3,465.13  
 Private insurance  672   3,837.21   3,288.61  
 Self-Pay  104   4,127.63   2,631.45  
 Other payer  66   5,083.18   3,678.20  
2009 Medicare  328   6,583.83   4,646.85  
 Medicaid  1,415   4,418.33   4,771.56  
 Private insurance  1,155   4,759.95   4,853.71  
 Self-Pay  188   4,705.88   3,813.02  
 Other payer  116   5,808.43   5,739.79  
2010 Medicare  196   7,158.62   5,611.25  
 Medicaid  924   4,476.35   3,743.02  
 Private insurance  696   4,516.01   3,923.98  
 Self-Pay  106   5,309.50   3,980.89  
 Other payer  106   6,041.40   3,913.35  
2011 Medicare  260   6,197.26   4,278.72  
 Medicaid  528   4,073.05   3,416.33  
 Private insurance  481   4,091.58   3,095.20  
 Self-Pay  93   4,933.17   4,126.34  
 Other payer  65   6,177.09   6,859.66  
2012 Medicare  288   7,370.77   4,556.61  
 Medicaid  882   5,030.67   5,715.06  
 Private insurance  615   5,334.94   4,435.01  
 Self-Pay  104   5,266.77   6,415.84  
 Other payer  113   5,981.20   4,633.71  
2013 Medicare  418   7,950.91   8,131.92  
 Medicaid  920   5,007.41   5,805.11  
 Private insurance  662   5,304.25   6,112.59  
 Self-Pay  112   4,751.36   2,646.36  
 Other payer  146   5,543.89   5,518.41  
2014 Medicare  297   7,510.01   4,850.55  
 Medicaid  1,003   5,188.87   4,887.46  
 Private insurance  588   5,704.44   6,038.33  
 Self-Pay  67   6,570.08   5,086.95  
 Other payer  73   8,637.11   18,763.83  
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Table 15 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 203 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  894   10,417.50   12,550.78  
 Medicaid  771   5,930.26   8,088.47  
 Private insurance  877   7,223.19   9,979.50  
 Self-Pay  126   4,722.11   4,185.85  
 Other payer  84   7,866.52   9,208.71  
2008 Medicare  678   6,015.24   3,791.70  
 Medicaid  1,883   4,287.50   3,427.84  
 Private insurance  1,542   4,052.31   3,104.62  
 Self-Pay  196   4,234.96   3,032.72  
 Other payer  174   5,397.76   3,819.06  
2009 Medicare  657   5,936.19   3,988.17  
 Medicaid  4,119   3,793.82   2,770.23  
 Private insurance  2,143   4,082.75   2,966.63  
 Self-Pay  375   4,274.63   2,662.11  
 Other payer  240   4,892.58   3,347.08  
2010 Medicare  470   6,420.63   4,498.23  
 Medicaid  3,383   4,792.48   3,831.54  
 Private insurance  1,789   4,726.06   3,548.47  
 Self-Pay  262   4,704.53   2,904.51  
 Other payer  269   5,399.98   3,582.75  
2011 Medicare  506   6,218.98   3,945.95  
 Medicaid  1,882   4,068.08   2,882.81  
 Private insurance  1,061   4,111.51   3,072.30  
 Self-Pay  244   4,856.30   2,971.64  
 Other payer  171   5,677.03   3,264.26  
2012 Medicare  472   6,834.71   4,449.55  
 Medicaid  2,920   5,097.54   5,068.56  
 Private insurance  1,543   5,007.60   4,295.18  
 Self-Pay  283   5,324.89   4,318.02  
 Other payer  271   5,933.28   4,867.93  
2013 Medicare  464   6,732.49   4,197.97  
 Medicaid  2,778   5,269.64   4,432.61  
 Private insurance  1,308   5,150.36   4,036.10  
 Self-Pay  252   4,931.86   2,995.65  
 Other payer  213   6,061.90   5,722.36  
2014 Medicare  370   6,992.63   4,096.87  
 Medicaid  2,582   5,209.18   3,807.63  
 Private insurance  1,142   5,355.12   4,324.68  
 Self-Pay  129   4,845.90   3,051.16  
 Other payer  124   6,195.84   6,022.08  
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Table 16 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 207 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  1,148   21,443.64   28,459.94  
 Medicaid  311   21,581.04   29,643.19  
 Private insurance  476   16,160.69   23,569.38  
 Self-Pay  68   11,620.38   15,115.73  
 Other payer  67   21,357.17   24,930.69  
2008 Medicare  1,276   52,442.44   38,136.81  
 Medicaid  518   58,384.84   51,653.02  
 Private insurance  361   57,259.39   44,376.54  
 Self-Pay  49   37,610.05   16,762.65  
 Other payer  87   60,952.61   55,292.66  
2009 Medicare  1,284   54,205.15   37,580.00  
 Medicaid  615   54,874.64   45,440.76  
 Private insurance  462   69,841.15   55,438.21  
 Self-Pay  70   58,072.86   39,627.25  
 Other payer  57   52,206.94   27,940.16  
2010 Medicare  1,186   60,949.79   44,502.79  
 Medicaid  543   64,256.16   52,605.92  
 Private insurance  311   62,081.71   55,578.87  
 Self-Pay  33   52,111.50   30,721.06  
 Other payer  71   65,554.97   42,337.93  
2011 Medicare  845   54,583.52   36,325.21  
 Medicaid  318   62,140.72   54,889.26  
 Private insurance  188   62,583.09   40,867.16  
 Self-Pay  27   53,937.33   24,655.13  
 Other payer  41   68,152.58   56,647.09  
2012 Medicare  940   57,760.98   42,973.93  
 Medicaid  425   67,653.43   67,668.52  
 Private insurance  274   66,418.22   59,243.25  
 Self-Pay  42   41,846.29   18,563.51  
 Other payer  68   70,740.72   64,570.39  
2013 Medicare  884   60,357.06   54,207.19  
 Medicaid  428   70,579.83   64,232.11  
 Private insurance  234   67,220.20   55,380.62  
 Self-Pay  47   60,028.88   39,093.73  
 Other payer  87   94,304.83   138,397.52  
2014 Medicare  826   62,056.36   55,399.82  
 Medicaid  471   80,504.21   86,867.81  
 Private insurance  234   71,816.44   65,873.09  
 Self-Pay  29   67,396.66   64,360.78  
 Other payer  61   105,675.78   123,144.48  
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Table 17 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 233 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  434   25,693.92   27,483.20  
 Medicaid  41   28,639.67   23,434.98  
 Private insurance  194   28,215.81   23,435.04  
 Self-Pay  11   42,910.13   39,384.14  
 Other payer  33   24,363.73   22,914.06  
2008 Medicare  349   69,050.57   37,599.10  
 Medicaid  67   66,639.31   27,348.26  
 Private insurance  119   59,526.04   22,077.02  
 Self-Pay  22   52,012.23   11,858.66  
 Other payer  31   66,665.47   21,877.08  
2009 Medicare  447   66,213.54   32,131.82  
 Medicaid  80   62,455.53   37,211.92  
 Private insurance  208   61,697.55   24,944.60  
 Self-Pay  44   70,124.60   46,697.05  
 Other payer  19   68,145.87   24,500.13  
2010 Medicare  370   67,020.07   32,491.71  
 Medicaid  70   64,406.50   27,290.22  
 Private insurance  202   61,822.79   24,576.69  
 Self-Pay  29   66,368.10   24,043.44  
 Other payer  20   66,188.66   22,877.92  
2011 Medicare  369   73,961.36   39,892.32  
 Medicaid  79   75,750.27   44,099.86  
 Private insurance  148   69,137.15   29,932.01  
 Self-Pay  27   67,918.55   25,665.53  
 Other payer  23   84,178.78   38,473.54  
2012 Medicare  342   79,186.25   42,469.65  
 Medicaid  71   74,707.61   33,867.60  
 Private insurance  146   66,504.96   24,883.56  
 Self-Pay  33   69,744.29   38,830.07  
 Other payer  34   72,429.78   22,411.61  
2013 Medicare  363   76,484.08   43,712.02  
 Medicaid  73   77,212.08   34,404.89  
 Private insurance  136   72,055.48   34,370.26  
 Self-Pay  35   66,633.42   25,150.12  
 Other payer  39   87,285.76   42,992.99  
2014 Medicare  381   77,700.51   38,002.87  
 Medicaid  118   70,965.34   29,739.82  
 Private insurance  149   68,074.98   28,072.66  
 Self-Pay  13   71,930.59   15,692.76  
 Other payer  19   69,434.28   21,171.59  
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Table 18 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 234 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  322   24,535.26   19,017.84  
 Medicaid  61   22,952.22   16,993.78  
 Private insurance  323   23,654.72   16,364.31  
 Self-Pay  15   22,375.14   17,862.71  
 Other payer  62   18,353.50   14,046.92  
2008 Medicare  525   47,121.18   13,957.05  
 Medicaid  123   44,429.78   12,103.38  
 Private insurance  364   44,084.83   13,734.47  
 Self-Pay  30   45,635.44   11,706.16  
 Other payer  43   50,596.13   14,794.72  
2009 Medicare  659   43,674.45   13,721.43  
 Medicaid  101   47,522.26   13,989.83  
 Private insurance  493   44,259.02   12,263.67  
 Self-Pay  39   49,527.72   15,386.75  
 Other payer  37   47,576.94   11,897.27  
2010 Medicare  415   49,590.66   14,200.17  
 Medicaid  102   51,339.24   17,149.07  
 Private insurance  403   46,361.31   12,008.38  
 Self-Pay  39   50,230.45   14,155.80  
 Other payer  39   46,935.86   20,163.54  
2011 Medicare  437   48,792.92   14,317.21  
 Medicaid  106   49,811.65   13,633.99  
 Private insurance  337   48,084.90   13,458.71  
 Self-Pay  37   49,893.26   12,335.12  
 Other payer  49   53,917.60   17,274.61  
2012 Medicare  487   51,709.71   18,248.93  
 Medicaid  88   57,522.99   20,274.75  
 Private insurance  342   52,415.92   18,571.10  
 Self-Pay  37   56,359.24   24,336.32  
 Other payer  63   57,654.99   23,266.66  
2013 Medicare  474   53,896.61   16,644.93  
 Medicaid  83   55,363.73   17,911.99  
 Private insurance  311   51,060.91   16,605.41  
 Self-Pay  43   56,622.98   19,280.38  
 Other payer  64   52,731.11   12,199.42  
2014 Medicare  469   53,157.36   16,392.73  
 Medicaid  150   59,061.05   20,173.45  
 Private insurance  311   51,798.12   16,154.25  
 Self-Pay  14   49,707.12   18,924.92  
 Other payer  22   55,983.49   22,245.85  
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Table 19 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 311 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  283   5,239.53   2,956.96  
 Medicaid  72   5,618.46   3,268.51  
 Private insurance  303   5,359.01   2,950.64  
 Self-Pay  37   5,129.31   2,403.27  
 Other payer  19   5,330.96   2,438.73  
2008 Medicare  593   5,309.10   3,248.63  
 Medicaid  196   5,783.66   4,359.10  
 Private insurance  399   4,555.01   2,318.42  
 Self-Pay  75   4,525.50   2,880.41  
 Other payer  57   6,869.48   4,732.36  
2009 Medicare  490   5,006.37   3,107.29  
 Medicaid  197   4,552.02   2,526.28  
 Private insurance  312   4,421.29   2,392.34  
 Self-Pay  74   4,977.07   2,973.85  
 Other payer  53   5,196.29   2,683.26  
2010 Medicare  443   5,315.89   3,140.12  
 Medicaid  252   5,100.70   5,373.33  
 Private insurance  295   4,565.18   2,536.59  
 Self-Pay  84   4,716.03   3,132.01  
 Other payer  101   5,834.21   3,467.22  
2011 Medicare  458   5,865.69   3,775.21  
 Medicaid  214   5,714.89   3,024.86  
 Private insurance  210   4,925.92   2,418.49  
 Self-Pay  48   5,299.68   3,482.82  
 Other payer  67   6,626.49   3,426.72  
2012 Medicare  400   6,528.66   5,761.77  
 Medicaid  207   5,372.19   3,025.05  
 Private insurance  173   5,330.54   2,812.71  
 Self-Pay  59   4,861.28   2,783.25  
 Other payer  88   7,012.23   8,190.34  
2013 Medicare  320   6,027.33   3,568.71  
 Medicaid  171   5,298.48   3,633.05  
 Private insurance  177   5,336.69   2,888.08  
 Self-Pay  45   5,248.47   4,213.14  
 Other payer  81   6,080.90   3,896.49  
2014 Medicare  297   6,427.67   3,761.79  
 Medicaid  254   5,953.74   3,663.63  
 Private insurance  142   6,338.64   4,262.56  
 Self-Pay  24   7,600.42   9,754.64  
 Other payer  25   5,046.34   2,944.20  
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Table 20 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 313 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  1,365   4,739.49   2,702.07  
 Medicaid  642   4,724.02   2,657.14  
 Private insurance  1,319   3,966.06   2,096.62  
 Self-Pay  257   4,372.50   2,266.25  
 Other payer  162   4,477.68   2,413.51  
2008 Medicare  4,605   5,294.20   3,345.30  
 Medicaid  2,196   5,044.35   2,912.74  
 Private insurance  3,944   4,257.26   2,203.78  
 Self-Pay  782   4,656.74   2,921.99  
 Other payer  716   5,385.56   3,015.74  
2009 Medicare  4,797   5,064.16   3,200.32  
 Medicaid  2,874   4,750.93   3,147.08  
 Private insurance  3,872   4,532.19   2,372.44  
 Self-Pay  1,086   4,397.22   2,509.58  
 Other payer  872   4,422.35   2,464.50  
2010 Medicare  4,132   5,392.59   3,038.38  
 Medicaid  2,669   5,178.26   2,966.00  
 Private insurance  3,190   4,680.10   2,444.48  
 Self-Pay  1,098   4,755.68   2,890.87  
 Other payer  969   4,837.50   2,881.14  
2011 Medicare  4,071   5,401.27   2,998.89  
 Medicaid  2,729   5,199.40   2,794.57  
 Private insurance  2,480   4,810.13   2,470.61  
 Self-Pay  792   5,021.49   2,953.64  
 Other payer  699   5,360.30   2,620.90  
2012 Medicare  3,698   5,925.95   3,569.94  
 Medicaid  2,705   5,408.52   3,558.29  
 Private insurance  2,506   5,035.29   2,928.39  
 Self-Pay  945   4,821.41   2,761.66  
 Other payer  1,009   5,077.90   2,925.10  
2013 Medicare  3,068   5,850.96   3,341.23  
 Medicaid  2,228   5,451.52   3,252.09  
 Private insurance  1,838   5,110.58   2,904.76  
 Self-Pay  654   5,371.23   3,670.66  
 Other payer  880   5,365.56   2,862.85  
2014 Medicare  2,605   6,344.61   4,046.48  
 Medicaid  2,793   5,661.02   3,442.25  
 Private insurance  1,543   5,409.89   2,705.30  
 Self-Pay  309   5,389.18   3,836.01  
 Other payer  292   5,859.51   3,870.86  
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Table 21 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 326 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  148   37,894.38   45,722.82  
 Medicaid  28   39,592.36   47,758.59  
 Private insurance  87   42,861.02   55,138.29  
 Self-Pay  14   26,311.71   48,411.28  
 Other payer  13   33,208.48   47,660.01  
2008 Medicare  332   53,397.77   40,235.11  
 Medicaid  113   59,478.60   65,836.34  
 Private insurance  175   53,532.42   51,073.39  
 Self-Pay  28   33,199.28   36,850.81  
 Other payer  39   73,535.59   84,472.10  
2009 Medicare  380   57,681.73   47,186.76  
 Medicaid  127   63,439.93   68,335.41  
 Private insurance  238   54,745.35   54,281.74  
 Self-Pay  38   33,567.33   28,982.43  
 Other payer  40   63,062.72   63,227.91  
2010 Medicare  324   52,939.55   35,339.70  
 Medicaid  120   53,007.33   50,239.41  
 Private insurance  185   53,816.54   49,233.70  
 Self-Pay  36   44,707.65   34,100.05  
 Other payer  44   68,581.07   59,655.58  
2011 Medicare  301   62,807.97   67,633.08  
 Medicaid  97   67,226.04   73,511.10  
 Private insurance  141   50,739.59   49,370.17  
 Self-Pay  31   26,457.25   13,599.33  
 Other payer  31   59,733.49   60,478.86  
2012 Medicare  311   58,206.12   49,085.40  
 Medicaid  113   66,133.37   82,197.77  
 Private insurance  176   54,427.78   52,613.73  
 Self-Pay  28   43,225.45   36,207.46  
 Other payer  45   71,876.13   111,562.99  
2013 Medicare  328   59,892.88   53,274.76  
 Medicaid  120   64,769.48   73,575.67  
 Private insurance  171   53,336.64   47,785.06  
 Self-Pay  37   50,410.28   37,985.97  
 Other payer  46   52,344.95   45,322.30  
2014 Medicare  305   63,089.38   62,069.78  
 Medicaid  159   65,669.06   101,234.87  
 Private insurance  191   56,072.80   55,828.63  
 Self-Pay  17   95,116.40   246,979.46  
 Other payer  25   43,790.07   25,877.27  
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Table 22 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 329 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  340   47,077.70   40,974.99  
 Medicaid  56   44,473.61   30,244.43  
 Private insurance  206   41,007.55   40,109.39  
 Self-Pay  14   23,643.89   13,130.33  
 Other payer  17   84,901.33   95,817.34  
2008 Medicare  1,313   49,637.39   38,512.12  
 Medicaid  268   68,184.72   72,335.67  
 Private insurance  632   44,496.80   42,386.06  
 Self-Pay  78   38,810.36   51,149.57  
 Other payer  88   46,626.67   44,849.59  
2009 Medicare  1,201   46,137.68   35,915.16  
 Medicaid  274   55,960.96   54,933.08  
 Private insurance  744   46,056.43   49,691.34  
 Self-Pay  86   36,395.07   30,574.85  
 Other payer  80   41,989.78   39,545.74  
2010 Medicare  1,128   50,386.11   34,886.90  
 Medicaid  232   62,258.47   65,526.82  
 Private insurance  582   42,902.53   36,999.18  
 Self-Pay  80   33,939.77   19,577.03  
 Other payer  72   55,625.04   58,162.05  
2011 Medicare  1,180   50,650.72   40,927.03  
 Medicaid  211   62,085.07   62,752.05  
 Private insurance  590   42,101.51   31,783.96  
 Self-Pay  63   35,067.10   22,689.91  
 Other payer  76   47,618.41   39,332.54  
2012 Medicare  1,144   55,902.42   50,662.78  
 Medicaid  253   65,824.06   71,255.95  
 Private insurance  542   47,798.33   42,371.00  
 Self-Pay  80   45,180.60   66,913.96  
 Other payer  95   52,626.74   50,581.50  
2013 Medicare  1,140   53,107.02   46,351.97  
 Medicaid  241   70,986.20   82,072.21  
 Private insurance  488   46,692.29   44,854.21  
 Self-Pay  89   42,453.17   36,112.70  
 Other payer  132   59,025.89   112,726.12  
2014 Medicare  1,089   50,439.18   38,872.08  
 Medicaid  370   63,088.31   69,812.39  
 Private insurance  520   49,657.69   59,316.58  
 Self-Pay  23   37,384.67   29,852.90  
 Other payer  52   94,290.52   160,665.50  
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Table 23 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 373 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  340   4,180.83   2,896.48  
 Medicaid  29,370   2,801.81   1,414.44  
 Private insurance  28,602   2,951.07   1,555.61  
 Self-Pay  1,492   2,562.59   1,243.99  
 Other payer  1,242   2,884.60   1,046.61  
2008 Medicare  239   7,769.80   5,373.77  
 Medicaid  120   7,676.02   5,606.24  
 Private insurance  254   7,006.99   4,753.93  
 Self-Pay  32   6,307.54   4,051.44  
 Other payer  31   11,043.72   7,149.32  
2009 Medicare  272   7,570.88   5,609.97  
 Medicaid  215   7,333.25   5,027.65  
 Private insurance  353   7,167.22   5,452.69  
 Self-Pay  48   8,382.48   7,375.29  
 Other payer  34   7,876.71   4,989.48  
2010 Medicare  241   7,919.68   4,732.90  
 Medicaid  153   9,592.27   7,996.58  
 Private insurance  309   7,781.00   4,542.77  
 Self-Pay  57   8,503.99   5,367.34  
 Other payer  51   9,576.95   6,213.57  
2011 Medicare  255   8,009.95   4,601.47  
 Medicaid  135   7,531.65   5,605.62  
 Private insurance  256   6,549.66   4,262.31  
 Self-Pay  42   9,316.13   5,022.60  
 Other payer  58   9,749.37   5,669.76  
2012 Medicare  240   8,785.95   5,382.46  
 Medicaid  189   8,507.31   6,344.12  
 Private insurance  304   7,580.75   4,808.68  
 Self-Pay  51   7,926.30   3,712.99  
 Other payer  54   7,871.79   6,835.06  
2013 Medicare  225   8,854.93   6,152.70  
 Medicaid  182   8,468.20   5,848.73  
 Private insurance  298   7,610.35   4,627.96  
 Self-Pay  45   7,774.26   3,934.65  
 Other payer  57   8,164.64   6,834.30  
2014 Medicare  216   8,408.65   4,993.77  
 Medicaid  253   9,493.86   10,057.09  
 Private insurance  247   7,830.87   5,403.94  
 Self-Pay  24   8,393.79   5,008.31  
 Other payer  18   7,788.31   5,447.11  
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Table 24 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 390 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  402   5,541.66   3,878.75  
 Medicaid  6,166   1,929.27   3,253.31  
 Private insurance  7,545   1,719.20   2,669.40  
 Self-Pay  387   2,036.12   3,438.79  
 Other payer  345   3,718.56   7,977.19  
2008 Medicare  1,282   6,038.61   3,949.30  
 Medicaid  336   5,357.53   3,425.79  
 Private insurance  982   5,147.44   3,219.94  
 Self-Pay  96   5,243.27   2,676.01  
 Other payer  109   6,066.38   3,607.03  
2009 Medicare  1,274   5,824.50   3,521.22  
 Medicaid  426   5,433.02   4,843.93  
 Private insurance  1,079   5,261.32   3,411.69  
 Self-Pay  134   5,769.13   4,562.88  
 Other payer  118   6,546.73   4,987.80  
2010 Medicare  1,026   6,495.67   3,459.73  
 Medicaid  429   5,563.24   3,221.25  
 Private insurance  934   5,769.89   5,267.53  
 Self-Pay  143   6,069.19   3,961.45  
 Other payer  107   6,589.39   4,219.01  
2011 Medicare  1,252   6,238.54   3,956.55  
 Medicaid  351   5,947.80   3,815.47  
 Private insurance  935   5,443.70   3,219.94  
 Self-Pay  136   5,788.15   3,731.77  
 Other payer  138   7,258.79   4,975.41  
2012 Medicare  1,197   6,508.16   3,924.44  
 Medicaid  438   5,559.33   3,278.65  
 Private insurance  977   5,856.12   4,145.60  
 Self-Pay  153   5,511.73   2,847.64  
 Other payer  147   6,313.89   4,376.81  
2013 Medicare  1,168   6,481.25   4,588.68  
 Medicaid  440   5,949.48   4,371.35  
 Private insurance  922   5,716.64   3,459.75  
 Self-Pay  132   5,741.99   3,130.22  
 Other payer  173   6,352.89   3,774.47  
2014 Medicare  1,115   6,588.11   3,684.88  
 Medicaid  578   5,983.33   4,011.82  
 Private insurance  883   5,823.45   3,518.95  
 Self-Pay  88   5,430.23   2,973.67  
 Other payer  83   6,160.26   4,364.66  
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Table 25 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 391 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  411   7,622.10   12,164.68  
 Medicaid  40,843   827.57   834.08  
 Private insurance  38,393   907.51   840.11  
 Self-Pay  2,202   801.12   1,033.65  
 Other payer  1,552   1,020.27   1,323.92  
2008 Medicare  1,166   9,437.50   7,837.28  
 Medicaid  443   9,809.22   12,299.48  
 Private insurance  447   9,326.66   9,323.22  
 Self-Pay  69   8,223.36   8,694.78  
 Other payer  84   8,383.39   6,460.90  
2009 Medicare  1,512   10,064.00   10,476.67  
 Medicaid  584   9,735.99   11,166.25  
 Private insurance  626   9,526.53   11,154.48  
 Self-Pay  105   7,629.92   5,742.86  
 Other payer  78   8,384.02   5,322.37  
2010 Medicare  1,582   10,653.61   10,088.88  
 Medicaid  581   10,103.62   12,547.56  
 Private insurance  605   10,323.12   10,512.83  
 Self-Pay  154   8,977.88   8,369.82  
 Other payer  116   11,749.73   14,964.39  
2011 Medicare  1,296   10,915.60   10,788.87  
 Medicaid  431   10,372.62   11,710.50  
 Private insurance  399   10,507.19   9,196.80  
 Self-Pay  83   8,990.70   6,436.03  
 Other payer  66   8,372.14   6,183.63  
2012 Medicare  1,282   11,555.54   11,794.17  
 Medicaid  475   10,054.92   10,962.71  
 Private insurance  486   11,987.09   19,208.32  
 Self-Pay  82   9,109.36   7,117.34  
 Other payer  105   12,523.74   20,185.82  
2013 Medicare  1,310   11,762.95   12,386.27  
 Medicaid  490   11,405.29   15,824.55  
 Private insurance  434   12,685.22   20,702.62  
 Self-Pay  95   9,101.05   6,945.19  
 Other payer  141   11,882.64   16,564.66  
2014 Medicare  1,352   11,337.35   10,126.68  
 Medicaid  689   11,994.86   17,844.83  
 Private insurance  442   11,485.00   12,334.00  
 Self-Pay  49   9,835.66   9,004.37  
 Other payer  58   14,907.45   27,267.39  
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Table 26 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 392 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  1,524   6,683.52   7,089.74  
 Medicaid  811   5,298.77   8,150.61  
 Private insurance  1,700   5,631.40   5,707.54  
 Self-Pay  204   5,539.75   3,737.74  
 Other payer  152   6,547.80   6,882.37  
2008 Medicare  5,161   6,586.20   4,993.89  
 Medicaid  2,844   5,772.96   5,249.07  
 Private insurance  5,073   5,264.94   3,919.90  
 Self-Pay  666   5,611.18   3,589.10  
 Other payer  632   6,694.42   5,015.22  
2009 Medicare  5,400   6,411.16   4,618.62  
 Medicaid  4,219   5,263.36   5,765.46  
 Private insurance  5,653   5,594.45   4,564.70  
 Self-Pay  1,006   5,513.44   3,506.51  
 Other payer  702   6,050.89   4,335.90  
2010 Medicare  5,067   7,163.68   4,755.27  
 Medicaid  3,598   5,985.16   5,730.35  
 Private insurance  5,223   6,310.53   4,848.19  
 Self-Pay  1,006   6,179.72   4,274.19  
 Other payer  777   7,019.83   6,322.17  
2011 Medicare  5,852   6,971.82   4,432.87  
 Medicaid  3,313   6,035.12   6,171.11  
 Private insurance  4,648   6,055.06   4,087.27  
 Self-Pay  906   5,970.19   3,560.15  
 Other payer  839   6,972.20   4,725.97  
2012 Medicare  5,813   7,746.96   6,010.37  
 Medicaid  3,713   6,234.87   5,602.90  
 Private insurance  4,845   6,862.77   5,761.02  
 Self-Pay  972   6,433.01   4,654.57  
 Other payer  1,032   7,309.27   9,037.63  
2013 Medicare  5,345   7,728.24   5,247.06  
 Medicaid  3,707   6,336.86   6,345.30  
 Private insurance  4,334   6,829.09   5,863.66  
 Self-Pay  856   6,455.08   4,391.39  
 Other payer  1,007   7,520.28   7,993.53  
2014 Medicare  4,963   7,849.29   5,484.39  
 Medicaid  4,718   6,678.13   5,703.75  
 Private insurance  4,009   7,023.06   6,923.33  
 Self-Pay  447   6,440.23   4,239.78  
 Other payer  451   7,699.77   6,542.23  
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Table 27 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 464 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  252   6,614.80   8,333.03  
 Medicaid  99   7,296.21   14,754.39  
 Private insurance  229   7,350.71   11,005.73  
 Self-Pay  32   6,804.94   8,534.10  
 Other payer  56   9,862.69   12,889.18  
2008 Medicare  149   23,880.90   22,012.98  
 Medicaid  70   37,865.54   32,890.57  
 Private insurance  145   29,426.86   25,472.56  
 Self-Pay  24   23,644.55   27,528.24  
 Other payer  80   34,897.95   25,079.30  
2009 Medicare  168   24,464.02   19,291.17  
 Medicaid  76   34,424.60   29,280.23  
 Private insurance  127   31,444.40   30,494.22  
 Self-Pay  25   26,027.34   23,567.18  
 Other payer  58   33,302.89   32,425.33  
2010 Medicare  173   29,507.13   22,518.75  
 Medicaid  84   34,145.09   40,121.51  
 Private insurance  131   32,544.09   31,179.02  
 Self-Pay  40   36,323.82   25,591.67  
 Other payer  65   45,729.77   45,275.38  
2011 Medicare  205   30,234.98   25,982.03  
 Medicaid  43   57,588.24   75,809.99  
 Private insurance  121   33,952.81   37,362.11  
 Self-Pay  17   42,898.18   42,288.58  
 Other payer  40   52,162.43   55,743.42  
2012 Medicare  225   31,613.93   26,970.45  
 Medicaid  90   46,810.04   59,222.97  
 Private insurance  120   36,745.69   35,100.70  
 Self-Pay  35   42,848.12   49,717.10  
 Other payer  68   48,697.65   41,917.64  
2013 Medicare  239   33,058.50   28,983.06  
 Medicaid  100   40,487.82   44,878.77  
 Private insurance  112   33,599.18   24,674.65  
 Self-Pay  25   25,926.69   23,694.75  
 Other payer  73   34,771.79   34,456.72  
2014 Medicare  222   31,218.95   19,341.26  
 Medicaid  139   35,248.85   31,052.05  
 Private insurance  135   34,922.78   27,242.93  
 Self-Pay  17   41,746.72   53,116.50  
 Other payer  35   44,374.11   29,448.34  
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Table 28 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 470 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  3,022   17,551.38   6,402.08  
 Medicaid  215   17,061.46   12,164.33  
 Private insurance  2,436   16,855.09   7,654.38  
 Self-Pay  54   10,290.49   7,151.93  
 Other payer  245   18,646.68   14,990.36  
2008 Medicare  10,835   17,995.41   6,316.39  
 Medicaid  745   19,405.39   7,209.95  
 Private insurance  6,695   17,134.51   5,744.09  
 Self-Pay  62   17,668.77   6,344.14  
 Other payer  877   18,349.97   6,705.02  
2009 Medicare  11,492   17,231.27   7,121.42  
 Medicaid  856   17,897.27   8,180.58  
 Private insurance  7,379   17,263.88   7,241.14  
 Self-Pay  87   17,571.62   8,192.95  
 Other payer  899   18,201.70   7,346.73  
2010 Medicare  10,447   18,463.13   6,644.49  
 Medicaid  618   20,043.67   7,759.10  
 Private insurance  7,101   17,820.25   6,210.46  
 Self-Pay  124   18,933.66   12,457.11  
 Other payer  740   18,784.86   7,016.20  
2011 Medicare  11,521   19,553.97   7,749.82  
 Medicaid  717   22,724.38   12,737.43  
 Private insurance  6,731   18,778.59   7,277.08  
 Self-Pay  63   21,672.31   8,688.20  
 Other payer  986   20,944.92   8,644.91  
2012 Medicare  12,176   20,532.09   8,539.52  
 Medicaid  807   21,513.43   13,594.68  
 Private insurance  7,465   20,239.42   8,510.50  
 Self-Pay  127   23,934.79   11,496.58  
 Other payer  1,111   21,114.42   8,699.77  
2013 Medicare  12,951   20,274.96   7,627.14  
 Medicaid  864   21,038.60   8,080.97  
 Private insurance  7,670   19,919.34   7,348.25  
 Self-Pay  107   21,641.53   11,219.93  
 Other payer  1,254   20,371.49   8,019.75  
2014 Medicare  13,591   19,928.23   7,411.82  
 Medicaid  1,415   20,775.56   9,230.32  
 Private insurance  7,931   19,336.02   7,327.10  
 Self-Pay  97   20,652.05   7,171.82  
 Other payer  1,090   19,874.34   7,786.97  
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Table 29 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 603 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  854   6,583.32   4,666.71  
 Medicaid  569   6,149.31   5,038.28  
 Private insurance  733   5,314.12   4,209.38  
 Self-Pay  263   5,340.74   3,741.79  
 Other payer  163   6,263.02   4,713.40  
2008 Medicare  3,265   6,895.86   4,971.84  
 Medicaid  2,019   6,493.14   4,981.77  
 Private insurance  2,524   5,571.68   4,331.05  
 Self-Pay  794   5,922.04   4,428.26  
 Other payer  842   7,075.15   6,471.32  
2009 Medicare  3,359   6,766.12   5,271.40  
 Medicaid  2,945   6,069.46   4,746.78  
 Private insurance  2,615   5,697.35   4,262.26  
 Self-Pay  1,209   6,082.64   4,922.12  
 Other payer  657   6,392.88   4,553.48  
2010 Medicare  3,223   7,654.54   5,570.14  
 Medicaid  2,794   6,906.28   6,359.32  
 Private insurance  2,492   6,141.25   4,332.02  
 Self-Pay  1,227   6,555.31   4,292.96  
 Other payer  909   7,726.49   5,402.38  
2011 Medicare  3,626   7,651.56   5,609.43  
 Medicaid  2,607   7,188.41   6,223.30  
 Private insurance  2,143   6,356.68   4,726.57  
 Self-Pay  1,036   6,589.44   4,637.60  
 Other payer  950   7,865.07   6,500.15  
2012 Medicare  3,632   7,938.43   5,605.35  
 Medicaid  2,671   7,233.82   6,049.90  
 Private insurance  2,335   6,875.54   7,460.89  
 Self-Pay  1,149   6,718.66   4,800.97  
 Other payer  1,059   7,641.05   5,868.09  
2013 Medicare  3,489   8,179.49   7,816.57  
 Medicaid  2,639   7,226.09   6,062.37  
 Private insurance  2,062   6,740.54   5,378.41  
 Self-Pay  1,150   6,862.61   5,166.31  
 Other payer  1,133   7,909.61   6,631.88  
2014 Medicare  3,512   8,121.84   6,491.08  
 Medicaid  4,189   7,457.98   6,075.83  
 Private insurance  2,054   7,065.77   5,237.62  
 Self-Pay  460   6,722.86   5,058.78  
 Other payer  391   8,471.12   9,397.29  
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Table 30 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 639 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  178   4,692.95   3,270.26  
 Medicaid  232   4,499.15   2,815.19  
 Private insurance  266   4,423.95   3,119.18  
 Self-Pay  100   4,619.14   2,365.32  
 Other payer  61   5,848.33   4,256.47  
2008 Medicare  736   4,687.78   3,254.27  
 Medicaid  778   5,275.04   3,826.20  
 Private insurance  891   4,640.31   2,992.11  
 Self-Pay  313   5,192.18   3,177.84  
 Other payer  245   6,575.47   5,160.23  
2009 Medicare  633   4,838.01   4,852.28  
 Medicaid  1,030   5,118.35   3,246.14  
 Private insurance  957   5,007.75   3,223.81  
 Self-Pay  460   5,220.27   3,033.71  
 Other payer  247   5,448.21   3,269.08  
2010 Medicare  481   5,271.74   3,588.43  
 Medicaid  752   5,685.40   4,664.83  
 Private insurance  781   5,290.94   3,327.77  
 Self-Pay  390   5,602.40   3,400.78  
 Other payer  378   6,332.81   3,543.74  
2011 Medicare  506   5,504.64   3,617.59  
 Medicaid  802   5,561.08   3,643.90  
 Private insurance  598   4,962.45   3,429.51  
 Self-Pay  276   5,939.64   3,326.17  
 Other payer  226   6,718.08   4,258.34  
2012 Medicare  491   5,808.46   4,871.15  
 Medicaid  863   6,697.29   4,545.43  
 Private insurance  722   6,180.95   4,126.30  
 Self-Pay  332   6,074.95   3,192.82  
 Other payer  390   6,832.67   4,604.26  
2013 Medicare  449   6,096.69   4,076.21  
 Medicaid  876   6,542.03   4,013.32  
 Private insurance  681   6,413.87   3,817.70  
 Self-Pay  282   6,512.69   4,202.78  
 Other payer  393   6,711.97   4,040.29  
2014 Medicare  372   6,385.44   4,946.38  
 Medicaid  1,226   6,505.93   4,555.44  
 Private insurance  618   6,451.82   4,400.26  
 Self-Pay  123   5,314.67   2,979.53  
 Other payer  150   7,108.26   5,464.11  
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Table 31 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 690 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  1,403   6,331.84   4,210.12  
 Medicaid  452   5,490.98   4,616.95  
 Private insurance  509   4,985.48   3,767.21  
 Self-Pay  87   4,452.66   2,704.56  
 Other payer  63   4,802.42   3,110.13  
2008 Medicare  5,134   6,687.05   5,014.54  
 Medicaid  1,627   6,144.27   5,121.72  
 Private insurance  1,726   5,461.68   4,032.01  
 Self-Pay  263   5,428.39   2,976.93  
 Other payer  196   7,276.05   6,554.08  
2009 Medicare  4,952   6,409.46   4,352.41  
 Medicaid  2,561   5,473.16   4,319.40  
 Private insurance  1,909   5,576.50   4,011.45  
 Self-Pay  393   5,115.77   2,780.39  
 Other payer  256   7,231.75   7,744.44  
2010 Medicare  4,531   7,334.94   5,510.00  
 Medicaid  2,011   6,181.30   5,180.21  
 Private insurance  1,637   6,074.20   4,333.60  
 Self-Pay  335   6,353.62   3,449.46  
 Other payer  272   7,637.08   5,968.03  
2011 Medicare  4,990   7,047.67   4,927.64  
 Medicaid  1,686   6,394.50   6,341.41  
 Private insurance  1,380   5,918.46   4,174.88  
 Self-Pay  320   5,956.17   3,699.21  
 Other payer  232   7,552.00   4,817.02  
2012 Medicare  4,964   7,682.58   5,711.76  
 Medicaid  2,032   6,634.01   5,405.66  
 Private insurance  1,468   6,814.94   7,279.90  
 Self-Pay  338   6,256.92   3,991.97  
 Other payer  324   7,118.00   10,657.41  
2013 Medicare  4,631   7,664.95   5,188.94  
 Medicaid  1,930   6,623.61   5,681.81  
 Private insurance  1,243   6,719.44   4,877.76  
 Self-Pay  310   6,344.09   4,280.91  
 Other payer  353   7,728.83   8,034.80  
2014 Medicare  4,264   7,625.65   5,046.64  
 Medicaid  2,238   6,761.13   5,481.81  
 Private insurance  1,267   6,916.59   6,884.68  
 Self-Pay  169   6,272.37   4,434.32  
 Other payer  164   7,796.57   7,854.21  
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Table 32 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 765 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  15   5,997.45   2,499.56  
 Medicaid  1,534   7,221.76   7,302.54  
 Private insurance  1,625   7,089.64   5,540.07  
 Self-Pay  76   7,356.42   12,008.88  
 Other payer  42   6,797.69   3,049.08  
2008 Medicare  86   11,472.48   13,948.85  
 Medicaid  5,508   8,322.97   7,152.79  
 Private insurance  5,753   8,221.47   7,725.36  
 Self-Pay  187   6,346.58   3,737.84  
 Other payer  226   9,458.65   11,138.60  
2009 Medicare  83   10,456.55   10,653.27  
 Medicaid  6,378   9,252.47   9,046.17  
 Private insurance  5,954   9,393.78   9,724.71  
 Self-Pay  173   8,444.53   8,295.05  
 Other payer  172   9,237.50   12,219.20  
2010 Medicare  70   9,507.03   11,436.87  
 Medicaid  5,938   8,878.01   8,495.27  
 Private insurance  5,596   9,375.80   10,245.47  
 Self-Pay  236   7,571.18   7,396.09  
 Other payer  344   8,302.80   5,894.39  
2011 Medicare  91   10,424.68   11,920.49  
 Medicaid  5,324   8,792.18   9,132.25  
 Private insurance  5,837   8,970.83   8,170.53  
 Self-Pay  94   8,192.98   8,295.95  
 Other payer  188   8,236.29   7,513.46  
2012 Medicare  104   10,728.09   6,995.61  
 Medicaid  6,059   9,666.11   9,366.74  
 Private insurance  5,525   9,976.38   9,627.15  
 Self-Pay  226   8,811.79   6,849.35  
 Other payer  297   10,167.57   9,682.87  
2013 Medicare  94   12,636.50   10,550.71  
 Medicaid  6,043   9,955.24   8,245.33  
 Private insurance  5,666   10,343.82   10,581.94  
 Self-Pay  317   8,360.26   5,429.10  
 Other payer  320   9,648.63   6,358.04  
2014 Medicare  118   11,644.77   9,718.01  
 Medicaid  6,283   10,261.75   10,374.02  
 Private insurance  5,787   10,524.18   11,443.35  
 Self-Pay  366   8,718.71   5,821.43  
 Other payer  325   10,068.26   6,488.64  
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Table 33 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 766 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  25   4,998.50   1,531.18  
 Medicaid  4,109   4,988.42   1,874.12  
 Private insurance  4,164   5,242.43   1,987.89  
 Self-Pay  203   4,293.08   1,492.51  
 Other payer  101   5,452.68   1,584.54  
2008 Medicare  94   5,848.77   2,777.59  
 Medicaid  13,667   5,705.92   2,997.06  
 Private insurance  13,432   5,643.88   2,661.36  
 Self-Pay  504   4,613.20   1,554.44  
 Other payer  414   5,894.38   3,610.39  
2009 Medicare  90   6,491.16   2,492.05  
 Medicaid  15,422   6,041.54   2,987.68  
 Private insurance  14,129   6,030.47   3,203.21  
 Self-Pay  393   5,701.81   2,135.65  
 Other payer  383   5,852.10   3,133.79  
2010 Medicare  53   7,407.76   3,752.06  
 Medicaid  12,421   6,163.20   2,593.06  
 Private insurance  10,551   6,509.61   3,108.44  
 Self-Pay  646   5,968.96   1,897.75  
 Other payer  643   5,895.39   2,732.38  
2011 Medicare  53   7,195.69   3,008.51  
 Medicaid  11,577   6,344.46   3,246.24  
 Private insurance  11,616   6,164.18   2,986.29  
 Self-Pay  296   5,295.28   2,459.90  
 Other payer  454   5,886.73   2,642.29  
2012 Medicare  80   6,688.74   2,781.81  
 Medicaid  11,628   6,744.44   3,364.34  
 Private insurance  10,783   7,090.99   3,881.69  
 Self-Pay  699   5,975.90   2,660.90  
 Other payer  554   6,946.85   3,364.53  
2013 Medicare  88   8,158.47   4,088.50  
 Medicaid  11,223   6,887.26   3,583.92  
 Private insurance  10,411   7,287.34   3,827.04  
 Self-Pay  1,024   5,925.41   2,747.73  
 Other payer  602   7,190.74   2,933.43  
2014 Medicare  96   7,754.17   2,669.86  
 Medicaid  10,716   7,179.99   4,047.71  
 Private insurance  10,201   7,485.54   4,135.17  
 Self-Pay  1,295   6,422.42   2,849.93  
 Other payer  584   7,161.52   3,276.38  
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Table 34 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 775 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  66   3,298.14   1,088.13  
 Medicaid  10,169   2,885.77   1,476.84  
 Private insurance  9,341   3,003.58   1,569.14  
 Self-Pay  540   2,626.92   1,284.17  
 Other payer  249   3,197.80   1,245.58  
2008 Medicare  248   3,627.41   1,732.87  
 Medicaid  35,127   3,305.68   1,955.89  
 Private insurance  32,201   3,408.07   1,886.95  
 Self-Pay  1,554   2,867.27   1,286.33  
 Other payer  1,202   3,284.72   2,180.12  
2009 Medicare  174   3,786.01   1,829.76  
 Medicaid  40,573   3,547.94   2,124.72  
 Private insurance  33,505   3,691.22   2,500.39  
 Self-Pay  1,146   3,310.02   1,849.58  
 Other payer  1,028   3,451.52   3,890.53  
2010 Medicare  128   4,260.45   2,490.02  
 Medicaid  35,287   3,527.25   1,928.29  
 Private insurance  28,604   3,800.63   2,674.76  
 Self-Pay  1,549   2,985.69   1,372.75  
 Other payer  1,887   3,387.80   3,303.42  
2011 Medicare  53   7,195.69   3,008.51  
 Medicaid  11,577   6,344.46   3,246.24  
 Private insurance  11,616   6,164.18   2,986.29  
 Self-Pay  296   5,295.28   2,459.90  
 Other payer  454   5,886.73   2,642.29  
2012 Medicare  206   4,698.21   3,984.21  
 Medicaid  31,620   3,987.52   2,297.53  
 Private insurance  27,792   4,233.15   2,788.77  
 Self-Pay  1,760   3,575.65   1,915.04  
 Other payer  1,556   3,987.40   1,922.52  
2013 Medicare  253   4,673.00   2,998.91  
 Medicaid  30,983   4,090.82   2,288.54  
 Private insurance  27,415   4,337.05   2,522.66  
 Self-Pay  2,037   3,526.14   1,917.30  
 Other payer  1,828   4,234.31   2,256.17  
2014 Medicare  246   4,759.34   2,026.07  
 Medicaid  30,687   4,206.63   2,482.94  
 Private insurance  28,405   4,420.33   2,741.29  
 Self-Pay  2,442   3,742.50   3,244.48  
 Other payer  1,768   4,323.84   2,279.09  
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Table 35 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 853 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  279   48,368.12   39,199.57  
 Medicaid  93   60,402.74   51,064.12  
 Private insurance  86   46,775.84   41,436.07  
 Self-Pay  15   47,309.73   28,459.15  
 Other payer  10   46,770.85   35,210.78  
2008 Medicare  1,255   47,906.72   45,715.62  
 Medicaid  325   63,229.88   68,694.53  
 Private insurance  361   54,179.58   55,468.43  
 Self-Pay  59   44,054.22   32,532.32  
 Other payer  80   60,085.82   54,465.97  
2009 Medicare  1,466   50,751.37   42,642.90  
 Medicaid  406   64,455.98   61,015.01  
 Private insurance  459   54,853.56   50,396.16  
 Self-Pay  80   43,576.49   37,890.98  
 Other payer  86   53,085.97   41,012.76  
2010 Medicare  1,492   49,915.41   41,776.74  
 Medicaid  419   66,571.89   60,108.25  
 Private insurance  444   57,163.74   55,199.35  
 Self-Pay  105   60,236.41   55,558.58  
 Other payer  103   52,659.39   38,083.05  
2011 Medicare  1,608   49,934.97   41,954.98  
 Medicaid  429   60,481.14   52,108.30  
 Private insurance  472   58,710.10   49,345.99  
 Self-Pay  118   43,214.04   29,339.43  
 Other payer  96   56,946.20   43,430.66  
2012 Medicare  1,629   54,747.50   53,433.66  
 Medicaid  554   63,446.46   55,381.90  
 Private insurance  510   56,266.62   64,187.51  
 Self-Pay  117   48,043.58   44,445.98  
 Other payer  129   83,283.00   118,565.87  
2013 Medicare  1,852   55,438.95   51,724.23  
 Medicaid  585   64,273.79   67,019.24  
 Private insurance  561   56,600.66   55,084.63  
 Self-Pay  158   39,719.76   30,561.92  
 Other payer  195   60,736.82   52,810.84  
2014 Medicare  2,079   51,176.76   48,071.64  
 Medicaid  919   61,504.77   65,583.77  
 Private insurance  725   52,741.85   48,569.00  
 Self-Pay  89   42,870.78   45,519.21  
 Other payer  101   67,495.37   121,331.18  
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Table 36 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 871 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  2,006   16,698.77   15,046.42  
 Medicaid  348   20,057.35   20,477.15  
 Private insurance  434   17,575.94   18,204.78  
 Self-Pay  45   17,440.93   15,561.43  
 Other payer  56   17,448.49   13,372.91  
2008 Medicare  9,871   16,171.39   14,341.06  
 Medicaid  1,685   19,703.84   19,358.60  
 Private insurance  1,946   16,350.25   16,928.04  
 Self-Pay  265   15,533.19   12,993.31  
 Other payer  279   20,689.82   21,020.82  
2009 Medicare  10,048   17,402.51   15,018.01  
 Medicaid  2,033   19,763.85   21,365.67  
 Private insurance  2,272   18,160.02   17,341.47  
 Self-Pay  371   16,379.24   12,568.82  
 Other payer  271   19,539.08   17,872.16  
2010 Medicare  11,088   18,244.54   16,217.01  
 Medicaid  2,179   21,174.59   21,130.03  
 Private insurance  2,259   17,697.60   16,775.97  
 Self-Pay  361   18,751.85   15,312.14  
 Other payer  338   20,772.46   17,985.14  
2011 Medicare  11,644   17,826.31   14,433.11  
 Medicaid  2,147   21,481.79   20,364.24  
 Private insurance  1,994   18,179.69   16,441.63  
 Self-Pay  409   18,400.23   15,442.00  
 Other payer  308   20,915.45   18,301.79  
2012 Medicare  12,976   18,349.62   16,613.55  
 Medicaid  2,510   21,750.17   22,557.99  
 Private insurance  2,394   18,685.79   17,612.76  
 Self-Pay  540   17,389.43   14,096.64  
 Other payer  561   21,661.72   20,343.77  
2013 Medicare  15,033   17,873.38   16,234.83  
 Medicaid  2,881   21,055.23   26,650.67  
 Private insurance  2,923   18,824.76   20,496.72  
 Self-Pay  585   17,261.96   15,018.83  
 Other payer  754   22,038.99   32,550.33  
2014 Medicare  17,087   18,030.59   17,462.65  
 Medicaid  4,414   20,449.24   19,922.21  
 Private insurance  3,306   18,439.82   18,871.72  
 Self-Pay  378   16,258.58   14,372.01  
 Other payer  493   20,484.95   19,174.31  
 
195 
 
Table 37 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 881 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  50   6,755.86   11,619.40  
 Medicaid  77   3,416.64   2,854.50  
 Private insurance  138   3,533.03   2,467.60  
 Self-Pay  26   2,108.79   852.94  
 Other payer  73   2,154.35   1,943.56  
2008 Medicare  221   6,246.59   9,119.23  
 Medicaid  417   4,972.45   13,564.15  
 Private insurance  798   3,118.64   2,777.09  
 Self-Pay  128   2,603.66   2,164.86  
 Other payer  213   3,042.00   2,463.85  
2009 Medicare  248   5,064.29   3,891.62  
 Medicaid  755   3,765.12   4,308.63  
 Private insurance  771   4,762.69   4,384.96  
 Self-Pay  143   3,266.92   3,133.30  
 Other payer  153   3,804.73   2,675.16  
2010 Medicare  331   6,008.17   5,470.49  
 Medicaid  599   4,301.44   4,444.31  
 Private insurance  480   4,124.78   6,863.71  
 Self-Pay  646   3,000.40   3,435.06  
 Other payer  246   3,290.05   3,347.31  
2011 Medicare  199   7,339.11   10,363.01  
 Medicaid  494   5,421.09   7,479.23  
 Private insurance  612   3,832.14   3,022.47  
 Self-Pay  275   5,694.50   4,031.54  
 Other payer  319   3,993.66   3,016.26  
2012 Medicare  250   6,019.02   5,101.32  
 Medicaid  517   4,655.30   6,352.17  
 Private insurance  544   4,364.13   4,888.03  
 Self-Pay  277   4,498.15   16,629.82  
 Other payer  335   3,860.78   4,324.33  
2013 Medicare  232   6,450.17   4,881.25  
 Medicaid  511   5,122.21   5,271.12  
 Private insurance  482   4,672.95   4,621.47  
 Self-Pay  263   3,013.07   2,387.44  
 Other payer  317   4,711.38   8,214.67  
2014 Medicare  215   6,535.76   7,769.04  
 Medicaid  828   4,378.05   4,854.57  
 Private insurance  418   4,589.53   4,217.58  
 Self-Pay  111   3,441.73   2,753.98  
 Other payer  105   4,686.87   4,637.53  
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Table 38 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 882 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  12   8,716.04   8,931.26  
 Medicaid  37   4,015.00   2,853.31  
 Private insurance  49   4,020.70   2,929.20  
 Self-Pay  18   2,727.52   1,857.51  
 Other payer  13   4,743.86   4,594.20  
2008 Medicare  80   5,256.55   6,787.40  
 Medicaid  174   4,441.71   3,054.64  
 Private insurance  306   3,461.51   4,696.17  
 Self-Pay  62   3,482.68   3,391.75  
 Other payer  54   4,322.43   2,849.05  
2009 Medicare  52   4,860.22   3,564.38  
 Medicaid  107   5,627.86   11,424.70  
 Private insurance  155   4,678.79   4,061.98  
 Self-Pay  18   2,702.66   2,382.78  
 Other payer  47   3,798.84   2,318.81  
2010 Medicare  116   5,617.67   4,550.13  
 Medicaid  180   5,410.58   4,901.50  
 Private insurance  183   4,097.27   3,617.37  
 Self-Pay  168   2,654.73   2,577.39  
 Other payer  114   2,651.81   3,421.52  
2011 Medicare  89   6,637.20   10,432.41  
 Medicaid  143   6,349.00   12,400.16  
 Private insurance  109   4,907.88   4,719.47  
 Self-Pay  79   5,734.02   5,332.76  
 Other payer  122   5,884.87   11,896.73  
2012 Medicare  88   6,912.06   6,938.17  
 Medicaid  193   6,261.64   9,607.35  
 Private insurance  174   5,174.59   7,577.00  
 Self-Pay  65   4,051.97   3,067.81  
 Other payer  122   6,312.73   11,941.09  
2013 Medicare  95   7,014.61   4,687.53  
 Medicaid  158   5,187.01   4,756.75  
 Private insurance  166   4,896.16   5,013.62  
 Self-Pay  70   2,780.50   2,515.43  
 Other payer  87   4,325.85   4,134.71  
2014 Medicare  93   6,085.02   5,256.72  
 Medicaid  275   5,366.46   7,359.76  
 Private insurance  173   5,031.34   6,865.47  
 Self-Pay  34   3,931.54   5,976.30  
 Other payer  51   8,675.61   14,185.04  
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Table 39 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 885 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  1,779   7,429.50   7,950.56  
 Medicaid  1,791   5,249.71   5,964.45  
 Private insurance  1,377   6,610.61   6,627.96  
 Self-Pay  251   4,216.02   3,375.85  
 Other payer  278   4,809.29   6,327.66  
2008 Medicare  7,698   8,718.73   9,300.37  
 Medicaid  5,122   6,598.91   8,829.36  
 Private insurance  5,089   5,362.00   6,639.97  
 Self-Pay  627   4,166.05   4,411.46  
 Other payer  1,324   5,613.86   6,384.11  
2009 Medicare  6,351   8,133.93   9,442.48  
 Medicaid  12,274   5,668.09   7,722.64  
 Private insurance  3,828   7,629.82   8,647.58  
 Self-Pay  943   3,618.24   2,861.06  
 Other payer  876   7,544.39   9,358.69  
2010 Medicare  6,387   10,582.18   11,971.19  
 Medicaid  6,474   8,035.24   12,327.28  
 Private insurance  4,570   7,183.64   8,454.87  
 Self-Pay  3,876   5,501.44   8,350.37  
 Other payer  1,271   5,627.55   8,159.22  
2011 Medicare  7,527   10,894.72   12,595.89  
 Medicaid  7,671   9,464.30   14,236.35  
 Private insurance  5,615   7,183.89   7,392.34  
 Self-Pay  1,683   11,066.67   11,011.67  
 Other payer  2,397   8,686.58   13,881.52  
2012 Medicare  7,343   9,097.67   10,944.16  
 Medicaid  8,664   6,939.55   10,924.21  
 Private insurance  4,481   7,132.95   9,314.18  
 Self-Pay  1,862   5,360.25   6,581.02  
 Other payer  2,992   7,048.83   10,168.62  
2013 Medicare  7,542   9,865.89   13,938.95  
 Medicaid  8,708   7,252.22   10,884.65  
 Private insurance  4,433   7,446.58   9,340.38  
 Self-Pay  1,709   5,255.50   5,850.12  
 Other payer  3,157   7,367.10   9,687.87  
2014 Medicare  7,235   10,570.79   13,372.93  
 Medicaid  11,679   7,105.23   11,154.25  
 Private insurance  4,185   6,988.76   8,469.86  
 Self-Pay  875   5,121.64   5,416.72  
 Other payer  920   9,636.03   15,980.87  
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Table 40 
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Health Care Costs - DRG 894 
Year Payer n 
 
Mean SD 
2007 Medicare  32   3,174.32   1,612.64  
 Medicaid  23   3,376.36   2,650.42  
 Private insurance  106   2,540.47   3,064.04  
 Self-Pay  83   2,842.16   2,081.69  
 Other payer  11   5,303.04   4,906.90  
2008 Medicare  148   2,990.90   3,698.25  
 Medicaid  104   5,671.38   7,096.26  
 Private insurance  376   2,224.68   2,830.34  
 Self-Pay  183   4,057.76   4,957.90  
 Other payer  68   6,658.80   15,795.24  
2009 Medicare  72   3,932.47   3,329.51  
 Medicaid  103   4,266.51   5,456.84  
 Private insurance  104   2,871.32   2,057.56  
 Self-Pay  132   4,086.32   3,721.70  
 Other payer  52   3,655.83   2,566.38  
2010 Medicare  140   4,750.27   6,485.37  
 Medicaid  98   5,509.97   4,184.17  
 Private insurance  275   2,393.77   2,091.07  
 Self-Pay  152   5,382.78   5,352.49  
 Other payer  71   5,409.33   5,324.96  
2011 Medicare  140   4,068.87   3,200.20  
 Medicaid  107   6,293.13   6,113.07  
 Private insurance  251   3,400.69   3,285.69  
 Self-Pay  268   3,454.87   3,838.45  
 Other payer  63   7,210.73   9,418.04  
2012 Medicare  129   4,957.64   5,112.84  
 Medicaid  129   4,680.34   3,966.65  
 Private insurance  263   3,213.38   5,903.92  
 Self-Pay  142   5,049.40   5,859.58  
 Other payer  89   4,749.55   3,512.95  
2013 Medicare  128   4,715.54   6,468.44  
 Medicaid  138   5,895.21   10,659.19  
 Private insurance  240   3,545.97   5,994.83  
 Self-Pay  158   4,967.00   4,213.75  
 Other payer  93   5,904.73   4,710.37  
2014 Medicare  117   4,421.90   3,278.18  
 Medicaid  275   6,863.13   8,181.66  
 Private insurance  192   3,583.29   3,571.50  
 Self-Pay  68   5,888.09   6,175.14  
 Other payer  37   4,663.58   5,738.32  
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Appendix C: One-Way Analysis of Variance of Health Care Costs 
Table 41 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 3 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 6.874E+11 1.718E+11 21.774 0.000 
 Within groups 477 3.764E+12 7.892E+09   
 Total 481 4.452E+12    
2008 Between groups  4  2.500E+11 6.251E+10 8.391 0.000 
 Within groups  1,429  1.065E+13 7.450E+09   
 Total  1,433  1.090E+13    
2009 Between groups  4  2.201E+11 5.503E+10 6.686 0.000 
 Within groups  1,434  1.180E+13 8.231E+09   
 Total  1,438  1.202E+13    
2010 Between groups  4  2.212E+11 5.529E+10 5.348 0.000 
 Within groups  1,102  1.139E+13 1.034E+10   
 Total  1,106  1.162E+13    
2011 Between groups  4  9.198E+11 2.299E+11  9.572  0.000 
 Within groups  813  1.953E+13 2.402E+10   
 Total  817  2.045E+13    
2012 Between groups  4  6.499E+11 1.625E+11  5.872  0.000 
 Within groups  1,144  3.165E+13 2.767E+10   
 Total  1,148  3.230E+13    
2013 Between groups  4  6.731E+11 1.683E+11  5.344  0.000 
 Within groups  1,109  3.492E+13 3.149E+10   
 Total  1,113  3.560E+13    
2014 Between groups  4  1.155E+12 2.889E+11  8.969  0.000 
 Within groups  1,114  3.588E+13 3.220E+10   
 Total  1,118  3.703E+13    
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Table 42 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 23 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 2.390E+09 5.974E+08 1.788 0.129 
 Within groups 885 2.957E+11 3.341E+08   
 Total 889 2.981E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  4.822E+09 1.205E+09 0.910 0.458 
 Within groups  436  5.777E+11 1.325E+09   
 Total  440  5.825E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  2.741E+10 6.853E+09 4.056 0.003 
 Within groups  524  8.853E+11 1.689E+09   
 Total  528  9.127E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  6.244E+10 1.561E+10 7.271 0.000 
 Within groups  652  1.400E+12 2.147E+09   
 Total  656  1.462E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  1.944E+11 4.861E+10  12.453  0.000 
 Within groups  395  1.542E+12 3.903E+09   
 Total  399  1.736E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  7.641E+10 1.910E+10  5.940  0.000 
 Within groups  499  1.605E+12 3.216E+09   
 Total  503  1.681E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  2.497E+10 6.243E+09  2.697  0.030 
 Within groups  539  1.248E+12 2.315E+09   
 Total  543  1.273E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  9.457E+10 2.364E+10  6.892  0.000 
 Within groups  575  1.973E+12 3.431E+09   
 Total  579  2.067E+12    
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Table 43 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 26 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  2.748E+10 6.870E+09 43.473 0.000 
 Within groups  1,206  1.906E+11 1.580E+08   
 Total  1,210  2.180E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  1.745E+10 4.363E+09 8.640 0.000 
 Within groups  1,297  6.549E+11 5.049E+08   
 Total  1,301  6.724E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  2.384E+10 5.960E+09 14.358 0.000 
 Within groups  1,470  6.101E+11 4.151E+08   
 Total  1,474  6.340E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  3.872E+10 9.680E+09 15.172 0.000 
 Within groups  1,247  7.956E+11 6.380E+08   
 Total  1,251  8.343E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  2.100E+10 5.251E+09  12.341  0.000 
 Within groups  700  2.979E+11 4.255E+08   
 Total  704  3.189E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  3.014E+10 7.535E+09  8.410  0.000 
 Within groups  937  8.395E+11 8.959E+08   
 Total  941  8.696E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  1.394E+10 3.486E+09  4.766  0.001 
 Within groups  898  6.568E+11 7.314E+08   
 Total  902  6.707E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  2.182E+10 5.456E+09  6.359  0.000 
 Within groups  898  7.704E+11 8.579E+08   
 Total  902  7.922E+11    
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Table 44 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 153 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 8.087E+08 2.022E+08 10.939 0.000 
 Within groups 764 1.412E+10 1.848E+07   
 Total 768 1.493E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  8.207E+08 2.052E+08 17.313 0.000 
 Within groups  1,817  2.153E+10 1.185E+07   
 Total  1,821  2.235E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  1.368E+09 3.421E+08 14.992 0.000 
 Within groups  3,197  7.295E+10 2.282E+07   
 Total  3,201  7.432E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  1.423E+09 3.557E+08 21.777 0.000 
 Within groups  2,023  3.304E+10 1.633E+07   
 Total  2,027  3.447E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  1.106E+09 2.764E+08  19.588  0.000 
 Within groups  1,422  2.007E+10 1.411E+07   
 Total  1,426  2.117E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  1.249E+09 3.123E+08  11.669  0.000 
 Within groups  1,997  5.346E+10 2.677E+07   
 Total  2,001  5.470E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  2.764E+09 6.909E+08  17.603  0.000 
 Within groups  2,253  8.844E+10 3.925E+07   
 Total  2,257  9.120E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  1.871E+09 4.678E+08  11.924  0.000 
 Within groups  2,023  7.936E+10 3.923E+07   
 Total  2,027  8.123E+10    
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Table 45 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 203 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  1.031E+10 2.577E+09 24.617 0.000 
 Within groups  2,747  2.875E+11 1.047E+08   
 Total  2,751  2.978E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  2.104E+09 5.261E+08 46.075 0.000 
 Within groups  4,468  5.102E+10 1.142E+07   
 Total  4,472  5.312E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  2.761E+09 6.901E+08 78.471 0.000 
 Within groups  7,529  6.622E+10 8.795E+06   
 Total  7,533  6.898E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  1.255E+09 3.137E+08 22.165 0.000 
 Within groups  6,168  8.730E+10 1.415E+07   
 Total  6,172  8.855E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  2.273E+09 5.683E+08  58.545  0.000 
 Within groups  3,859  3.746E+10 9.707E+06   
 Total  3,863  3.973E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  1.469E+09 3.672E+08  16.184  0.000 
 Within groups  5,484  1.244E+11 2.269E+07   
 Total  5,488  1.259E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  1.101E+09 2.752E+08  14.790  0.000 
 Within groups  5,010  9.321E+10 1.860E+07   
 Total  5,014  9.431E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  1.152E+09 2.879E+08  17.707  0.000 
 Within groups  4,342  7.061E+10 1.626E+07   
 Total  4,346  7.176E+10    
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Table 46 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 207 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  1.507E+10 3.768E+09  5.114  0.000 
 Within groups  2,065  1.522E+12 7.369E+08   
 Total  2,069  1.537E+12    
2008 Between groups  4  3.356E+10 8.391E+09 4.546 0.001 
 Within groups  2,286  4.219E+12 1.846E+09   
 Total  2,290  4.253E+12    
2009 Between groups  4  9.010E+10 2.252E+10 12.031 0.000 
 Within groups  2,483  4.649E+12 1.872E+09   
 Total  2,487  4.739E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  8.196E+09 2.049E+09 0.884 0.473 
 Within groups  2,139  4.960E+12 2.319E+09   
 Total  2,143  4.968E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  2.382E+10 5.956E+09  3.335  0.010 
 Within groups  1,414  2.525E+12 1.786E+09   
 Total  1,418  2.549E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  5.786E+10 1.446E+10  5.119  0.000 
 Within groups  1,744  4.927E+12 2.825E+09   
 Total  1,748  4.985E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  1.087E+11 2.717E+10  6.703  0.000 
 Within groups  1,675  6.788E+12 4.053E+09   
 Total  1,679  6.897E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  1.822E+11 4.555E+10  9.069  0.000 
 Within groups  1,616  8.116E+12 5.022E+09   
 Total  1,620  8.298E+12    
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Table 47 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 233 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 4.108E+09 1.027E+09 1.492 0.203 
 Within groups 708 4.873E+11 6.883E+08   
 Total 712 4.914E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  1.258E+10 3.144E+09 2.975 0.019 
 Within groups  583  6.162E+11 1.057E+09   
 Total  587  6.287E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  4.783E+09 1.196E+09 1.181 0.318 
 Within groups  793  8.032E+11 1.013E+09   
 Total  797  8.080E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  3.633E+09 9.082E+08 1.059 0.376 
 Within groups  686  5.885E+11 8.578E+08   
 Total  690  5.921E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  6.696E+09 1.674E+09  1.168  0.324 
 Within groups  641  9.187E+11 1.433E+09   
 Total  645  9.254E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  1.766E+10 4.415E+09  3.226  0.012 
 Within groups  621  8.499E+11 1.369E+09   
 Total  625  8.676E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  1.031E+10 2.577E+09  1.606  0.171 
 Within groups  641  1.028E+12 1.604E+09   
 Total  645  1.038E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  1.198E+10 2.996E+09  2.592  0.036 
 Within groups  675  7.799E+11 1.155E+09   
 Total  679  7.919E+11    
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Table 48 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 234 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 2.032E+09 5.080E+08 1.674 0.154 
 Within groups 778 2.362E+11 3.035E+08   
 Total 782 2.382E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  3.198E+09 7.996E+08 4.284 0.002 
 Within groups  1,080  2.016E+11 1.867E+08   
 Total  1,084  2.048E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  2.735E+09 6.837E+08 3.909 0.004 
 Within groups  1,324  2.315E+11 1.749E+08   
 Total  1,328  2.343E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  3.359E+09 8.396E+08 4.293 0.002 
 Within groups  993  1.942E+11 1.956E+08   
 Total  997  1.976E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  1.584E+09 3.959E+08  2.007  0.091 
 Within groups  961  1.896E+11 1.972E+08   
 Total  965  1.911E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  4.510E+09 1.128E+09  3.083  0.015 
 Within groups  1,012  3.701E+11 3.657E+08   
 Total  1,016  3.746E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  2.558E+09 6.395E+08  2.316  0.056 
 Within groups  970  2.678E+11 2.761E+08   
 Total  974  2.704E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  5.910E+09 1.477E+09  5.029  0.001 
 Within groups  961  2.823E+11 2.938E+08   
 Total  965  2.883E+11    
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Table 49 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 311 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 1.004E+07 2.509E+06 0.288 0.886 
 Within groups 709 6.168E+09 8.700E+06   
 Total 713 6.179E+09    
2008 Between groups  4  4.319E+08 1.080E+08 10.172 0.000 
 Within groups  1,315  1.396E+10 1.062E+07   
 Total  1,319  1.439E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  8.748E+07 2.187E+07 2.795 0.025 
 Within groups  1,121  8.772E+09 7.825E+06   
 Total  1,125  8.860E+09    
2010 Between groups  4  1.715E+08 4.288E+07 3.234 0.012 
 Within groups  1,170  1.551E+10 1.326E+07   
 Total  1,174  1.568E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  2.020E+08 5.050E+07  4.542  0.001 
 Within groups  992  1.103E+10 1.112E+07   
 Total  996  1.123E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  4.374E+08 1.094E+08  4.427  0.002 
 Within groups  922  2.278E+10 2.470E+07   
 Total  926  2.321E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  1.058E+08 2.644E+07  2.135  0.075 
 Within groups  789  9.770E+09 1.238E+07   
 Total  793  9.876E+09    
2014 Between groups  4  1.127E+08 2.817E+07  1.655  0.159 
 Within groups  737  1.254E+10 1.702E+07   
 Total  741  1.266E+10    
 
208 
 
Table 50 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 313 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  4.714E+08 1.178E+08 19.561 0.000 
 Within groups  3,740  2.253E+10 6.024E+06   
 Total  3,744  2.300E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  2.601E+09 6.502E+08 77.657 0.000 
 Within groups  12,238  1.025E+11 8.373E+06   
 Total  12,242  1.051E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  8.859E+08 2.215E+08 26.811 0.000 
 Within groups  13,496  1.115E+11 8.261E+06   
 Total  13,500  1.124E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  1.104E+09 2.760E+08 33.992 0.000 
 Within groups  12,053  9.787E+10 8.120E+06   
 Total  12,057  9.897E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  5.821E+08 1.455E+08  18.490  0.000 
 Within groups  10,766  8.473E+10 7.871E+06   
 Total  10,770  8.532E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  1.774E+09 4.436E+08  40.593  0.000 
 Within groups  10,858  1.187E+11 1.093E+07   
 Total  10,862  1.204E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  6.883E+08 1.721E+08  16.694  0.000 
 Within groups  8,663  8.929E+10 1.031E+07   
 Total  8,667  8.998E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  1.101E+09 2.753E+08  21.635  0.000 
 Within groups  7,537  9.590E+10 1.272E+07   
 Total  7,541  9.700E+10    
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Table 51 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 326 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 4.163E+09 1.041E+09 0.431 0.786 
 Within groups 285 6.881E+11 2.414E+09   
 Total 289 6.922E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  3.016E+10 7.540E+09 2.884 0.022 
 Within groups  682  1.783E+12 2.614E+09   
 Total  686  1.813E+12    
2009 Between groups  4  2.898E+10 7.244E+09 2.557 0.038 
 Within groups  818  2.318E+12 2.833E+09   
 Total  822  2.347E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  1.290E+10 3.225E+09 1.690 0.150 
 Within groups  704  1.343E+12 1.908E+09   
 Total  708  1.356E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  5.333E+10 1.333E+10  3.385  0.009 
 Within groups  596  2.348E+12 3.939E+09   
 Total  600  2.401E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  2.404E+10 6.009E+09  1.561  0.183 
 Within groups  668  2.571E+12 3.849E+09   
 Total  672  2.595E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  1.398E+10 3.496E+09  1.158  0.328 
 Within groups  697  2.105E+12 3.020E+09   
 Total  701  2.119E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  3.613E+10 9.032E+09  1.429  0.223 
 Within groups  692  4.375E+12 6.322E+09   
 Total  696  4.411E+12    
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Table 52 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 329 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 3.813E+10 9.533E+09  5.450  0.000 
 Within groups 628 1.098E+12 1.749E+09   
 Total 632 1.137E+12    
2008 Between groups  4  1.187E+11 2.967E+10 14.513 0.000 
 Within groups  2,374  4.853E+12 2.044E+09   
 Total  2,378  4.972E+12    
2009 Between groups  4  3.509E+10 8.772E+09 4.735 0.001 
 Within groups  2,380  4.409E+12 1.853E+09   
 Total  2,384  4.444E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  8.583E+10 2.146E+10 13.071 0.000 
 Within groups  2,089  3.429E+12 1.642E+09   
 Total  2,093  3.515E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  7.974E+10 1.993E+10  11.894  0.000 
 Within groups  2,115  3.545E+12 1.676E+09   
 Total  2,119  3.625E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  6.631E+10 1.658E+10  6.050  0.000 
 Within groups  2,109  5.779E+12 2.740E+09   
 Total  2,113  5.845E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  1.114E+11 2.784E+10  8.507  0.000 
 Within groups  2,085  6.823E+12 3.272E+09   
 Total  2,089  6.934E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  1.444E+11 3.610E+10  11.199  0.000 
 Within groups  2,049  6.605E+12 3.223E+09   
 Total  2,053  6.749E+12    
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Table 53 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 373 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  1.048E+09 2.621E+08 118.959 0.000 
 Within groups  61,041  1.345E+11 2.203E+06   
 Total  61,045  1.355E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  5.161E+08 1.290E+08 4.712 0.001 
 Within groups  671  1.837E+10 2.738E+07   
 Total  675  1.889E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  8.189E+07 2.047E+07 0.676 0.609 
 Within groups  917  2.778E+10 3.030E+07   
 Total  921  2.786E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  4.585E+08 1.146E+08 3.696 0.005 
 Within groups  806  2.500E+10 3.101E+07   
 Total  810  2.545E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  7.168E+08 1.792E+08  7.771  0.000 
 Within groups  741  1.709E+10 2.306E+07   
 Total  745  1.780E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  2.259E+08 5.648E+07  1.908  0.107 
 Within groups  833  2.466E+10 2.961E+07   
 Total  837  2.489E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  2.214E+08 5.536E+07  1.825  0.122 
 Within groups  802  2.433E+10 3.034E+07   
 Total  806  2.455E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  3.682E+08 9.206E+07  1.772  0.132 
 Within groups  753  3.912E+10 5.195E+07   
 Total  757  3.948E+10    
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Table 54 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 390 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  6.669E+09 1.667E+09 163.322 0.000 
 Within groups  14,840  1.515E+11 1.021E+07   
 Total  14,844  1.582E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  5.024E+08 1.256E+08 9.724 0.000 
 Within groups  2,800  3.617E+10 1.292E+07   
 Total  2,804  3.667E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  3.094E+08 7.734E+07 5.321 0.000 
 Within groups  3,026  4.398E+10 1.454E+07   
 Total  3,030  4.429E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  4.091E+08 1.023E+08 5.766 0.000 
 Within groups  2,634  4.671E+10 1.773E+07   
 Total  2,638  4.712E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  5.831E+08 1.458E+08  10.325  0.000 
 Within groups  2,807  3.963E+10 1.412E+07   
 Total  2,811  4.022E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  4.445E+08 1.111E+08  7.356  0.000 
 Within groups  2,907  4.392E+10 1.511E+07   
 Total  2,911  4.436E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  3.430E+08 8.576E+07  5.086  0.000 
 Within groups  2,830  4.772E+10 1.686E+07   
 Total  2,834  4.806E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  3.692E+08 9.230E+07  6.719  0.000 
 Within groups  2,742  3.767E+10 1.374E+07   
 Total  2,746  3.804E+10    
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Table 55 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 391 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  1.883E+10 4.708E+09  3,238.132  0.000 
 Within groups  83,396  1.213E+11 1.454E+06   
 Total  83,400  1.401E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  2.603E+08 6.507E+07 0.772 0.543 
 Within groups  2,204  1.858E+11 8.430E+07   
 Total  2,208  1.861E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  7.979E+08 1.995E+08 1.797 0.127 
 Within groups  2,900  3.219E+11 1.110E+08   
 Total  2,904  3.227E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  6.744E+08 1.686E+08 1.439 0.219 
 Within groups  3,033  3.555E+11 1.172E+08   
 Total  3,037  3.561E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  6.973E+08 1.743E+08  1.588  0.175 
 Within groups  2,270  2.493E+11 1.098E+08   
 Total  2,274  2.499E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  1.600E+09 4.000E+08  2.106  0.078 
 Within groups  2,425  4.606E+11 1.899E+08   
 Total  2,429  4.622E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  1.107E+09 2.767E+08  1.236  0.293 
 Within groups  2,465  5.518E+11 2.239E+08   
 Total  2,469  5.529E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  9.932E+08 2.483E+08  1.363  0.244 
 Within groups  2,585  4.710E+11 1.822E+08   
 Total  2,589  4.720E+11    
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Table 56 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 392 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  1.424E+09 3.561E+08 7.981 0.000 
 Within groups  4,386  1.957E+11 4.462E+07   
 Total  4,390  1.971E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  4.971E+09 1.243E+09 57.731 0.000 
 Within groups  14,371  3.094E+11 2.153E+07   
 Total  14,375  3.144E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  3.594E+09 8.986E+08 38.260 0.000 
 Within groups  16,975  3.987E+11 2.349E+07   
 Total  16,979  4.023E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  3.663E+09 9.158E+08 35.441 0.000 
 Within groups  15,666  4.048E+11 2.584E+07   
 Total  15,670  4.085E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  3.325E+09 8.311E+08  37.048  0.000 
 Within groups  15,553  3.489E+11 2.243E+07   
 Total  15,557  3.522E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  5.897E+09 1.474E+09  40.733  0.000 
 Within groups  16,370  5.925E+11 3.619E+07   
 Total  16,374  5.984E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  5.081E+09 1.270E+09  36.808  0.000 
 Within groups  15,244  5.261E+11 3.451E+07   
 Total  15,248  5.312E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  3.873E+09 9.683E+08  27.046  0.000 
 Within groups  14,583  5.221E+11 3.580E+07   
 Total  14,587  5.260E+11    
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Table 57 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 464 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 4.928E+08 1.232E+08 1.050 0.380 
 Within groups 663 7.777E+10 1.173E+08   
 Total 667 7.827E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  1.276E+10 3.189E+09 4.811 0.001 
 Within groups  463  3.069E+11 6.629E+08   
 Total  467  3.197E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  7.706E+09 1.926E+09 2.730 0.029 
 Within groups  449  3.169E+11 7.057E+08   
 Total  453  3.246E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  1.291E+10 3.228E+09 3.126 0.015 
 Within groups  488  5.039E+11 1.033E+09   
 Total  492  5.168E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  3.846E+10 9.614E+09  5.812  0.000 
 Within groups  421  6.964E+11 1.654E+09   
 Total  425  7.349E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  2.494E+10 6.234E+09  4.035  0.003 
 Within groups  533  8.235E+11 1.545E+09   
 Total  537  8.484E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  6.013E+09 1.503E+09  1.445  0.218 
 Within groups  544  5.659E+11 1.040E+09   
 Total  548  5.719E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  6.779E+09 1.695E+09  2.361  0.052 
 Within groups  543  3.898E+11 7.179E+08   
 Total  547  3.966E+11    
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Table 58 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 470 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  3.753E+09 9.382E+08 15.739 0.000 
 Within groups  5,967  3.557E+11 5.961E+07   
 Total  5,971  3.594E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  5.542E+09 1.385E+09 36.278 0.000 
 Within groups  19,209  7.336E+11 3.819E+07   
 Total  19,213  7.392E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  1.103E+09 2.757E+08 5.280 0.000 
 Within groups  20,708  1.081E+12 5.221E+07   
 Total  20,712  1.082E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  4.013E+09 1.003E+09 23.063 0.000 
 Within groups  19,025  8.276E+11 4.350E+07   
 Total  19,029  8.317E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  1.334E+10 3.335E+09  53.708  0.000 
 Within groups  20,013  1.243E+12 6.210E+07   
 Total  20,017  1.256E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  3.259E+09 8.148E+08  10.527  0.000 
 Within groups  21,681  1.678E+12 7.740E+07   
 Total  21,685  1.681E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  1.543E+09 3.859E+08  6.688  0.000 
 Within groups  22,841  1.318E+12 5.769E+07   
 Total  22,845  1.319E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  3.348E+09 8.369E+08  14.801  0.000 
 Within groups  24,119  1.364E+12 5.654E+07   
 Total  24,123  1.367E+12    
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Table 59 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 603 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  7.727E+08 1.932E+08 9.352 0.000 
 Within groups  2,577  5.323E+10 2.066E+07   
 Total  2,581  5.401E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  3.116E+09 7.791E+08 32.132 0.000 
 Within groups  9,439  2.289E+11 2.425E+07   
 Total  9,443  2.320E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  1.825E+09 4.563E+08 19.676 0.000 
 Within groups  10,780  2.500E+11 2.319E+07   
 Total  10,784  2.518E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  3.963E+09 9.906E+08 34.138 0.000 
 Within groups  10,640  3.088E+11 2.902E+07   
 Total  10,644  3.127E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  3.066E+09 7.666E+08  24.414  0.000 
 Within groups  10,357  3.252E+11 3.140E+07   
 Total  10,361  3.283E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  2.359E+09 5.896E+08  15.798  0.000 
 Within groups  10,841  4.046E+11 3.732E+07   
 Total  10,845  4.070E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  3.652E+09 9.130E+08  21.233  0.000 
 Within groups  10,468  4.501E+11 4.300E+07   
 Total  10,472  4.538E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  2.277E+09 5.693E+08  14.900  0.000 
 Within groups  10,601  4.050E+11 3.821E+07   
 Total  10,605  4.073E+11    
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Table 60 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 639 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 1.065E+08 2.663E+07 2.790 0.025 
 Within groups 832 7.943E+09 9.547E+06   
 Total 836 8.049E+09    
2008 Between groups  4  8.615E+08 2.154E+08 17.323 0.000 
 Within groups  2,958  3.677E+10 1.243E+07   
 Total  2,962  3.764E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  8.589E+07 2.147E+07 1.678 0.152 
 Within groups  3,322  4.251E+10 1.280E+07   
 Total  3,326  4.260E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  3.337E+08 8.343E+07 5.736 0.000 
 Within groups  2,777  4.039E+10 1.455E+07   
 Total  2,781  4.073E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  5.578E+08 1.395E+08  10.676  0.000 
 Within groups  2,403  3.139E+10 1.306E+07   
 Total  2,407  3.195E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  3.847E+08 9.617E+07  5.036  0.000 
 Within groups  2,793  5.333E+10 1.910E+07   
 Total  2,797  5.372E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  9.231E+07 2.308E+07  1.443  0.217 
 Within groups  2,676  4.281E+10 1.600E+07   
 Total  2,680  4.290E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  2.289E+08 5.723E+07  2.735  0.027 
 Within groups  2,484  5.198E+10 2.092E+07   
 Total  2,488  5.221E+10    
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Table 61 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 690 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  9.983E+08 2.496E+08 14.595 0.000 
 Within groups  2,509  4.290E+10 1.710E+07   
 Total  2,513  4.390E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  2.401E+09 6.003E+08 25.502 0.000 
 Within groups  8,941  2.105E+11 2.354E+07   
 Total  8,945  2.129E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  2.577E+09 6.441E+08 34.021 0.000 
 Within groups  10,066  1.906E+11 1.893E+07   
 Total  10,070  1.932E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  3.186E+09 7.964E+08 29.654 0.000 
 Within groups  8,781  2.358E+11 2.686E+07   
 Total  8,785  2.390E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  1.948E+09 4.869E+08  18.814  0.000 
 Within groups  8,603  2.227E+11 2.588E+07   
 Total  8,607  2.246E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  2.315E+09 5.788E+08  15.478  0.000 
 Within groups  9,121  3.411E+11 3.739E+07   
 Total  9,125  3.434E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  2.239E+09 5.599E+08  19.347  0.000 
 Within groups  8,462  2.449E+11 2.894E+07   
 Total  8,466  2.471E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  1.488E+09 3.720E+08  12.088  0.000 
 Within groups  8,097  2.492E+11 3.077E+07   
 Total  8,101  2.506E+11    
 
 
220 
 
Table 62 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 765 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  4.219E+07 1.055E+07 0.243 0.914 
 Within groups  3,287  1.429E+11 4.347E+07   
 Total  3,291  1.429E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  1.919E+09 4.797E+08 8.390 0.000 
 Within groups  11,755  6.721E+11 5.717E+07   
 Total  11,759  6.740E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  3.022E+08 7.554E+07 0.852 0.492 
 Within groups  12,755  1.131E+12 8.871E+07   
 Total  12,759  1.132E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  1.488E+09 3.720E+08 4.317 0.002 
 Within groups  12,179  1.050E+12 8.618E+07   
 Total  12,183  1.051E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  4.286E+08 1.071E+08  1.431  0.221 
 Within groups  11,529  8.633E+11 7.488E+07   
 Total  11,533  8.637E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  6.292E+08 1.573E+08  1.767  0.133 
 Within groups  12,206  1.087E+12 8.904E+07   
 Total  12,210  1.087E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  2.093E+09 5.232E+08  6.037  0.000 
 Within groups  12,435  1.078E+12 8.667E+07   
 Total  12,439  1.080E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  1.422E+09 3.554E+08  3.111  0.014 
 Within groups  12,874  1.471E+12 1.142E+08   
 Total  12,878  1.472E+12    
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Table 63 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 766 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  2.806E+08 7.015E+07 19.064 0.000 
 Within groups  8,597  3.164E+10 3.680E+06   
 Total  8,601  3.192E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  6.107E+08 1.527E+08 19.054 0.000 
 Within groups  28,106  2.252E+11 8.012E+06   
 Total  28,110  2.258E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  7.562E+07 1.891E+07 1.992 0.093 
 Within groups  30,412  2.887E+11 9.493E+06   
 Total  30,416  2.888E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  9.367E+08 2.342E+08 29.450 0.000 
 Within groups  24,309  1.933E+11 7.952E+06   
 Total  24,313  1.942E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  5.622E+08 1.405E+08  14.598  0.000 
 Within groups  23,991  2.310E+11 9.628E+06   
 Total  23,995  2.316E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  1.270E+09 3.175E+08  24.643  0.000 
 Within groups  23,739  3.059E+11 1.288E+07   
 Total  23,743  3.071E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  2.294E+09 5.736E+08  43.057  0.000 
 Within groups  23,343  3.110E+11 1.332E+07   
 Total  23,347  3.133E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  1.520E+09 3.799E+08  23.667  0.000 
 Within groups  22,887  3.674E+11 1.605E+07   
 Total  22,891  3.689E+11    
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Table 64 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 775 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  1.455E+08 3.638E+07 15.922 0.000 
 Within groups  20,360  4.652E+10 2.285E+06   
 Total  20,364  4.667E+10    
2008 Between groups  4  5.611E+08 1.403E+08 38.229 0.000 
 Within groups  70,327  2.580E+11 3.669E+06   
 Total  70,331  2.586E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  5.107E+08 1.277E+08 23.642 0.000 
 Within groups  76,421  4.127E+11 5.400E+06   
 Total  76,425  4.132E+11    
2010 Between groups  4  2.010E+09 5.024E+08 94.105 0.000 
 Within groups  67,450  3.601E+11 5.339E+06   
 Total  67,454  3.621E+11    
2011 Between groups  4  6.895E+08 1.724E+08  40.292  0.000 
 Within groups  61,892  2.648E+11 4.278E+06   
 Total  61,896  2.655E+11    
2012 Between groups  4  1.459E+09 3.648E+08  57.607  0.000 
 Within groups  62,929  3.985E+11 6.332E+06   
 Total  62,933  4.000E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  1.857E+09 4.643E+08  81.584  0.000 
 Within groups  62,511  3.558E+11 5.691E+06   
 Total  62,515  3.576E+11    
2014 Between groups  4  1.484E+09 3.710E+08  53.760  0.000 
 Within groups  63,543  4.385E+11 6.901E+06   
 Total  63,547  4.400E+11    
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Table 65 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 853 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 1.186E+10 2.965E+09 1.696 0.150 
 Within groups 478 8.355E+11 1.748E+09   
 Total 482 8.474E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  7.255E+10 1.814E+10 6.778 0.000 
 Within groups  2,075  5.553E+12 2.676E+09   
 Total  2,079  5.626E+12    
2009 Between groups  4  6.853E+10 1.713E+10 7.635 0.000 
 Within groups  2,492  5.591E+12 2.244E+09   
 Total  2,496  5.660E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  9.936E+10 2.484E+10 10.713 0.000 
 Within groups  2,558  5.931E+12 2.319E+09   
 Total  2,562  6.031E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  6.729E+10 1.682E+10  8.439  0.000 
 Within groups  2,718  5.418E+12 1.993E+09   
 Total  2,722  5.485E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  1.289E+11 3.222E+10  9.028  0.000 
 Within groups  2,934  1.047E+13 3.569E+09   
 Total  2,938  1.060E+13    
2013 Between groups  4  8.524E+10 2.131E+10  7.157  0.000 
 Within groups  3,346  9.962E+12 2.977E+09   
 Total  3,350  1.005E+13    
2014 Between groups  4  9.884E+10 2.471E+10  7.972  0.000 
 Within groups  3,908  1.211E+13 3.100E+09   
 Total  3,912  1.221E+13    
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Table 66 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 871 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  3.402E+09 8.504E+08 3.213 0.012 
 Within groups  2,884  7.634E+11 2.647E+08   
 Total  2,888  7.668E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  2.300E+10 5.751E+09 23.848 0.000 
 Within groups  14,041  3.386E+12 2.411E+08   
 Total  14,045  3.409E+12    
2009 Between groups  4  1.125E+10 2.813E+09 10.487 0.000 
 Within groups  14,990  4.021E+12 2.683E+08   
 Total  14,994  4.032E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  1.928E+10 4.819E+09 16.571 0.000 
 Within groups  16,220  4.717E+12 2.908E+08   
 Total  16,224  4.736E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  2.626E+10 6.566E+09  26.718  0.000 
 Within groups  16,497  4.054E+12 2.458E+08   
 Total  16,501  4.081E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  2.994E+10 7.485E+09  23.914  0.000 
 Within groups  18,976  5.939E+12 3.130E+08   
 Total  18,980  5.969E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  3.533E+10 8.833E+09  23.985  0.000 
 Within groups  22,171  8.165E+12 3.683E+08   
 Total  22,175  8.200E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  2.438E+10 6.095E+09  18.633  0.000 
 Within groups  25,673  8.398E+12 3.271E+08   
 Total  25,677  8.422E+12    
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Table 67 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 881 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 7.113E+08 1.778E+08 7.637 0.000 
 Within groups 359 8.359E+09 2.328E+07   
 Total 363 9.070E+09    
2008 Between groups  4  2.556E+09 6.389E+08 11.006 0.000 
 Within groups  1,772  1.029E+11 5.805E+07   
 Total  1,776  1.054E+11    
2009 Between groups  4  7.129E+08 1.782E+08 10.508 0.000 
 Within groups  2,065  3.503E+10 1.696E+07   
 Total  2,069  3.574E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  2.163E+09 5.408E+08 22.746 0.000 
 Within groups  2,297  5.461E+10 2.377E+07   
 Total  2,301  5.677E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  2.451E+09 6.128E+08  18.791  0.000 
 Within groups  1,894  6.177E+10 3.261E+07   
 Total  1,898  6.422E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  7.210E+08 1.802E+08  2.814  0.024 
 Within groups  1,918  1.228E+11 6.405E+07   
 Total  1,922  1.236E+11    
2013 Between groups  4  1.535E+09 3.837E+08  13.089  0.000 
 Within groups  1,800  5.276E+10 2.931E+07   
 Total  1,804  5.430E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  9.892E+08 2.473E+08  9.639  0.000 
 Within groups  1,672  4.289E+10 2.565E+07   
 Total  1,676  4.388E+10    
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Table 68 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 882 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 2.876E+08 7.190E+07 4.707 0.001 
 Within groups 124 1.894E+09 1.528E+07   
 Total 128 2.182E+09    
2008 Between groups  4  2.712E+08 6.780E+07 3.469 0.008 
 Within groups  671  1.311E+10 1.954E+07   
 Total  675  1.338E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  2.017E+08 5.043E+07 1.086 0.363 
 Within groups  374  1.737E+10 4.644E+07   
 Total  378  1.757E+10    
2010 Between groups  4  1.166E+09 2.916E+08 19.177 0.000 
 Within groups  756  1.150E+10 1.521E+07   
 Total  760  1.266E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  1.866E+08 4.665E+07  0.471  0.757 
 Within groups  537  5.316E+10 9.900E+07   
 Total  541  5.335E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  4.476E+08 1.119E+08  1.434  0.221 
 Within groups  637  4.970E+10 7.802E+07   
 Total  641  5.015E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  7.771E+08 1.943E+08  9.504  0.000 
 Within groups  571  1.167E+10 2.044E+07   
 Total  575  1.245E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  6.694E+08 1.674E+08  2.829  0.024 
 Within groups  621  3.673E+10 5.915E+07   
 Total  625  3.740E+10    
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Table 69 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 885 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups  4  6.059E+09 1.515E+09 33.091 0.000 
 Within groups  5,471  2.505E+11 4.578E+07   
 Total  5,475  2.565E+11    
2008 Between groups  4  4.477E+10 1.119E+10 163.946 0.000 
 Within groups  19,855  1.355E+12 6.827E+07   
 Total  19,859  1.400E+12    
2009 Between groups  4  3.883E+10 9.706E+09 141.157 0.000 
 Within groups  24,267  1.669E+12 6.876E+07   
 Total  24,271  1.707E+12    
2010 Between groups  4  7.699E+10 1.925E+10 168.382 0.000 
 Within groups  22,573  2.580E+12 1.143E+08   
 Total  22,577  2.657E+12    
2011 Between groups  4  5.031E+10 1.258E+10  84.130  0.000 
 Within groups  24,888  3.721E+12 1.495E+08   
 Total  24,892  3.771E+12    
2012 Between groups  4  3.120E+10 7.801E+09  73.426  0.000 
 Within groups  25,337  2.692E+12 1.062E+08   
 Total  25,341  2.723E+12    
2013 Between groups  4  4.652E+10 1.163E+10  91.754  0.000 
 Within groups  25,544  3.238E+12 1.268E+08   
 Total  25,548  3.285E+12    
2014 Between groups  4  7.082E+10 1.770E+10  133.243  0.000 
 Within groups  24,889  3.307E+12 1.329E+08   
 Total  24,893  3.378E+12    
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Table 70 
 
One-Way ANOVA of Health Care Costs - DRG 894 
Year Source 
 
df SS MS F p 
2007 Between groups 4 8.509E+07 2.127E+07 2.927 0.022 
 Within groups 250 1.817E+09 7.268E+06   
 Total 254 1.902E+09    
2008 Between groups  4  1.876E+09 4.689E+08 13.055 0.000 
 Within groups  874  3.139E+10 3.592E+07   
 Total  878  3.327E+10    
2009 Between groups  4  1.251E+08 3.128E+07 2.235 0.064 
 Within groups  458  6.411E+09 1.400E+07   
 Total  462  6.536E+09    
2010 Between groups  4  1.423E+09 3.558E+08 17.279 0.000 
 Within groups  731  1.505E+10 2.059E+07   
 Total  735  1.648E+10    
2011 Between groups  4  1.351E+09 3.378E+08  15.892  0.000 
 Within groups  824  1.752E+10 2.126E+07   
 Total  828  1.887E+10    
2012 Between groups  4  4.827E+08 1.207E+08  4.414  0.002 
 Within groups  747  2.042E+10 2.734E+07   
 Total  751  2.090E+10    
2013 Between groups  4  6.605E+08 1.651E+08  3.620  0.006 
 Within groups  752  3.430E+10 4.561E+07   
 Total  756  3.496E+10    
2014 Between groups  4  1.366E+09 3.416E+08  9.067  0.000 
 Within groups  684  2.576E+10 3.767E+07   
 Total  688  2.713E+10    
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Appendix D: Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs 
Table 71 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 3 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 161,645.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 75,713.29 85,932.25* 
(1.00) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
83,439.11 78,206.43* 
(0.87) 
-7,725.81 --   
 4. Self-Pay 180,362.65 -18,717.11 
(-0.20) 
-
104,649.36** 
(-1.11) 
-
96,923.55** 
(-0.99) 
--  
 5. Other payer 70,910.31 90,735.23* 
(1.14) 
4,802.98 12,528.79 109,452.34** 
(1.24) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 154,148.33 --     
 2. Medicaid 184,079.71 -29,931.37* 
(-0.32) 
-- 
   
 3. Private 
insurance 
149,944.85 4,203.48 34,134.86* 
(0.36) --   
 4. Self-Pay 137,745.76 16,402.57 46,333.95** 
(0.51) 
12,199.09 
--  
 5. Other payer 165,016.78 -10,868.45 19,062.93 -15,071.93 -27,271.02 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 150,744.60 --     
 2. Medicaid 167,880.90 -17,136.30 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
171,339.99 -
20,595.39** 
(-0.22) 
-3,459.09 --   
 4. Self-Pay 116,945.86 33,798.74** 
(0.46) 
50,935.04* 
(0.63) 
54,394.13* 
(0.65) 
--  
 5. Other payer 158,426.08 -7,681.48 9,454.82 12,913.91 -41,480.22** 
(-0.53) 
-- 
2010 1. Medicare 159,768.10 --     
 2. Medicaid 194,307.36 -34,539.26* 
(-0.34) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
168,175.46 -8,407.36 26,131.90** 
(0.24) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 153,783.26 5,984.84 40,524.10 14,392.20 --  
 5. Other payer 181,323.17 -21,555.07 12,984.19 -13,147.71 -27,539.91 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 186,789.99 --     
 2. Medicaid 265,795.32 -79,005.33* 
(-0.50) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
224,728.37 -37,938.38 41,066.95 --   
 4. Self-Pay 149,004.25 37,785.74 116,791.07* 
(0.83) 
75,724.12** 
(0.53) 
--  
 5. Other payer 176,966.78 9,823.21 88,828.53** 
(0.57) 
47,761.58 -27,962.53 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 192,309.45 --     
 2. Medicaid 246,206.00 -53,896.55* 
(-0.31) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
227,139.08 -
34,829.63** 
(-0.22) 
19,066.92 --   
 4. Self-Pay 169,894.36 22,415.09 76,311.63* 
(0.51) 
57,244.72** 
(0.44) 
--  
 5. Other payer 228,993.50 -36,684.04 17,212.50 -1,854.41 -59,099.13 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 197,310.19 --     
 2. Medicaid 254,363.22 -57,053.03* 
(-0.32) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
233,578.83 -
36,268.64** 
(-0.21) 
20,784.39 --   
 4. Self-Pay 183,052.39 14,257.80 71,310.83 50,526.44 --  
 5. Other payer 241,192.78 -43,882.59 13,170.44 -7,613.95 -58,140.39 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 190,033.66 --     
 2. Medicaid 244,768.73 -54,735.07* 
(-0.35) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
254,794.12 -64,760.47* 
(-0.34) 
-10,025.39 --   
 4. Self-Pay 144,063.02 45,970.64 100,705.71* 
(0.74) 
110,731.10* 
(0.63) 
--  
 5. Other payer 271,958.84 -81,925.18 -27,190.11 -17,164.72 -
127,895.82** 
(-0.73) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 72 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 23 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 9,831.84 --     
 2. Medicaid 10,744.77 -912.92 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
11,378.55 -1,546.70 -633.78 --   
 4. Self-Pay 16,120.40 -6,288.56 -5,375.63 -4,741.85 --  
 5. Other payer 15,613.55 -5,781.70 -4,868.78 -4,235.00 506.85 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 55,547.21 --     
 2. Medicaid 62,952.32 -7,405.11 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,000.19 1,547.02 8,952.13 --   
 4. Self-Pay 51,715.89 3,831.32 11,236.43 2,284.30 --  
 5. Other payer 54,314.85 1,232.36 8,637.47 -314.66 -2,598.96 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 57,214.64 --     
 2. Medicaid 72,135.28 -14,920.64 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,193.48 3,021.15 17,941.80 --   
 4. Self-Pay 45,461.49 11,753.15 26,673.79 8,731.99 --  
 5. Other payer 43,496.88 13,717.76 28,638.41** 
(0.54) 
10,696.61 1,964.62 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 56,181.99 --     
 2. Medicaid 83,336.58 -27,154.60* 
(-0.54) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
67,484.82 -11,302.83* 
(-0.28) 
15,851.77 --   
 4. Self-Pay 73,016.15 -16,834.16 10,320.44 -5,531.33 --  
 5. Other payer 69,441.97 -13,259.98 13,894.61 -1,957.15 3,574.18 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 57,246.03 --     
 2. Medicaid 111,647.08 -
54,401.04** 
(-0.63) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,785.15 2,460.88 56,861.93* 
(0.65) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 74,662.64 -17,416.61 36,984.44 -19,877.49 --  
 5. Other payer 97,699.84 -40,453.81 13,947.24 -42,914.69 -23,037.20 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 60,392.65 --     
 2. Medicaid 94,572.84 -
34,180.19** 
(-0.45) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
68,957.71 -8,565.07 25,615.13 --   
 4. Self-Pay 53,326.50 7,066.15 41,246.34** 
(0.55) 
15,631.22 --  
 5. Other payer 67,402.86 -7,010.22 27,169.98 1,554.85 -14,076.36 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 60,202.18 --     
 2. Medicaid 74,634.24 -14,432.06 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
66,471.78 -6,269.60 8,162.46 --   
 4. Self-Pay 51,698.46 8,503.72 22,935.78 14,773.32 --  
 5. Other payer 50,696.32 9,505.86 23,937.92 15,775.46 1,002.14 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 59,139.12 --     
 2. Medicaid 87,955.27 -28,816.15* 
(-0.48) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
81,034.41 -
21,895.29** 
(-0.39) 
6,920.86 --   
 4. Self-Pay 58,231.29 907.83 29,723.98** 
(0.53) 
22,803.12 --  
 5. Other payer 75,054.94 -15,915.82 12,900.33 5,979.47 -16,823.65 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 73 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 26 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 25,837.87 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,268.47 19,569.39* 
(1.31) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
9,365.54 16,472.33* 
(1.03) 
-3,097.06* 
(-0.25) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 8,849.53 16,988.34* 
(1.05) 
-2,581.06 516.00 --  
 5. Other payer 5,981.05 19,856.82* 
(1.44) 
287.42 3,384.49** 
(0.31) 
2,868.48 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 27,457.30 --     
 2. Medicaid 38,333.50 -10,876.20* 
(-0.41) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
31,995.06 -4,537.76* 
(-0.24) 
6,338.44 --   
 4. Self-Pay 28,964.30 -1,507.00 9,369.20 3,030.76 --  
 5. Other payer 35,122.85 -7,665.55** 
(-0.41) 
3,210.65 -3,127.79 -6,158.55 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 26,270.42 --     
 2. Medicaid 38,228.28 -11,957.86* 
(-0.45) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
29,041.38 -2,770.96** 
(-0.17) 
9,186.90** 
(0.33) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 33,407.27 -7,136.85 4,821.01 -4,365.89 --  
 5. Other payer 25,804.18 466.24 12,424.10* 
(0.47) 
3,237.20 7,603.09 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 29,046.89 --     
 2. Medicaid 39,854.89 -10,808.00* 
(-0.45) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
35,675.87 -6,628.99* 
(-0.32) 
4,179.02 --   
 4. Self-Pay 34,562.35 -5,515.46 5,292.55 1,113.53 --  
 5. Other payer 50,774.00 -
21,727.12** 
(-0.58) 
-10,919.11 -15,098.13 -
16,211.66 
-- 
2011 1. Medicare 30,958.42 --     
 2. Medicaid 44,948.10 -13,989.68* 
(-0.55) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
29,248.62 1,709.79 15,699.48* 
(0.63) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 29,424.74 1,533.68 15,523.36** 
(0.65) 
-176.12 --  
 5. Other payer 42,755.97 -11,797.55 2,192.13 -13,507.34 -
13,331.22 
-- 
     (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 32,299.98 --     
 2. Medicaid 44,064.61 -
11,764.62** 
(-0.35) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
36,042.20 -3,742.21 8,022.41 --   
 4. Self-Pay 41,513.39 -9,213.40 2,551.22 -5,471.19 --  
 5. Other payer 52,803.50 -
20,503.51** 
(-0.55) 
-8,738.89 -16,761.30 -
11,290.11 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 35,486.03 --     
 2. Medicaid 42,109.51 -6,623.48 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
36,671.16 -1,185.13 5,438.35 --   
 4. Self-Pay 39,009.74 -3,523.71 3,099.77 -2,338.58 --  
 5. Other payer 50,319.90 -
14,833.86** 
(-0.52) 
-8,210.38 -13,648.74 -
11,310.15 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 33,262.49 --     
 2. Medicaid 46,716.54 -13,454.05* 
(-0.40) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
38,868.70 -5,606.21** 
(-0.25) 
7,847.84 --   
 4. Self-Pay 42,626.95 -9,364.46 4,089.59 -3,758.25 --  
 5. Other payer 39,005.76 -5,743.27 7,710.79 -137.06 3,621.19 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 74 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 153 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 6,979.55 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,863.48 3,116.07* 
(0.76) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,362.17 1,617.38** 
(0.37) 
-1,498.69* 
(-0.35) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,730.63 2,248.91** 
(0.61) 
-867.15 631.54 --  
 5. Other payer 6,374.93 604.61 -2,511.45 -1,012.76 -1,644.30 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 5,661.88 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,995.80 1,666.08* 
(0.45) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,837.21 1,824.67* 
(0.51) 
158.59 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,127.63 1,534.26* 
(0.46) 
-131.82 -290.42 --  
 5. Other payer 5,083.18 578.70 -1,087.38 -1,245.97 -955.55 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 6,583.83 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,418.33 2,165.49* 
(0.46) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,759.95 1,823.88* 
(0.38) 
-341.61 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,705.88 1,877.94* 
(0.44) 
-287.55 54.07 --  
 5. Other payer 5,808.43 775.40 -1,390.09 -1,048.48 -1,102.54 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 7,158.62 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,476.35 2,682.27* 
(0.56) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,516.01 2,642.61* 
(0.55) 
-39.66 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,309.50 1,849.12** 
(0.38) 
-833.15 -793.50 --  
 5. Other payer 6,041.40 1,117.22 -1,565.05* 
(-0.41) 
-
1,525.39** 
(-0.39) 
-731.90 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 6,197.26 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,073.05 2,124.21* 
(0.55) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,091.58 2,105.68* 
(0.56) 
-18.53 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,933.17 1,264.10 -860.11 -841.58 --  
 5. Other payer 6,177.09 20.17 -2,104.04 -2,085.51 -1,243.92 -- 
     (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 7,370.77 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,030.67 2,340.10* 
(0.45) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 5,334.94 2,035.83* 
(0.45) 
-304.27 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,266.77 2,104.00** 
(0.38) 
-236.10 68.17 --  
 5. Other payer 5,981.20 1,389.57 -950.53 -646.26 -714.43 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 7,950.91 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,007.41 2,943.50* 
(0.42) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 5,304.25 2,646.65* 
(0.37) 
-296.85 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,751.36 3,199.55* 
(0.53) 
256.04 552.89 --  
 5. Other payer 5,543.89 2,407.02* 
(0.35) 
-536.49 -239.64 -792.53 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 7,510.01 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,188.87 2,321.14* 
(0.48) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 5,704.44 1,805.57* 
(0.33) 
-515.56 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,570.08 939.93 -1,381.20 -865.64 --  
 5. Other payer 8,637.11 -1,127.10 -3,448.24 -2,932.67 -2,067.03 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 75 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 203 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 10,417.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,930.26 4,487.23* 
(0.43) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,223.19 3,194.30* 
(0.28) 
-1,292.93** 
(-0.14) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,722.11 5,695.39* 
(0.61) 
1,208.15 2,501.09* 
(0.33) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,866.52 2,550.97 -1,936.26 -643.33 -
3,144.41** 
(-0.44) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 6,015.24 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,287.50 1,727.74* 
(0.48) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,052.31 1,962.93* 
(0.57) 
235.19 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,234.96 1,780.28* 
(0.52) 
52.54 -182.65 --  
 5. Other payer 5,397.76 617.48 -1,110.26** 
(-0.31) 
-
1,345.45* 
(-0.39) 
-
1,162.80** 
(-0.34) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 5,936.19 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,793.82 2,142.37* 
(0.62) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,082.75 1,853.44* 
(0.53) 
-288.93** 
(-0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,274.63 1,661.55* 
(0.49) 
-480.81** 
(-0.18) 
-191.88 --  
 5. Other payer 4,892.58 1,043.61* 
(0.28) 
-1,098.76* 
(-0.36) 
-809.83** 
(-0.26) 
-617.94 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 6,420.63 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,792.48 1,628.14* 
(0.39) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,726.06 1,694.57* 
(0.42) 
66.42 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,704.53 1,716.10* 
(0.45) 
87.95 21.53 --  
 5. Other payer 5,399.98 1,020.65** 
(0.25) 
-607.49 -673.92** 
(-0.19) 
-695.45 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Mean differences 
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   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 6,218.98 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,068.08 2,150.90* 
(0.62) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,111.51 2,107.47* 
(0.60) 
-43.42 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,856.30 1,362.67* 
(0.39) 
-788.22* 
(-0.27) 
-744.80** 
(-0.25) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,677.03 541.95 -1,608.94* 
(-0.52) 
-1,565.52* 
(-0.49) 
-820.72 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 6,834.71 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,097.54 1,737.18* 
(0.36) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,007.60 1,827.11* 
(0.42) 
89.93 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,324.89 1,509.82* 
(0.34) 
-227.36 -317.29 --  
 5. Other payer 5,933.28 901.43 -835.74 -925.68** 
(-0.20) 
-608.39 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 6,732.49 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,269.64 1,462.85* 
(0.34) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,150.36 1,582.13* 
(0.38) 
119.28 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,931.86 1,800.63* 
(0.49) 
337.78 218.50 --  
 5. Other payer 6,061.90 670.59 -792.26 -911.54 -1,130.04 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,992.63 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,209.18 1,783.45* 
(0.45) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,355.12 1,637.51* 
(0.39) 
-145.94 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,845.90 2,146.73* 
(0.59) 
363.28 509.22 --  
 5. Other payer 6,195.84 796.79 -986.66 -840.72 -1,349.95 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 76 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 207 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 21,443.64 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,581.04 -137.41 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
16,160.69 5,282.94* 
(0.20) 
5,420.35** 
(0.20) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 11,620.38 9,823.25* 
(0.43) 
9,960.66* 
(0.42) 
4,540.31 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
21,357.17 86.46 223.87 -5,196.48 -9,736.79 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 52,442.44 --     
 2. Medicaid 58,384.84 -5,942.40 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
57,259.39 -4,816.95 1,125.45 --   
 4. Self-Pay 37,610.05 14,832.39* 
(0.50) 
20,774.78* 
(0.54) 
19,649.34* 
(0.59) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
60,952.61 -8,510.17 -2,567.77 -3,693.22 -
23,342.56** 
(-0.57) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 54,205.15 --     
 2. Medicaid 54,874.64 -669.49 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
69,841.15 -
15,636.00* 
(-0.33) 
-
14,966.51* 
(-0.30) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 58,072.86 -3,867.70 -3,198.21 11,768.29 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
52,206.94 1,998.22 2,667.70 17,634.21* 
(0.40) 
5,865.92 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 60,949.79 --     
 2. Medicaid 64,256.16 -3,306.37 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
62,081.71 -1,131.92 2,174.45 --   
 4. Self-Pay 52,111.50 8,838.29 12,144.66 9,970.21 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
65,554.97 -4,605.18 -1,298.81 -3,473.26 -13,443.47 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 54,583.52 --     
 2. Medicaid 62,140.72 -7,557.20 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
62,583.09 -7,999.57 -442.37 --   
 4. Self-Pay 53,937.33 646.19 8,203.38 8,645.76 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
68,152.58 -13,569.06 -6,011.87 -5,569.49 -14,215.25 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 57,760.98 --     
 2. Medicaid 67,653.43 -9,892.45** 
(-0.17) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
66,418.22 -8,657.24 1,235.20 --   
 4. Self-Pay 41,846.29 15,914.69* 
(0.48) 
25,807.14* 
(0.52) 
24,571.93* 
(0.56) 
--  
 5. Other payer 70,740.72 -12,979.74 -3,087.29 -4,322.50 -
28,894.43** 
(-0.61) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 60,357.06 --     
 2. Medicaid 70,579.83 -
10,222.78** 
(-0.17) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
67,220.20 -6,863.15 3,359.63 --   
 4. Self-Pay 60,028.88 328.17 10,550.95 7,191.32 --  
 5. Other payer 94,304.83 -33,947.77 -23,724.99 -27,084.63 -34,275.94 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 62,056.36 --     
 2. Medicaid 80,504.21 -18,447.85* 
(-0.25) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
71,816.44 -9,760.08 8,687.77 --   
 4. Self-Pay 67,396.66 -5,340.30 13,107.55 4,419.78 --  
 5. Other payer 105,675.78 -43,619.42 -25,171.57 -33,859.34 -38,279.12 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 77 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 233 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 25,693.92 --     
 2. Medicaid 28,639.67 -2,945.75 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
28,215.81 -2,521.89 423.86 --   
 4. Self-Pay 42,910.13 -17,216.21 -14,270.46 -
14,694.32 
--  
 5. Other payer 24,363.73 1,330.19 4,275.94 3,852.08 18,546.40 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 69,050.57 --     
 2. Medicaid 66,639.31 2,411.26 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
59,526.04 9,524.52** 
(0.31) 
7,113.26 --   
 4. Self-Pay 52,012.23 17,038.34* 
(0.61) 
14,627.08** 
(0.69) 
7,513.82 --  
 5. Other payer 66,665.47 2,385.09 -26.17 -7,139.43 -
14,653.25** 
(-0.83) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 66,213.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 62,455.53 3,758.01 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
61,697.55 4,516.00 757.98 --   
 4. Self-Pay 70,124.60 -3,911.06 -7,669.07 -8,427.06 --  
 5. Other payer 68,145.87 -1,932.33 -5,690.34 -6,448.33 1,978.73 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 67,020.07 --     
 2. Medicaid 64,406.50 2,613.57 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
61,822.79 5,197.28 2,583.71 --   
 4. Self-Pay 66,368.10 651.97 -1,961.60 -4,545.31 --  
 5. Other payer 66,188.66 831.41 -1,782.17 -4,365.87 179.44 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 73,961.36 --     
 2. Medicaid 75,750.27 -1,788.91 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 69,137.15 4,824.21 6,613.13 --   
 4. Self-Pay 67,918.55 6,042.81 7,831.72 1,218.60 --  
 5. Other payer 
84,178.78 -10,217.42 -8,428.50 
-
15,041.63 -16,260.23 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 79,186.25 --     
 2. Medicaid 74,707.61 4,478.64 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
66,504.96 12,681.30* 
(0.36) 
8,202.66 --   
 4. Self-Pay 69,744.29 9,441.96 4,963.32 -3,239.34 --  
 5. Other payer 72,429.78 6,756.47 2,277.83 -5,924.83 -2,685.49 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 76,484.08 --     
 2. Medicaid 77,212.08 -728.00 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 72,055.48 4,428.60 5,156.60 --   
 4. Self-Pay 66,633.42 9,850.66 10,578.66 5,422.06 --  
 5. Other payer 87,285.76 -10,801.68 -10,073.67 -15,230.28 -20,652.33 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 77,700.51 --     
 2. Medicaid 70,965.34 6,735.17 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
68,074.98 9,625.53** 
(0.29) 
2,890.36 --   
 4. Self-Pay 71,930.59 5,769.92 -965.25 -3,855.61 --  
 5. Other payer 69,434.28 8,266.23 1,531.06 -1,359.30 2,496.31 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 78 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 234 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 24,535.26 --     
 2. Medicaid 22,952.22 1,583.04 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
23,654.72 880.54 -702.49 --   
 4. Self-Pay 22,375.14 2,160.12 577.08 1,279.57 --  
 5. Other payer 18,353.50 6,181.76** 
(0.037) 
4,598.72 5,301.21 4,021.64 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 47,121.18 --     
 2. Medicaid 44,429.78 2,691.40 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
44,084.83 3,036.34** 
(0.22) 
344.95 --   
 4. Self-Pay 45,635.44 1,485.73 -1,205.66 -1,550.61 --  
 5. Other payer 50,596.13 -3,474.95 -6,166.35 -6,511.30 -
4,960.69 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 43,674.45 --     
 2. Medicaid 47,522.26 -3,847.81 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
44,259.02 -584.57 3,263.24 --   
 4. Self-Pay 49,527.72 -5,853.27 -2,005.46 -5,268.70 --  
 5. Other payer 47,576.94 -3,902.50 -54.68 -3,317.93 1,950.77 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 49,590.66 --     
 2. Medicaid 51,339.24 -1,748.58 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
46,361.31 3,229.35** 
(0.25) 
4,977.93 --   
 4. Self-Pay 50,230.45 -639.79 1,108.80 -3,869.13 --  
 5. Other payer 46,935.86 2,654.80 4,403.38 -574.55 3,294.59 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 48,792.92 --     
 2. Medicaid 49,811.65 -1,018.72 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
48,084.90 708.03 1,726.75 --   
 4. Self-Pay 49,893.26 -1,100.34 -81.62 -1,808.37 --  
 5. Other payer 53,917.60 -5,124.68 -4,105.96 -5,832.70 -
4,024.34 
-- 
2012 1. Medicare 51,709.71 --     
 2. Medicaid 57,522.99 -5,813.28 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
52,415.92 -706.21 5,107.07 --   
 4. Self-Pay 56,359.24 -4,649.53 1,163.75 -3,943.32 --  
 5. Other payer 57,654.99 -5,945.28 -132.00 -5,239.07 -
1,295.75 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 53,896.61 --     
 2. Medicaid 55,363.73 -1,467.12 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
51,060.91 2,835.69 4,302.82 --   
 4. Self-Pay 56,622.98 -2,726.37 -1,259.25 -5,562.06 --  
 5. Other payer 52,731.11 1,165.50 2,632.63 -1,670.19 3,891.87 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 53,157.36 --     
 2. Medicaid 59,061.05 -
5,903.69** 
(-0.32) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
51,798.12 1,359.24 7,262.94* 
(0.40) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 49,707.12 3,450.24 9,353.93 2,091.00 --  
 5. Other payer 55,983.49 -2,826.13 3,077.56 -4,185.38 -
6,276.37 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 79 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 311 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 5,239.53 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,618.46 -378.94 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,359.01 -119.48 259.46 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,129.31 110.22 489.16 229.70 --  
 5. Other payer 5,330.96 -91.43 287.50 28.05 -201.65 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 5,309.10 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,783.66 -474.56 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,555.01 754.09* 
(0.27) 
1,228.65** 
(0.35) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,525.50 783.60 1,258.16** 
(0.34) 
29.51 --  
 5. Other payer 6,869.48 -1,560.38 -1,085.81 -2,314.46** 
(-0.62) 
-
2,343.97** 
(-0.60) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 5,006.37 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,552.02 454.35 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,421.29 585.08** 
(0.21) 
130.73 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,977.07 29.30 -425.05 -555.78 --  
 5. Other payer 5,196.29 -189.92 -644.27 -775.00 -219.22 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 5,315.89 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,100.70 215.20 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,565.18 750.72** 
(0.26) 
535.52 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,716.03 599.87 384.67 -150.85 --  
 5. Other payer 5,834.21 -518.32 -733.51 -1,269.03** 
(-0.42) 
-1,118.18 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 5,865.69 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,714.89 150.80 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,925.92 939.77* 
(0.30) 
788.97** 
(0.29) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,299.68 566.01 415.21 -373.76 --  
 5. Other payer 6,626.49 -760.80 -911.60 -1,700.57** 
(-0.57) 
-1,326.81 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 6,528.66 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,372.19 1,156.46** 
(0.25) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,330.54 1,198.12** 
(0.26) 
41.65 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,861.28 1,667.38** 
(0.37) 
510.92 469.27 --  
 5. Other payer 7,012.23 -483.57 -1,640.04 -1,681.69 -2,150.96 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 6,027.33 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,298.48 728.85 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 5,336.69 690.64 -38.21 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,248.47 778.87 50.02 88.22 --  
 5. Other payer 6,080.90 -53.57 -782.42 -744.21 -832.43 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,427.67 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,953.74 473.93 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,338.64 89.03 -384.90 --   
 4. Self-Pay 7,600.42 -1,172.75 -1,646.68 -1,261.78 --  
 5. Other payer 5,046.34 1,381.34 907.40 1,292.30 2,554.09 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 80 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 313 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 4,739.49 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,724.02 15.48 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,966.06 773.44* 
(0.32) 
757.96* 
(0.32) 
-- 
  
 4. Self-Pay 4,372.50 367.00 351.52 -406.44 --  
 5. Other payer 4,477.68 261.82 246.34 -511.62 -105.18 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 5,294.20 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,044.35 249.85** --    
 3. Private 
insurance 4,257.26 1,036.94* 787.09* --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,656.74 637.46* 387.61** -399.48** --  
 5. Other payer 
5,385.56 -91.37 -341.22 -1,128.31* 
-
728.83* -- 
2009 1. Medicare 5,064.16 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,750.93 313.23* 
(0.10) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,532.19 531.97* 
(0.19) 
218.74** 
(0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,397.22 666.94* 
(0.23) 
353.71** 
(0.12) 
134.97 --  
 5. Other payer 4,422.35 641.81* 
(0.22) 
328.58** 
(0.12) 
109.84 -25.13 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 5,392.59 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,178.26 214.33** 
(0.07) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,680.10 712.49* 
(0.26) 
498.15* 
(0.18) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,755.68 636.91* 
(0.21) 
422.58* 
(0.14) 
-75.57 --  
 5. Other payer 4,837.50 555.09* 
(0.19) 
340.75** 
(0.12) 
-157.40 -81.83 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 5,401.27 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,199.40 201.87** 
(0.07) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,810.13 591.14* 
(0.22) 
389.27* 
(0.15) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,021.49 379.78** 
(0.13) 
177.91 -211.36 --  
 5. Other payer 5,360.30 40.97 -160.90 -550.17* 
(-0.22) 
-338.81 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 5,925.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,408.52 517.44* 
(0.15) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 5,035.29 890.66* 
(0.27) 
373.22* 
(0.11) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,821.41 1,104.54* 
(0.35) 
587.11* 
(0.18) 
213.89 --  
 5. Other payer 5,077.90 848.05* 
(0.26) 
330.61** 
(0.10) 
-42.61 -256.50 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 5,850.96 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,451.52 399.44* 
(0.12) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 5,110.58 740.38* 
(0.24) 
340.94** 
(0.11) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,371.23 479.72** 
(0.14) 
80.28 -260.66 --  
 5. Other payer 5,365.56 485.39* 
(0.16) 
85.95 -254.99 5.67 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,344.61 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,661.02 683.59* 
(0.18) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 5,409.89 934.72* 
(0.27) 
251.13 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,389.18 955.43* 
(0.24) 
271.84 20.71 --  
 5. Other payer 5,859.51 485.10 -198.49 -449.61 -470.32 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 81 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 326 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 37,894.38 --     
 2. Medicaid 39,592.36 -1,697.99 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
42,861.02 -4,966.64 -3,268.66 --   
 4. Self-Pay 26,311.71 11,582.67 13,280.65 16,549.31 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
33,208.48 4,685.90 6,383.88 9,652.54 -6,896.77 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 53,397.77 --     
 2. Medicaid 59,478.60 -6,080.83 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
53,532.42 -134.65 5,946.18 --   
 4. Self-Pay 33,199.28 20,198.49 26,279.32** 
(0.49) 
20,333.14 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
73,535.59 -20,137.82 -14,057.00 -20,003.17 -40,336.31 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 57,681.73 --     
 2. Medicaid 63,439.93 -5,758.20 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,745.35 2,936.39 8,694.59 --   
 4. Self-Pay 33,567.33 24,114.41* 
(0.62) 
29,872.61* 
(0.57) 
21,178.02** 
(0.49) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
63,062.72 -5,380.99 377.21 -8,317.38 -29,495.40 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 52,939.55 --     
 2. Medicaid 53,007.33 -67.78 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
53,816.54 -876.99 -809.21 --   
 4. Self-Pay 44,707.65 8,231.90 8,299.68 9,108.89 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
68,581.07 -15,641.52 -15,573.74 -14,764.53 -23,873.42 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 62,807.97 --     
 2. Medicaid 67,226.04 -4,418.07 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
50,739.59 12,068.38 16,486.45 --   
 4. Self-Pay 26,457.25 36,350.72* 
(0.75) 
40,768.79* 
(0.77) 
24,282.34* 
(0.67) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
59,733.49 3,074.48 7,492.54 -8,993.90 -
33,276.24** 
(-0.76) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 58,206.12 --     
 2. Medicaid 66,133.37 -7,927.25 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,427.78 3,778.34 11,705.59 --   
 4. Self-Pay 43,225.45 14,980.67 22,907.93 11,202.34 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
71,876.13 -13,670.01 -5,742.76 -17,448.35 -28,650.69 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 59,892.88 --     
 2. Medicaid 64,769.48 -4,876.60 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
53,336.64 6,556.23 11,432.83 --   
 4. Self-Pay 50,410.28 9,482.60 14,359.20 2,926.37 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
52,344.95 7,547.93 12,424.53 991.70 -1,934.67 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 63,089.38 --     
 2. Medicaid 65,669.06 -2,579.68 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
56,072.80 7,016.59 9,596.26 --   
 4. Self-Pay 95,116.40 -32,027.02 -29,447.34 -39,043.61 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
43,790.07 19,299.31** 
(0.41) 
21,878.99 12,282.72 51,326.33 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 82 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 329 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 47,077.70 --     
 2. Medicaid 44,473.61 2,604.09 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
41,007.55 6,070.15 3,466.06 --   
 4. Self-Pay 23,643.89 23,433.81* 
(0.77) 
20,829.72** 
(0.89) 
17,363.66** 
(0.58) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
84,901.33 -37,823.63 -40,427.72 -43,893.78 -61,257.44 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 49,637.39 --     
 2. Medicaid 68,184.72 -18,547.33* 
(-0.32) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
44,496.80 5,140.60 23,687.92* 
(0.40) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 38,810.36 10,827.03 29,374.36 5,686.43 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
46,626.67 3,010.72 21,558.05 -2,129.87 -7,816.31 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 46,137.68 --     
 2. Medicaid 55,960.96 -9,823.28** 
(-0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
46,056.43 81.25 9,904.53 --   
 4. Self-Pay 36,395.07 9,742.61** 
(0.29) 
19,565.90* 
(0.44) 
9,661.36 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
41,989.78 4,147.91 13,971.19 4,066.66 -5,594.71 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 50,386.11 --     
 2. Medicaid 62,258.47 -11,872.36 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
42,902.53 7,483.59* 
(0.21) 
19,355.94* 
(0.36) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 33,939.77 16,446.34* 
(0.58) 
28,318.69* 
(0.59) 
8,962.75** 
(0.30) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
55,625.04 -5,238.93 6,633.43 -12,722.52 -
21,685.27** 
(-0.50) 
-- 
2011 1. Medicare 50,650.72 --     
 2. Medicaid 62,085.07 -11,434.35 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
42,101.51 8,549.21* 
(0.23) 
19,983.56* 
(0.40) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 35,067.10 15,583.62* 
(0.47) 
27,017.97* 
(0.57) 
7,034.41 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
47,618.41 3,032.31 14,466.66 -5,516.90 -12,551.32 -- 
      (table continues) 
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insurance 
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Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 55,902.42 --     
 2. Medicaid 65,824.06 -9,921.64 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
47,798.33 8,104.08** 
(0.17) 
18,025.72** 
(0.31) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 45,180.60 10,721.81 20,643.46 2,617.73 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
52,626.74 3,275.67 13,197.31 -4,828.41 -7,446.14 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 53,107.02 --     
 2. Medicaid 70,986.20 -
17,879.18** 
(-0.27) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
46,692.29 6,414.73 24,293.91* 
(0.37) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 42,453.17 10,653.85 28,533.03* 
(0.45) 
4,239.12 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
59,025.89 -5,918.87 11,960.31 -12,333.60 -16,572.72 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 50,439.18 --     
 2. Medicaid 63,088.31 -
12,649.13** 
(-0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
49,657.69 781.49 13,430.62** 
(0.21) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 37,384.67 13,054.51 25,703.65** 
(0.48) 
12,273.02 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
94,290.52 -43,851.34 -31,202.20 -44,632.83 -56,905.85 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 83 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 373 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 4,180.83 --     
 2. Medicaid 2,801.81 1,379.02* 
(0.61) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
2,951.07 1,229.76* 
(0.53) 
-149.26* 
(-0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,562.59 1,618.24* 
(0.73) 
239.22* 
(0.18) 
388.48* 
(0.28) 
--  
 5. Other payer 2,884.60 1,296.23* 
(0.60) 
-82.79 66.47 -322.01* 
(-0.28) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 7,769.80 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,676.02 93.78 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,006.99 762.80 669.03 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,307.54 1,462.26 1,368.48 699.46 --  
 5. Other payer 11,043.72 -3,273.92 -3,367.70 -
4,036.72** 
(-0.66) 
-
4,736.18** 
(-0.82) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 7,570.88 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,333.25 237.63 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,167.22 403.66 166.03 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,382.48 -811.60 -1,049.23 -1,215.26 --  
 5. Other payer 7,876.71 -305.83 -543.46 -709.49 505.77 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 7,919.68 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,592.27 -1,672.59 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,781.00 138.68 1,811.27 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,503.99 -584.31 1,088.28 -722.98 --  
 5. Other payer 9,576.95 -1,657.27 15.32 -1,795.95 -1,072.97 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 8,009.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,531.65 478.30 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,549.66 1,460.29** 
(0.33) 
981.99 --   
 4. Self-Pay 9,316.13 -1,306.18 -1,784.48 -
2,766.47** 
(-0.59) 
--  
 5. Other payer 9,749.37 -1,739.42 -2,217.72 -3,199.71* 
(-0.64) 
-433.24 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Mean differences 
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   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 8,785.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,507.31 278.63 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,580.75 1,205.20 926.57 --   
 4. Self-Pay 7,926.30 859.65 581.01 -345.55 --  
 5. Other payer 7,871.79 914.16 635.53 -291.04 54.51 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 8,854.93 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,468.20 386.74 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,610.35 1,244.58 857.84 --   
 4. Self-Pay 7,774.26 1,080.67 693.93 -163.91 --  
 5. Other payer 8,164.64 690.29 303.56 -554.29 -390.38 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 8,408.65 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,493.86 -1,085.21 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,830.87 577.78 1,662.99 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,393.79 14.86 1,100.07 -562.91 --  
 5. Other payer 7,788.31 620.34 1,705.55 42.57 605.48 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 84 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 390 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 5,541.66 --     
 2. Medicaid 1,929.27 3,612.39* 
(1.01) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
1,719.20 3,822.46* 
(1.15) 
210.07* 
(0.07) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,036.12 3,505.54* 
(0.96) 
-106.85 -316.92 --  
 5. Other payer 3,718.56 1,823.10* 
(0.29) 
-1,789.29* 
(-0.29) 
-
1,999.36* 
(-0.34) 
-
1,682.44** 
(-0.27) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 6,038.61 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,357.53 681.08** 
(0.18) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,147.44 891.17* 
(0.25) 
210.09 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,243.27 795.34 114.26 -95.83 --  
 5. Other payer 6,066.38 -27.77 -708.85 -918.94 -823.11 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 5,824.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,433.02 391.48 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,261.32 563.18* 
(0.16) 
171.70 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,769.13 55.38 -336.11 -507.80 --  
 5. Other payer 6,546.73 -722.23 -1,113.71 -1,285.41 -777.60 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 6,495.67 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,563.24 932.43* 
(0.28) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,769.89 725.78** 
(0.16) 
-206.65 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,069.19 426.48 -505.95 -299.30 --  
 5. Other payer 6,589.39 -93.71 -1,026.15 -819.50 -520.19 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 6,238.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,947.80 290.74 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,443.70 794.84* 
(0.22) 
504.10 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,788.15 450.39 159.65 -344.45 --  
 5. Other payer 7,258.79 -1,020.25 -1,310.99** 
(-0.30) 
-
1,815.09* 
(-0.43) 
-
1,470.64** 
(-0.33) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 6,508.16 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,559.33 948.84* 
(0.26) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,856.12 652.04** 
(0.16) 
-296.80 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,511.73 996.43* 
(0.29) 
47.59 344.39 --  
 5. Other payer 6,313.89 194.27 -754.57 -457.77 -802.16 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 6,481.25 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,949.48 531.77 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,716.64 764.61* 
(0.19) 
232.83 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,741.99 739.26 207.49 -25.35 --  
 5. Other payer 6,352.89 128.36 -403.41 -636.24 -610.90 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,588.11 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,983.33 604.78** 
(0.16) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,823.45 764.66* 
(0.21) 
159.89 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,430.23 1,157.88** 
(0.35) 
553.10 393.21 --  
 5. Other payer 6,160.26 427.85 -176.93 -336.82 -730.03 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 85 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 391 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 7,622.10 --     
 2. Medicaid 827.57 6,794.53* 
(0.79) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
907.51 6,714.59* 
(0.78) 
-79.94* 
(-0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 801.12 6,820.98* 
(0.79) 
26.45 106.39* 
(0.11) 
--  
 5. Other payer 1,020.27 6,601.83* 
(0.76) 
-192.70* 
(-0.17) 
-112.76** 
(-0.10) 
-219.15* 
(-0.18) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 9,437.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,809.22 -371.72 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
9,326.66 110.84 482.56 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,223.36 1,214.14 1,585.86 1,103.30 --  
 5. Other payer 8,383.39 1,054.12 1,425.83 943.27 -160.02 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 10,064.00 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,735.99 328.01 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
9,526.53 537.47 209.46 --   
 4. Self-Pay 7,629.92 2,434.08* 
(0.29) 
2,106.08** 
(0.24) 
1,896.62 --  
 5. Other payer 8,384.02 1,679.99 1,351.98 1,142.52 -754.10 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 10,653.61 --     
 2. Medicaid 10,103.62 549.99 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,323.12 330.49 -219.50 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,977.88 1,675.73 1,125.74 1,345.24 --  
 5. Other payer 11,749.73 -1,096.12 -1,646.11 -1,426.61 -
2,771.85 
-- 
2011 1. Medicare 10,915.60 --     
 2. Medicaid 10,372.62 542.99 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,507.19 408.41 -134.57 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,990.70 1,924.90 1,381.91 1,516.48 --  
 5. Other payer 8,372.14 2,543.46** 
(0.29) 
2,000.48 2,135.05 618.57 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 11,555.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 10,054.92 1,500.62 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
11,987.09 -431.55 -1,932.17 --   
 4. Self-Pay 9,109.36 2,446.18** 
(0.25) 
945.56 2,877.73 --  
 5. Other payer 12,523.74 -968.20 -2,468.82 -536.65 -
3,414.38 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 11,762.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 11,405.29 357.66 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
12,685.22 -922.27 -1,279.93 --   
 4. Self-Pay 9,101.05 2,661.90** 
(0.27) 
2,304.24 3,584.17** 
(0.23) 
--  
 5. Other payer 11,882.64 -119.69 -477.35 802.58 -
2,781.59 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 11,337.35 --     
 2. Medicaid 11,994.86 -657.51 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
11,485.00 -147.65 509.86 --   
 4. Self-Pay 9,835.66 1,501.70 2,159.20 1,649.34 --  
 5. Other payer 14,907.45 -3,570.09 -2,912.58 -3,422.45 -
5,071.79 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 86 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 392 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 6,683.52 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,298.77 1,384.74* 
(0.18) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,631.40 1,052.12* 
(0.16) 
-332.63 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,539.75 1,143.76** 
(0.20) 
-240.98 91.65 --  
 5. Other payer 6,547.80 135.72 -1,249.03 -916.40 -1,008.05 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 6,586.20 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,772.96 813.25* 
(0.16) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,264.94 1,321.27* 
(0.29) 
508.02* 
(0.11) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,611.18 975.03* 
(0.22) 
161.78 -346.24 --  
 5. Other payer 6,694.42 -108.21 -921.46* 
(-0.18) 
-
1,429.48* 
(-0.32) 
-1,083.24* 
(-0.25) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 6,411.16 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,263.36 1,147.80* 
(0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,594.45 816.71* 
(0.18) 
-331.09** 
(-0.06) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,513.44 897.72* 
(0.22) 
-250.08 81.01 --  
 5. Other payer 6,050.89 360.27 -787.53* 
(-0.15) 
-456.44 -537.45 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 7,163.68 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,985.16 1,178.52* 
(0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,310.53 853.15* 
(0.18) 
-325.37** 
(-0.06) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,179.72 983.95* 
(0.22) 
-194.56 130.80 --  
 5. Other payer 7,019.83 143.85 -1,034.67* 
(-0.17) 
-709.30** 
(-0.13) 
-840.11** 
(-0.16) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 6,971.82 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,035.12 936.70* 
(0.17) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,055.06 916.76* 
(0.22) 
-19.94 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,970.19 1,001.63* 
(0.25) 
64.93 84.87 --  
 5. Other payer 6,972.20 -0.38 -937.08* 
(-0.17) 
-917.14* 
(-0.21) 
-1,002.01* 
(-0.24) 
-- 
2012 1. Medicare 7,746.96 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,234.87 1,512.09* 
(0.26) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,862.77 884.19* 
(0.15) 
-627.90* 
(-0.11) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,433.01 1,313.96* 
(0.24) 
-198.14 429.76 --  
 5. Other payer 7,309.27 437.69 -1,074.40** 
(-0.14) 
-446.50 -876.27** 
(-0.12) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 7,728.24 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,336.86 1,391.38* 
(0.24) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,829.09 899.15* 
(0.16) 
-492.23** 
(-0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,455.08 1,273.16* 
(0.26) 
-118.22 374.01 --  
 5. Other payer 7,520.28 207.96 -1,183.42* 
(-0.16) 
-691.19 -
1,065.20** 
(-0.17) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 7,849.29 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,678.13 1,171.16* 
(0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,023.06 826.23* 
(0.13) 
-344.92 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,440.23 1,409.06* 
(0.29) 
237.90 582.83 --  
 5. Other payer 7,699.77 149.52 -1,021.64** 
(-0.17) 
-676.71 -
1,259.54** 
(-0.23) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 87 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 464 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 6,614.80 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,296.21 -681.41 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,350.71 -735.91 -54.50 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,804.94 -190.15 491.26 545.76 --  
 5. Other payer 9,862.69 -3,247.89 -2,566.48 -2,511.98 -3,057.74 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 23,880.90 --     
 2. Medicaid 37,865.54 -
13,984.64** 
(-0.50) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
29,426.86 -5,545.96 8,438.68 --   
 4. Self-Pay 23,644.55 236.35 14,220.99 5,782.31 --  
 5. Other payer 34,897.95 -
11,017.05** 
(-0.47) 
2,967.59 -5,471.10 -
11,253.40 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 24,464.02 --     
 2. Medicaid 34,424.60 -9,960.58 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
31,444.40 -6,980.38 2,980.20 --   
 4. Self-Pay 26,027.34 -1,563.32 8,397.26 5,417.06 --  
 5. Other payer 33,302.89 -8,838.87 1,121.71 -1,858.49 -7,275.55 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 29,507.13 --     
 2. Medicaid 34,145.09 -4,637.96 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
32,544.09 -3,036.96 1,601.00 --   
 4. Self-Pay 36,323.82 -6,816.69 -2,178.73 -3,779.73 --  
 5. Other payer 45,729.77 -16,222.63 -11,584.68 -13,185.67 -9,405.94 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 30,234.98 --     
 2. Medicaid 57,588.24 -27,353.26 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
33,952.81 -3,717.84 23,635.42 --   
 4. Self-Pay 42,898.18 -12,663.20 14,690.06 -8,945.36 --  
 5. Other payer 52,162.43 -21,927.45 5,425.81 -18,209.62 -9,264.25 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 31,613.93 --     
 2. Medicaid 46,810.04 -15,196.11 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
36,745.69 -5,131.76 10,064.35 --   
 4. Self-Pay 42,848.12 -11,234.19 3,961.92 -6,102.43 --  
 5. Other payer 48,697.65 -
17,083.72** 
(-0.48) 
-1,887.61 -11,951.96 -5,849.53 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 33,058.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 40,487.82 -7,429.31 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 33,599.18 -540.67 6,888.64 --   
 4. Self-Pay 25,926.69 7,131.82 14,561.13 7,672.49 --  
 5. Other payer 34,771.79 -1,713.28 5,716.03 -1,172.61 -8,845.10 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 31,218.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 35,248.85 -4,029.90 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
34,922.78 -3,703.82 326.08 --   
 4. Self-Pay 41,746.72 -10,527.76 -6,497.87 -6,823.94 --  
 5. Other payer 44,374.11 -13,155.15 -9,125.25 -9,451.33 -2,627.39 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 88 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 470 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 17,551.38 --     
 2. Medicaid 17,061.46 489.92 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
16,855.09 696.30* 
(0.10) 
206.38 --   
 4. Self-Pay 10,290.49 7,260.89* 
(1.07) 
6,770.98* 
(0.68) 
6,564.60* 
(0.89) 
--  
 5. Other payer 18,646.68 -1,095.30 -1,585.22 -1,791.59 -
8,356.19* 
(-0.71) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 17,995.41 --     
 2. Medicaid 19,405.39 -1,409.98* 
(-0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
17,134.51 860.90* 
(0.14) 
2,270.88* 
(0.35) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 17,668.77 326.64 1,736.61 -534.26 --  
 5. Other payer 18,349.97 -354.55 1,055.42** 
(0.15) 
-1,215.46* 
(-0.19) 
-681.19 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 17,231.27 --     
 2. Medicaid 17,897.27 -666.01 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
17,263.88 -32.61 633.39 --   
 4. Self-Pay 17,571.62 -340.35 325.65 -307.74 --  
 5. Other payer 18,201.70 -970.43* 
(-0.13) 
-304.43 -937.82** 
(-0.13) 
-630.08 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 18,463.13 --     
 2. Medicaid 20,043.67 -1,580.54* 
(-0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
17,820.25 642.89* 
(0.10) 
2,223.42* 
(0.32) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 18,933.66 -470.52 1,110.01 -1,113.41 --  
 5. Other payer 18,784.86 -321.72 1,258.81** 
(0.17) 
-964.61** 
(-0.15) 
148.80 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 19,553.97 --     
 2. Medicaid 22,724.38 -3,170.41* 
(-0.30) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
18,778.59 775.38* 
(0.10) 
3,945.79* 
(0.38) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 21,672.31 -2,118.34 1,052.07 -2,893.72 --  
 5. Other payer 20,944.92 -1,390.95* 
(-0.17) 
1,779.45** 
(0.16) 
-2,166.34* 
(-0.27) 
727.38 -- 
     (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 20,532.09 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,513.43 -981.33 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
20,239.42 292.67 1,274.00 --   
 4. Self-Pay 23,934.79 -
3,402.70** 
(-0.34) 
-2,421.37 -3,695.37** 
(-0.37) 
--  
 5. Other payer 21,114.42 -582.33 399.00 -875.00** 
(-0.10) 
2,820.37 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 20,274.96 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,038.60 -763.64 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
19,919.34 355.63** 
(0.05) 
1,119.27* 
(0.14) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 21,641.53 -1,366.57 -602.92 -1,722.19 --  
 5. Other payer 20,371.49 -96.53 667.11 -452.15 1,270.04 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 19,928.23 --     
 2. Medicaid 20,775.56 -847.33** 
(-0.10) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
19,336.02 592.21* 
(0.08) 
1,439.54* 
(0.17) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 20,652.05 -723.82 123.51 -1,316.02 --  
 5. Other payer 19,874.34 53.89 901.22 -538.32 777.71 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 89 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 603 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 6,583.32 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,149.31 434.02 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,314.12 1,269.20* 
(0.29) 
835.19** 
(0.18) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,340.74 1,242.58* 
(0.29) 
808.57 -26.62 --  
 5. Other payer 6,263.02 320.30 -113.71 -948.90 -922.28 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 6,895.86 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,493.14 402.72** 
(0.08) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,571.68 1,324.19* 
(0.28) 
921.46* 
(0.20) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,922.04 973.82* 
(0.21) 
571.10** 
(0.12) 
-350.37 --  
 5. Other payer 7,075.15 -179.29 -582.01 -1,503.47* 
(-0.27) 
-1,153.11* 
(-0.21) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 6,766.12 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,069.46 696.66* 
(0.14) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,697.35 1,068.77* 
(0.22) 
372.11** 
(0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,082.64 683.49* 
(0.13) 
-13.17 -385.28 --  
 5. Other payer 6,392.88 373.24 -323.41 -695.53** 
(--0.16) 
-310.24 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 7,654.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,906.28 748.26* 
(0.13) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,141.25 1,513.29* 
(0.30) 
765.03* 
(0.14) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,555.31 1,099.23* 
(0.22) 
350.97 -414.06** 
(-0.10) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,726.49 -71.95 -820.21* 
(-0.14) 
-1,585.24* 
(-0.32) 
-1,171.18* 
(-0.24) 
-- 
2011 1. Medicare 7,651.56 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,188.41 463.15** 
(0.08) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,356.68 1,294.88* 
(0.25) 
831.73* 
(0.15) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,589.44 1,062.13* 
(0.21) 
598.98** 
(0.11) 
-232.75 --  
 5. Other payer 7,865.07 -213.51 -676.66 
(-0.11) 
-1,508.39* 
(-0.27) 
-1,275.64* 
(-0.23) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 7,938.43 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,233.82 704.61* 
(0.12) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,875.54 1,062.89* 
(0.16) 
358.28 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,718.66 1,219.77* 
(0.23) 
515.16** 
(0.09) 
156.88 --  
 5. Other payer 7,641.05 297.38 -407.23 -765.51** 
(-0.11) 
-922.39* 
(-0.17) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 8,179.49 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,226.09 953.40* 
(0.14) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,740.54 1,438.95* 
(0.21) 
485.55** 
(0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,862.61 1,316.89* 
(0.20) 
363.49 -122.06 --  
 5. Other payer 7,909.61 269.88 -683.52** 
(-0.11) 
-1,169.07* 
(-0.19) 
-1,047.00* 
(-0.18) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 8,121.84 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,457.98 663.86* 
(0.11) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,065.77 1,056.06* 
(0.18) 
392.21 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,722.86 1,398.98* 
(0.24) 
735.12** 
(0.13) 
342.92 --  
 5. Other payer 8,471.12 -349.28 -1,013.14 -
1,405.34** 
(-0.18) 
-
1,748.26** 
(-0.23) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 90 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 639 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 4,692.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,499.15 193.81 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,423.95 269.00 75.19 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,619.14 73.81 -120.00 -195.19 --  
 5. Other payer 5,848.33 -1,155.37 -1,349.18 -1,424.38 -1,229.18 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 4,687.78 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,275.04 -587.26** 
(-0.17) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,640.31 47.47 634.73** 
(0.18) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,192.18 -504.40 82.86 -551.87 --  
 5. Other payer 6,575.47 -1,887.69* 
(-0.44) 
-1,300.43** 
(-0.29) 
-1,935.16* 
(-0.46) 
-
1,383.29** 
(-0.32) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 4,838.01 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,118.35 -280.34 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,007.75 -169.74 110.60 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,220.27 -382.26 -101.93 -212.52 --  
 5. Other payer 5,448.21 -610.20 -329.86 -440.46 -227.94 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 5,271.74 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,685.40 -413.67 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,290.94 -19.20 394.46 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,602.40 -330.66 83.01 -311.46 --  
 5. Other payer 6,332.81 -1,061.07* 
(-0.30) 
-647.40 -1,041.87* 
(-0.30) 
-730.41** 
(-0.21) 
-- 
2011 1. Medicare 5,504.64 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,561.08 -56.45 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,962.45 542.19 598.64** 
(0.17) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,939.64 -435.00 -378.55 -977.19* 
(-0.29) 
--  
 5. Other payer 6,718.08 -
1,213.45** 
(-0.31) 
-1,157.00** 
(-0.45) 
-1,755.64* 
(-0.45) 
-778.45 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 5,808.46 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,697.29 -888.83** 
(-0.19) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,180.95 -372.49 516.34 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,074.95 -266.49 622.34 106.00 --  
 5. Other payer 6,832.67 -
1,024.21** 
(-0.22) 
-135.38 -651.72 -757.72 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 6,096.69 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,542.03 -445.34 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,413.87 -317.18 128.16 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,512.69 -415.99 29.34 -98.81 --  
 5. Other payer 6,711.97 -615.28 -169.94 -298.10 -199.29 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,385.44 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,505.93 -120.49 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,451.82 -66.38 54.11 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,314.67 1,070.78** 
(0.26) 
1,191.27* 
(0.31) 
1,137.15** 
(0.30) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,108.26 -722.82 -602.33 -656.44 -
1,793.60** 
(-0.41) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 91 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 690 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 6,331.84 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,490.98 840.87** 
(0.19) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,985.48 1,346.36* 
(0.24) 
505.50 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,452.66 1,879.18* 
(0.53) 
1,038.31** 
(0.27) 
532.82 --  
 5. Other payer 4,802.42 1,529.42** 
(0.41) 
688.56 183.06 -349.76 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 6,687.05 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,144.27 542.78** 
(0.11) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,461.68 1,225.38* 
(0.27) 
682.59* 
(0.15) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,428.39 1,258.66* 
(0.31) 
715.87** 
(0.17) 
33.28 --  
 5. Other payer 7,276.05 -589.00 -1,131.78 -
1,814.38** 
(-0.33) 
-
1,847.66** 
(-0.36) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 6,409.46 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,473.16 936.29* 
(0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,576.50 832.96* 
(0.20) 
-103.34 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,115.77 1,293.69* 
(0.35) 
357.40 460.74** 
(0.13) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,231.75 -822.29 -
1,758.58** 
(-0.28) 
-
1,655.24** 
(-0.27) 
-2,115.98* 
(-0.36) 
-- 
2010 1. Medicare 7,334.94 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,181.30 1,153.64* 
(0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,074.20 1,260.74* 
(0.25) 
107.10 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,353.62 981.32* 
(0.21) 
-172.32 -279.42 --  
 5. Other payer 7,637.08 -302.14 -1,455.78* 
(-0.26) 
-1,562.88* 
(-0.30) 
-
1,283.46** 
(-0.26) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 7,047.67 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,394.50 653.17* 
(0.12) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,918.46 1,129.21* 
(0.25) 
476.04 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,956.17 1,091.50* 
(0.25) 
438.33 -37.71 --  
 5. Other payer 7,552.00 -504.33 -
1,157.50** 
(-0.21) 
-1,633.55* 
(-0.36) 
-1,595.84* 
(-0.37) 
-- 
2012 1. Medicare 7,682.58 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,634.01 1,048.57* 
(0.19) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,814.94 867.64* 
(0.13) 
-180.93 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,256.92 1,425.66* 
(0.29) 
377.09 558.02 --  
 5. Other payer 7,118.00 564.58 -483.99 -303.06 -861.08 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 7,664.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,623.61 1,041.34* 
(0.19) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,719.44 945.52* 
(0.19) 
-95.82 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,344.09 1,320.86* 
(0.28) 
279.52 375.35 --  
 5. Other payer 7,728.83 -63.88 -1,105.22 -1,009.40 -
1,384.74** 
(-0.22) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 7,625.65 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,761.13 864.52* 
(0.16) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,916.59 709.06** 
(0.12) 
-155.46 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,272.37 1,353.27* 
(0.28) 
488.75 644.21 --  
 5. Other payer 7,796.57 -170.92 -1,035.44 -879.98 -1,524.19 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 92 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 765 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 5,997.45 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,221.76 -1,224.31 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,089.64 -1,092.19 132.12 --   
 4. Self-Pay 7,356.42 -1,358.97 -134.66 -266.78 --  
 5. Other payer 6,797.69 -800.24 424.06 291.95 558.73 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 11,472.48 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,322.97 3,149.51 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
8,221.47 3,251.02 101.50 --   
 4. Self-Pay 6,346.58 5,125.90** 
(0.50) 
1,976.39* 
(0.35) 
1,874.89* 
(0.31) 
--  
 5. Other payer 9,458.65 2,013.83 -1,135.69 -1,237.19 -3,112.08* 
(-0.37) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 10,456.55 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,252.47 1,204.08 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
9,393.78 1,062.77 -141.31 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,444.53 2,012.02 807.93 949.24 --  
 5. Other payer 9,237.50 1,219.05 14.97 156.28 -792.96 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 9,507.03 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,878.01 629.03 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
9,375.80 131.23 -497.80** 
(-0.05) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 7,571.18 1,935.86 1,306.83 1,804.63** 
(0.20) 
--  
 5. Other payer 8,302.80 1,204.23 575.20 1,073.00** 
(0.13) 
-731.63 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 10,424.68 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,792.18 1,632.50 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
8,970.83 1,453.85 -178.65 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,192.98 2,231.70 599.20 777.84 --  
 5. Other payer 8,236.29 2,188.39 555.90 734.54 -43.30 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 10,728.09 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,666.11 1,061.98 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
9,976.38 751.70 -310.28 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,811.79 1,916.30 854.32 1,164.59 --  
 5. Other payer 10,167.57 560.52 -501.46 -191.18 -1,355.78 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 12,636.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,955.24 2,681.26 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,343.82 2,292.68 -388.58 --   
        
        
        
 4. Self-Pay 8,360.26 4,276.24** 
(0.51) 
1,594.98* 
(0.23) 
1,983.56* 
(0.24) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
9,648.63 2,987.87 306.61 695.20 -
1,288.37** 
(-0.22) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 11,644.77 --     
 2. Medicaid 10,261.75 1,383.02 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
10,524.18 1,120.59 -262.43 --   
 4. Self-Pay 8,718.71 2,926.06** 
(0.37) 
1,543.05* 
(0.18) 
1,805.47* 
(0.20) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
10,068.26 1,576.51 193.50 455.92 -
1,349.55** 
(-0.22) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 93 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 766 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 4,998.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,988.42 10.08 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,242.43 -243.93 -254.00* 
(-0.13) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,293.08 705.42 695.34* 
(0.41) 
949.34* 
(0.54) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,452.68 -454.18 -464.26** 
(-0.27) 
-210.26 -
1,159.60* 
(-0.75) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 5,848.77 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,705.92 142.85 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,643.88 204.89 62.04 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,613.20 1,235.57* 
(0.55) 
1,092.72* 
(0.46) 
1,030.68* 
(0.47) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,894.38 -45.61 -188.45 -250.50 -
1,281.17* 
(-0.46) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 6,491.16 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,041.54 449.62 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,030.47 460.69 11.07 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,701.81 789.36** 
(0.34) 
339.74** 
(0.13) 
328.67** 
(0.12) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,852.10 639.06 189.44 178.37 -150.29 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 7,407.76 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,163.20 1,244.56 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,509.61 898.15 -346.41* 
(-0.12) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,968.96 1,438.80 194.24 540.65* 
(0.21) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,895.39 1,512.37** 
(0.46) 
267.81 614.22* 
(0.21) 
73.57 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 7,195.69 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,344.46 851.23 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,164.18 1,031.51 180.28* 
(0.06) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,295.28 1,900.40* 
(0.69) 
1,049.17* 
(0.36) 
868.90* 
(0.32) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,886.73 1,308.96** 
(0.46) 
457.73** 
(0.15) 
277.45 -591.45** 
(-0.23) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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 (Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 6,688.74 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,744.44 -55.70 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,090.99 -402.24 -346.54* 
(-0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,975.90 712.84 768.54* 
(0.25) 
1,115.09* 
(0.34) 
--  
 5. Other payer 6,946.85 -258.10 -202.40 144.14 -970.95* 
(-0.32) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 8,158.47 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,887.26 1,271.21** 
(0.33) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,287.34 871.13 -400.08* 
(-0.11) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,925.41 2,233.07* 
(0.64) 
961.85* 
(0.30) 
1,361.93* 
(0.41) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,190.74 967.73 -303.48 96.60 -
1,265.34* 
(-0.45) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 7,754.17 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,179.99 574.18 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,485.54 268.64 -305.55* 
(-0.07) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 6,422.42 1,331.75* 
(0.48) 
757.57* 
(0.22) 
1,063.11* 
(0.30) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,161.52 592.65 18.47 324.02 -739.09* 
(-0.24) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 94 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 775 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 3,298.14 --     
 2. Medicaid 2,885.77 412.37** 
(0.32) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 3,003.58 294.57 -117.80* 
(-0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,626.92 671.23* 
(0.56) 
258.85* 
(0.19) 
376.66* 
(0.26) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,197.80 100.34 -312.03* 
(-0.23) 
-194.23 -570.88* 
(-0.45) 
-- 
2008 1. Medicare 3,627.41 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,305.68 321.73** 
(0.17) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 3,408.07 219.34 -102.39* 
(-0.05) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,867.27 760.15* 
(0.50) 
438.41* 
(0.26) 
540.80* 
(0.33) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,284.72 342.69 20.96 123.35 -417.46* 
(-0.23) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 3,786.01 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,547.94 238.07 --    
 3. Private insurance 3,691.22 94.79 -143.28* 
(-0.06) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,310.02 475.99** 
(0.26) 
237.92* 
(0.12) 
381.20* 
(0.17) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,451.52 334.50 96.43 239.71 -141.49 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 4,260.45 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,527.25 733.20** 
(0.33) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 3,800.63 459.82 -273.38* 
(-0.12) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,985.69 1,274.75* 
(0.63) 
541.56* 
(0.32) 
814.94* 
(0.38) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,387.80 872.64** 
(0.30) 
139.45 412.83* 
(0.14) 
-402.11* 
(-0.16) 
-- 
2011 1. Medicare 3,627.51 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,572.89 54.63 --    
 3. Private insurance 3,711.94 -84.43 -139.06* 
(-0.07) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,044.47 583.05** 
(0.35) 
528.42* 
(0.28) 
667.48* 
(0.36) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,321.16 306.36 251.73* 
(0.14) 
390.79* 
(0.22) 
-276.69* 
(-0.18) 
-- 
     (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 4,698.21 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,987.52 710.69 --    
 3. Private insurance 4,233.15 465.05 -245.64* 
(-0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,575.65 1,122.56* 
(0.36) 
411.87* 
(0.19) 
657.50* 
(0.27) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,987.40 710.81 0.12 245.75* 
(0.10) 
-411.75* 
(-0.21) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 4,673.00 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,090.82 582.18** 
(0.22) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 4,337.05 335.96 -246.22* 
(-0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,526.14 1,146.86* 
(0.46) 
564.68* 
(0.27) 
810.91* 
(0.36) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,234.31 438.69 -143.49 102.74 -708.17* 
(-0.34) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 4,759.34 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,206.63 552.71* 
(0.24) 
--    
 3. Private insurance 4,420.33 339.01 -213.70* 
(-0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,742.50 1,016.84* 
(0.38) 
464.13* 
(0.16) 
677.83* 
(0.23) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,323.84 435.50** 
(0.20) 
-117.22 96.48 -581.34* 
(-0.21) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 95 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 853 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 48,368.12 --     
 2. Medicaid 60,402.74 -12,034.62 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
46,775.84 1,592.28 13,626.90 --   
 4. Self-Pay 47,309.73 1,058.39 13,093.01 -533.89 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
46,770.85 1,597.27 13,631.89 4.99 538.88 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 47,906.72 --     
 2. Medicaid 63,229.88 -
15,323.15** 
(-0.26) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,179.58 -6,272.85 9,050.30 --   
 4. Self-Pay 44,054.22 3,852.50 19,175.65** 
(0.36) 
10,125.35 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
60,085.82 -12,179.09 3,144.06 -5,906.24 -16,031.59 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 50,751.37 --     
 2. Medicaid 64,455.98 -13,704.61* 
(-0.26) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
54,853.56 -4,102.19 9,602.42 --   
 4. Self-Pay 43,576.49 7,174.89 20,879.49* 
(0.41) 
11,277.07 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
53,085.97 -2,334.59 11,370.01 1,767.59 -9,509.48 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 49,915.41 --     
 2. Medicaid 66,571.89 -16,656.48* 
(-0.32) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
57,163.74 -7,248.32 9,408.16 --   
 4. Self-Pay 60,236.41 -10,321.00 6,335.48 -3,072.67 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
52,659.39 -2,743.98 13,912.50** 
(0.28) 
4,504.35 7,577.02 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 49,934.97 --     
 2. Medicaid 60,481.14 -10,546.17* 
(-0.22) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
58,710.10 -8,775.13** 
(-0.19) 
1,771.04 --   
 4. Self-Pay 43,214.04 6,720.92 17,267.10* 
(0.41) 
15,496.06* 
(0.38) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
56,946.20 -7,011.23 3,534.94 1,763.91 -13,732.15 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 54,747.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 63,446.46 -8,698.96** 
(-0.16) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
56,266.62 -1,519.12 7,179.84 --   
 4. Self-Pay 48,043.58 6,703.91 15,402.87* 
(0.31) 
8,223.03 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
83,283.00 -28,535.50 -19,836.54 -27,016.38 -
35,239.42** 
(-0.39) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 55,438.95 --     
 2. Medicaid 64,273.79 -8,834.84** 
(-0.15) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
56,600.66 -1,161.71 7,673.13 --   
 4. Self-Pay 39,719.76 15,719.20* 
(0.37) 
24,554.04* 
(0.47) 
16,880.90* 
(0.38) 
--  
 5. Other 
payer 
60,736.82 -5,297.86 3,536.98 -4,136.16 -21,017.06 
(-0.49) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 51,176.76 --     
 2. Medicaid 61,504.77 -10,328.01* 
(-0.18) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
52,741.85 -1,565.09 8,762.91** 
(0.15) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 42,870.78 8,305.98 18,633.99** 
(0.33) 
9,871.08 --  
 5. Other 
payer 
67,495.37 -16,318.61 -5,990.61 -14,753.52 -24,624.59 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 96 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 871 
Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 16,698.77 --     
 2. Medicaid 20,057.35 -
3,358.57** 
(-0.19) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
17,575.94 -877.17 2,481.40 --   
 4. Self-Pay 17,440.93 -742.16 2,616.41 135.01 --  
 5. Other payer 17,448.49 -749.72 2,608.85 127.45 -7.56 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 16,171.39 --     
 2. Medicaid 19,703.84 -3,532.46* 
(-0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
16,350.25 -178.86 3,353.60* 
(0.18) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 15,533.19 638.20 4,170.65* 
(0.25) 
817.06 --  
 5. Other payer 20,689.82 -
4,518.43** 
(-0.25) 
-985.97 -
4,339.57** 
(-0.23) 
-
5,156.63** 
(-0.30) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 17,402.51 --     
 2. Medicaid 19,763.85 -2,361.33* 
(-0.13) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
18,160.02 -757.51 1,603.83 --   
 4. Self-Pay 16,379.24 1,023.28 3,384.61* 
(0.19) 
1,780.78 --  
 5. Other payer 19,539.08 -2,136.57 224.76 -1,379.06 -3,159.85 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 18,244.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,174.59 -2,930.05* 
(-0.16) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
17,697.60 546.94 3,477.00* 
(0.18) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 18,751.85 -507.31 2,422.75 -1,054.25 --  
 5. Other payer 20,772.46 -2,527.93 402.13 -
3,074.87** 
(-0.18) 
-2,020.62 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of 
insurance 
Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 17,826.31 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,481.79 -3,655.48* 
(-0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
18,179.69 -353.39 3,302.09* 
(0.18) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 18,400.23 -573.92 3,081.56** 
(0.17) 
-220.53 --  
 5. Other payer 20,915.45 -
3,089.15** 
(-0.19) 
566.33 -2,735.76 -2,515.23 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 18,349.62 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,750.17 -3,400.54* 
(-0.17) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
18,685.79 -336.17 3,064.37* 
(0.15) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 17,389.43 960.19 4,360.74* 
(0.23) 
1,296.36 --  
 5. Other payer 21,661.72 -3,312.09* 
(-0.18) 
88.45 -
2,975.92** 
(-0.16) 
-4,272.29* 
(-0.24) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 17,873.38 --     
 2. Medicaid 21,055.23 -3,181.85* 
(-0.14) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
18,824.76 -951.38 2,230.47** 
(0.09) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 17,261.96 611.42 3,793.27* 
(0.18) 
1,562.80 --  
 5. Other payer 22,038.99 -
4,165.61** 
(-0.16) 
-983.76 -3,214.23 -
4,777.03** 
(-0.19) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 18,030.59 --     
 2. Medicaid 20,449.24 -2,418.64* 
(-0.13) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
18,439.82 -409.23 2,009.42* 
(0.10) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 16,258.58 1,772.01 4,190.65* 
(0.24) 
2,181.24** 
(0.13) 
--  
 5. Other payer 20,484.95 -2,454.36 -35.72 -
2,045.13** 
(-0.11) 
-
4,226.37** 
(-0.25) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 97 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 881 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 6,755.86 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,416.64 3,339.22 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,533.03 3,222.83 -116.39 --   
 4. Self-Pay 2,108.79 4,647.07** 
(0.56) 
1,307.85** 
(0.62) 
1,424.24* 
(0.77) 
--  
 5. Other payer 2,154.35 4,601.52 1,262.30** 
(0.52) 
1,378.69* 
(0.62) 
-45.55 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 6,246.59 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,972.45 1,274.14 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,118.64 3,127.95* 
(0.46) 
1,853.81** 
(0.19) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,603.66 3,642.93* 
(0.55) 
2,368.79** 
(0.24) 
514.98 --  
 5. Other payer 3,042.00 3,204.59* 
(0.48) 
1,930.45** 
(0.20) 
76.64 -438.34 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 5,064.29 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,765.12 1,299.16* 
(0.32) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,762.69 301.59 -997.57* 
(-0.23) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,266.92 1,797.36* 
(0.51) 
498.20 1,495.77* 
(0.39) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,804.73 1,259.56* 
(0.38) 
-39.60 957.97** 
(0.26) 
-537.80 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 6,008.17 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,301.44 1,706.73* 
(0.34) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,124.78 1,883.39* 
(0.30) 
176.66 --   
 4. Self-Pay 3,000.40 3,007.78* 
(0.66) 
1,301.05* 
(0.33) 
1,124.39** 
(0.21) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,290.05 2,718.13* 
(0.60) 
1,011.39** 
(0.26) 
834.74 -289.65 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 7,339.11 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,421.09 1,918.02 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,832.14 3,506.97* 
(0.46) 
1,588.95* 
(0.28) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,694.50 1,644.62 -273.41 -1,862.35* 
(-0.52) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,993.66 3,345.45* 
(0.44) 
1,427.43** 
(0.25) 
-161.52 1,700.84* 
(0.48) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 6,019.02 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,655.30 1,363.71** 
(0.24) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,364.13 1,654.89* 
(0.33) 
291.18 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,498.15 1,520.87 157.16 -134.02 --  
 5. Other payer 3,860.78 2,158.24* 
(0.46) 
794.53 503.35 637.37 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 6,450.17 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,122.21 1,327.96** 
(0.26) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,672.95 1,777.22* 
(0.37) 
449.26 --   
 4. Self-Pay 3,013.07 3,437.10* 
(0.89) 
2,109.14* 
(0.52) 
1,659.88* 
(0.45) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,711.38 1,738.79** 
(0.26) 
410.83 -38.43 -
1,698.31** 
(-0.28) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,535.76 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,378.05 2,157.71* 
(0.33) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,589.53 1,946.22** 
(0.31) 
-211.48 --   
 4. Self-Pay 3,441.73 3,094.03* 
(0.53) 
936.33** 
(0.24) 
1,147.81** 
(0.32) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,686.87 1,848.89 -308.82 -97.34 -1,245.15 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 98 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 882 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 8,716.04 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,015.00 4,701.04 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,020.70 4,695.34 -5.70 --   
 4. Self-Pay 2,727.52 5,988.52 1,287.48 1,293.18 --  
 5. Other payer 4,743.86 3,972.18 -728.85 -723.16 -2,016.33 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 5,256.55 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,441.71 814.84 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,461.51 1,795.03 980.20** 
(0.25) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,482.68 1,773.87 959.03 -21.16 --  
 5. Other payer 4,322.43 934.12 119.28 -860.91 -839.75 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 4,860.22 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,627.86 -767.64 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,678.79 181.43 949.07 --   
 4. Self-Pay 2,702.66 2,157.56** 
(0.71) 
2,925.20 1,976.13** 
(0.59) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,798.84 1,061.38 1,829.02 879.95 -1,096.18 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 5,617.67 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,410.58 207.09 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,097.27 1,520.40** 
(0.37) 
1,313.32** 
(0.30) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 2,654.73 2,962.94* 
(0.80) 
2,755.85* 
(0.70) 
1,442.54* 
(0.46) 
--  
 5. Other payer 2,651.81 2,965.86* 
(0.74) 
2,758.77* 
(0.65) 
1,445.45** 
(0.41) 
2.92 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 6,637.20 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,349.00 288.21 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,907.88 1,729.32 1,441.12 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,734.02 903.18 614.98 -826.14 --  
 5. Other payer 5,884.87 752.34 464.13 -976.99 -150.85 -- 
2012 1. Medicare 6,912.06 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,261.64 650.41 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,174.59 1,737.46 1,087.05 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,051.97 2,860.09** 
(0.53) 
2,209.67** 
(0.31) 
1,122.62 --  
 5. Other payer 6,312.73 599.33 -51.08 -1,138.13 -2,260.75 -- 
     (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2013 1. Medicare 7,014.61 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,187.01 1,827.60** 
(0.39) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
4,896.16 2,118.46** 
(0.44) 
290.86 --   
 4. Self-Pay 2,780.50 4,234.12* 
(1.13) 
2,406.52* 
(0.63) 
2,115.66* 
(0.53) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,325.85 2,688.76* 
(0.61) 
861.16 570.30 -1,545.36** 
(-0.45) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 6,085.02 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,366.46 718.56 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,031.34 1,053.68 335.12 --   
 4. Self-Pay 3,931.54 2,153.47 1,434.91 1,099.80 --  
 5. Other payer 8,675.61 -2,590.59 -3,309.15 -3,644.27 -4,744.07 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 99 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 885 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 7,429.50 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,249.71 2,179.79* 
(0.31) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,610.61 818.90** 
(0.11) 
-1,360.90* 
(-0.22) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,216.02 3,213.48* 
(0.53) 
1,033.69* 
(0.21) 
2,394.58* 
(0.46) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,809.29 2,620.21* 
(0.36) 
440.42 1,801.31* 
(0.28) 
-593.27 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 8,718.73 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,598.91 2,119.81* 
(0.23) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
5,362.00 3,356.73* 
(0.42) 
1,236.92* 
(0.16) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,166.05 4,552.67* 
(0.63) 
2,432.86* 
(0.35) 
1,195.94* 
(0.21) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,613.86 3,104.87* 
(0.39) 
985.06* 
(0.13) 
-251.86 -
1,447.80* 
(-0.26) 
-- 
2009 1. Medicare 8,133.93 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,668.09 2,465.84* 
(0.29) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,629.82 504.11** 
(0.06) 
-1,961.73* 
(-0.24) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,618.24 4,515.69* 
(0.65) 
2,049.85* 
(0.35) 
4,011.58* 
(0.62) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,544.39 589.54 -1,876.29* 
(-0.22) 
85.43 -
3,926.14* 
(-0.57) 
-- 
2010 1. Medicare 10,582.18 --     
 2. Medicaid 8,035.24 2,546.93* 
(0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,183.64 3,398.54* 
(0.33) 
851.60* 
(0.08) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,501.44 5,080.73* 
(0.49) 
2,533.80* 
(0.24) 
1,682.20* 
(0.20) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,627.55 4,954.62* 
(0.48) 
2,407.69* 
(0.23) 
1,556.09* 
(0.19) 
-126.11 -- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2011 1. Medicare 10,894.72 --     
 2. Medicaid 9,464.30 1,430.42* 
(0.11) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,183.89 3,710.82* 
(0.36) 
2,280.41* 
(0.20) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 11,066.67 -171.96 -1,602.37* 
(-0.13) 
-
3,882.78* 
(-0.41) 
--  
 5. Other payer 8,686.58 2,208.14* 
(0.17) 
777.72 -
1,502.69* 
(-0.14) 
2,380.09* 
(0.19) 
-- 
2012 1. Medicare 9,097.67 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,939.55 2,158.12* 
(0.20) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,132.95 1,964.72* 
(0.19) 
-193.40 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,360.25 3,737.42* 
(0.41) 
1,579.30* 
(0.18) 
1,772.70* 
(0.22) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,048.83 2,048.84* 
(0.19) 
-109.28 84.12 -
1,688.58* 
(-0.20) 
-- 
2013 1. Medicare 9,865.89 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,252.22 2,613.67* 
(0.21) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
7,446.58 2,419.31* 
(0.20) 
-194.37 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,255.50 4,610.39* 
(0.43) 
1,996.72* 
(0.23) 
2,191.08* 
(0.28) 
--  
 5. Other payer 7,367.10 2,498.79* 
(0.21) 
-114.89 79.48 -
2,111.60* 
(-0.26) 
-- 
2014 1. Medicare 10,570.79 --     
 2. Medicaid 7,105.23 3,465.56* 
(0.28) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
6,988.76 3,582.03* 
(0.32) 
116.47 --   
 4. Self-Pay 5,121.64 5,449.16* 
(0.52) 
1,983.59* 
(0.23) 
1,867.13* 
(0.26) 
--  
 5. Other payer 9,636.03 934.77 -2,530.80* 
(-0.18) 
-
2,647.26* 
(-0.21) 
-
4,514.39* 
(-0.38) 
-- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Table 100 
 
Post Hoc Results for Health Care Costs - DRG 894 
Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2007 1. Medicare 3,174.32 --     
 2. Medicaid 3,376.36 -202.04 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
2,540.47 633.84 835.89 --   
 4. Self-Pay 2,842.16 332.15 534.20 -301.69 --  
 5. Other payer 5,303.04 -2,128.73 -1,926.68 -2,762.57 -2,460.88 -- 
2008 1. Medicare 2,990.90 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,671.38 -
2,680.48** 
(-0.47) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
2,224.68 766.23 3,446.71* 
(0.64) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 4,057.76 -1,066.86 1,613.63 -1,833.08* 
(-0.45) 
--  
 5. Other payer 6,658.80 -3,667.90 -987.42 -4,434.13 -2,601.04 -- 
2009 1. Medicare 3,932.47 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,266.51 -334.04 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
2,871.32 1,061.15 1,395.19 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,086.32 -153.85 180.19 -
1,215.00** 
(-0.40) 
--  
 5. Other payer 3,655.83 276.65 610.68 -784.50 430.49 -- 
2010 1. Medicare 4,750.27 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,509.97 -759.71 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
2,393.77 2,356.50* 
(0.49) 
3,116.21* 
(0.94) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,382.78 -632.52 127.19 -2,989.02* 
(-0.74) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,409.33 -659.06 100.64 -3,015.56* 
(-0.75) 
-26.55 -- 
2011 1. Medicare 4,068.87 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,293.13 -
2,224.25** 
(-0.46) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,400.69 668.18 2,892.44* 
(0.59) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 3,454.87 614.01 2,838.26* 
(0.56) 
-54.18 --  
 5. Other payer 7,210.73 -3,141.85 -917.60 -
3,810.04** 
(-0.54) 
-
3,755.86** 
(-0.52) 
-- 
      (table continues) 
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Year Type of insurance Mean 
 
Mean differences 
(Effect sizes are indicated in parentheses) 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
2012 1. Medicare 4,957.64 --     
 2. Medicaid 4,680.34 277.30 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,213.38 1,744.26** 
(0.32) 
1,466.96** 
(0.29) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,049.40 -91.76 -369.06 -1,836.02** 
(-0.31) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,749.55 208.09 -69.21 -1,536.17** 
(-0.32) 
299.85 -- 
2013 1. Medicare 4,715.54 --     
 2. Medicaid 5,895.21 -1,179.66 --    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,545.97 1,169.57 2,349.24 --   
 4. Self-Pay 4,967.00 -251.46 928.21 -1,421.03** 
(-0.27) 
--  
 5. Other payer 5,904.73 -1,189.19 -9.52 -2,358.76** 
(-0.44) 
-937.73 -- 
2014 1. Medicare 4,421.90 --     
 2. Medicaid 6,863.13 -2,441.23* 
(-0.39) 
--    
 3. Private 
insurance 
3,583.29 838.60 3,279.84* 
(0.52) 
--   
 4. Self-Pay 5,888.09 -1,466.19 975.04 -2,304.80** 
(-0.46) 
--  
 5. Other payer 4,663.58 -241.68 2,199.55 -1,080.29 1,224.51 -- 
*p<.001, **p<.05 
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Appendix E: Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality 
Table 101 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2007 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.154 482 .000 
23 0.297 890 .000 
26 0.264 1,211 .000 
153 0.158 769 .000 
203 0.244 2,752 .000 
207 0.241 2,070 .000 
233 0.206 713 .000 
234 0.155 783 .000 
311 0.093 714 .000 
313 0.113 3,745 .000 
326 0.217 290 .000 
329 0.190 633 .000 
373 0.127 61,046 .000 
390 0.297 14,845 .000 
391 0.294 83,401 .000 
392 0.213 4,391 .000 
464 0.265 668 .000 
470 0.129 5,972 .000 
603 0.149 2,582 .000 
639 0.131 837 .000 
690 0.135 2,514 .000 
765 0.239 3,292 .000 
766 0.098 8,602 .000 
775 0.122 20,365 .000 
853 0.171 483 .000 
871 0.168 2,889 .000 
881 0.263 3,64 .000 
882 0.206 129 .000 
885 0.199 5,476 .000 
894 0.170 255 .000 
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Table 102 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2008 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.084 1,434 .000 
23 0.117 441 .000 
26 0.159 1,302 .000 
153 0.151 1,822 .000 
203 0.132 4,473 .000 
207 0.158 2,291 .000 
233 0.165 588 .000 
234 0.060 1,085 .000 
311 0.139 1,320 .000 
313 0.108 12,243 .000 
326 0.188 687 .000 
329 0.179 2,379 .000 
373 0.148 676 .000 
390 0.132 2,805 .000 
391 0.187 2,209 .000 
392 0.145 14,376 .000 
464 0.179 468 .000 
470 0.106 19,214 .000 
603 0.143 9,444 .000 
639 0.132 2,963 .000 
690 0.149 8,946 .000 
765 0.236 11,760 .000 
766 0.139 28,111 .000 
775 0.125 70,332 .000 
853 0.188 2,080 .000 
871 0.163 14,046 .000 
881 0.324 1,777 .000 
882 0.208 676 .000 
885 0.216 19,860 .000 
894 0.304 879 .000 
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Table 103 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2009 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.096 1,439 .000 
23 0.116 529 .000 
26 0.143 1,475 .000 
153 0.189 3,202 .000 
203 0.149 7,534 .000 
207 0.158 2,488 .000 
233 0.156 798 .000 
234 0.073 1,329 .000 
311 0.126 1,126 .000 
313 0.121 13,501 .000 
326 0.167 823 .000 
329 0.182 2,385 .000 
373 0.153 922 .000 
390 0.150 3,031 .000 
391 0.204 2,905 .000 
392 0.148 16,980 .000 
464 0.171 454 .000 
470 0.129 20,713 .000 
603 0.140 10,785 .000 
639 0.117 3,327 .000 
690 0.139 10,071 .000 
765 0.243 12,760 .000 
766 0.139 30,417 .000 
775 0.149 76,426 .000 
853 0.166 2,497 .000 
871 0.162 14,995 .000 
881 0.185 2,070 .000 
882 0.266 379 .000 
885 0.236 24,272 .000 
894 0.185 463 .000 
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Table 104 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2010 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.117 1,107 .000 
23 0.145 657 .000 
26 0.153 1,252 .000 
153 0.163 2,028 .000 
203 0.148 6,173 .000 
207 0.152 2,144 .000 
233 0.150 691 .000 
234 0.102 998 .000 
311 0.150 1,175 .000 
313 0.105 12,058 .000 
326 0.141 709 .000 
329 0.161 2,094 .000 
373 0.118 811 .000 
390 0.141 2,639 .000 
391 0.206 3,038 .000 
392 0.147 15,671 .000 
464 0.174 493 .000 
470 0.119 19,030 .000 
603 0.139 10,645 .000 
639 0.131 2,782 .000 
690 0.147 8,786 .000 
765 0.255 12,184 .000 
766 0.117 24,314 .000 
775 0.147 67,455 .000 
853 0.167 2,563 .000 
871 0.163 16,225 .000 
881 0.232 2,302 .000 
882 0.187 761 .000 
885 0.242 22,578 .000 
894 0.203 736 .000 
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Table 105 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2011 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.156 818 .000 
23 0.212 400 .000 
26 0.152 705 .000 
153 0.154 1,427 .000 
203 0.140 3,864 .000 
207 0.150 1,419 .000 
233 0.148 646 .000 
234 0.096 966 .000 
311 0.136 997 .000 
313 0.111 10,771 .000 
326 0.206 601 .000 
329 0.173 2,120 .000 
373 0.121 746 .000 
390 0.136 2,812 .000 
391 0.195 2,275 .000 
392 0.133 15,558 .000 
464 0.228 426 .000 
470 0.112 20,018 .000 
603 0.144 10,362 .000 
639 0.120 2,408 .000 
690 0.145 8,608 .000 
765 0.236 11,534 .000 
766 0.126 23,996 .000 
775 0.122 61,897 .000 
853 0.157 2,723 .000 
871 0.149 16,502 .000 
881 0.223 1,899 .000 
882 0.293 542 .000 
885 0.236 24,893 .000 
894 0.212 829 .000 
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Table 106 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2012 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.153 1,149 .000 
23 0.154 504 .000 
26 0.164 942 .000 
153 0.177 2,002 .000 
203 0.177 5,489 .000 
207 0.174 1,749 .000 
233 0.148 626 .000 
234 0.115 1,017 .000 
311 0.180 927 .000 
313 0.118 10,863 .000 
326 0.196 673 .000 
329 0.187 2,114 .000 
373 0.117 838 .000 
390 0.133 2,912 .000 
391 0.236 2,430 .000 
392 0.156 16,375 .000 
464 0.198 538 .000 
470 0.122 21,686 .000 
603 0.154 10,846 .000 
639 0.137 2,798 .000 
690 0.163 9,126 .000 
765 0.228 12,211 .000 
766 0.115 23,744 .000 
775 0.130 62,934 .000 
853 0.195 2,939 .000 
871 0.167 18,981 .000 
881 0.302 1,923 .000 
882 0.270 642 .000 
885 0.247 25,342 .000 
894 0.224 752 .000 
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Table 107 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2013 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.154 1,114 .000 
23 0.139 544 .000 
26 0.155 903 .000 
153 0.218 2,258 .000 
203 0.151 5,015 .000 
207 0.186 1,680 .000 
233 0.153 646 .000 
234 0.092 975 .000 
311 0.120 794 .000 
313 0.113 8,668 .000 
326 0.177 702 .000 
329 0.214 2,090 .000 
373 0.125 807 .000 
390 0.134 2,835 .000 
391 0.245 2,470 .000 
392 0.154 15,249 .000 
464 0.168 549 .000 
470 0.097 22,846 .000 
603 0.169 10,473 .000 
639 0.111 2,681 .000 
690 0.145 8,467 .000 
765 0.211 12,440 .000 
766 0.115 23,348 .000 
775 0.115 62,516 .000 
853 0.178 3,351 .000 
871 0.193 22,176 .000 
881 0.213 1,805 .000 
882 0.170 576 .000 
885 0.254 25,549 .000 
894 0.255 757 .000 
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Table 108 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Tests of Normality - 2014 
DRG Statistic 
 
df Sig. 
3 0.147 1,119 .000 
23 0.161 580 .000 
26 0.166 903 .000 
153 0.213 2,028 .000 
203 0.144 4,347 .000 
207 0.203 1,621 .000 
233 0.137 680 .000 
234 0.100 966 .000 
311 0.126 742 .000 
313 0.119 7,542 .000 
326 0.241 697 .000 
329 0.216 2,054 .000 
373 0.177 758 .000 
390 0.128 2,747 .000 
391 0.224 2,590 .000 
392 0.153 14,588 .000 
464 0.153 548 .000 
470 0.104 24,124 .000 
603 0.150 10,606 .000 
639 0.136 2,489 .000 
690 0.145 8,102 .000 
765 0.235 12,879 .000 
766 0.117 22,892 .000 
775 0.128 63,548 .000 
853 0.194 3,913 .000 
871 0.180 25,678 .000 
881 0.205 1,677 .000 
882 0.255 626 .000 
885 0.255 24,894 .000 
894 0.211 689 .000 
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Appendix F: Homogeneity of Variance and Robust Test of Equality of Means 
Table 109 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 3 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  7.218  4  1,114  .000 
 2013  4.540  4  1,109  .001 
 2012  6.802  4  1,144  .000 
 2011  9.641  4  813  .000 
 2010  3.885  4  1,102  .004 
 2009  4.394  4  1,434  .002 
 2008  2.993  4  1,429  .018 
 2007  0.531  4  477  .713 
Welch 2014  11.706  4  122.827  .000 
 2013  5.695  4  133.313  .000 
 2012  7.380  4  213.311  .000 
 2011  9.524  4  94.324  .000 
 2010  4.837  4  214.095  .001 
 2009  9.225  4  232.189  .000 
 2008  6.555  4  234.396  .000 
 2007  21.842  4  60.652  .000 
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Table 110 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 23 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014 5.743 4  575  .000 
 2013 5.129 4  539  .000 
 2012 10.242 4  499  .000 
 2011 20.487 4  395  .000 
 2010 13.800 4  652  .000 
 2009 3.771 4  524  .005 
 2008 1.768 4  436  .134 
 2007 3.369 4  885  .010 
Welch 2014 6.913 4  75.485  .000 
 2013 2.277 4  104.335  .066 
 2012 3.336 4  124.646  .012 
 2011 5.097 4  48.157  .002 
 2010 6.404 4  130.434  .000 
 2009 2.991 4  87.860  .023 
 2008 0.662 4  74.715  .621 
 2007 1.429 4  125.196  .228 
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Table 111 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 26 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  9.705  4  898  .000 
 2013  4.331  4  898  .002 
 2012  9.012  4  937  .000 
 2011  16.449  4  700  .000 
 2010  19.834  4  1,247  .000 
 2009  28.371  4  1,470  .000 
 2008  16.793  4  1,297  .000 
 2007  11.612  4  1,206  .000 
Welch 2014  5.970  4  105.933  .000 
 2013  3.719  4  149.976  .006 
 2012  5.970  4  164.607  .000 
 2011  6.093  4  88.023  .000 
 2010  12.303  4  224.255  .000 
 2009  8.080  4  168.069  .000 
 2008  8.045  4  157.628  .000 
 2007  25.299  4  152.141  .000 
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Table 112 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 153 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  8.926  4  2,023  .000 
 2013  7.031  4  2,253  .000 
 2012  0.812  4  1,997  .518 
 2011  5.412  4  1,422  .000 
 2010  9.127  4  2,023  .000 
 2009  4.593  4  3,197  .001 
 2008  4.797  4  1,817  .001 
 2007  6.115  4  764  .000 
Welch 2014  13.846  4  254.339  .000 
 2013  12.911  4  542.583  .000 
 2012  13.789  4  392.590  .000 
 2011  15.237  4  271.258  .000 
 2010  14.209  4  353.099  .000 
 2009  15.206  4  508.362  .000 
 2008  14.465  4  307.181  .000 
 2007  11.566  4  104.975  .000 
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Table 113 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 203 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  7.781  4  4,342  .000 
 2013  3.826  4  5,010  .004 
 2012  1.607  4  5,484  .170 
 2011  13.247  4  3,859  .000 
 2010  4.691  4  6,168  .001 
 2009  31.373  4  7,529  .000 
 2008  5.992  4  4,468  .000 
 2007  10.136  4  2,747  .000 
Welch 2014  17.120  4  447.715  .000 
 2013  15.618  4  800.634  .000 
 2012  18.090  4  928.752  .000 
 2011  43.173  4  707.003  .000 
 2010  16.684  4  893.294  .000 
 2009  49.849  4  996.599  .000 
 2008  39.028  4  688.845  .000 
 2007  29.101  4  435.976  .000 
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Table 114 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 207 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  13.943  4  1,616  .000 
 2013  12.662  4  1,675  .000 
 2012  13.399  4  1,744  .000 
 2011  5.883  4  1,414  .000 
 2010  4.593  4  2,139  .001 
 2009  15.782  4  2,483  .000 
 2008  10.089  4  2,286  .000 
 2007  5.935  4  2,065  .000 
Welch 2014  6.218  4  143.797  .000 
 2013  3.441  4  225.611  .009 
 2012  12.021  4  216.197  .000 
 2011  2.925  4  121.547  .024 
 2010  1.342  4  173.646  .256 
 2009  8.268  4  244.915  .000 
 2008  12.768  4  257.851  .000 
 2007  8.569  4  265.934  .000 
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Table 115 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 233 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  2.726  4  675  .029 
 2013  1.643  4  641  .162 
 2012  5.103  4  621  .000 
 2011  1.243  4  641  .291 
 2010  1.385  4  686  .238 
 2009  2.188  4  793  .069 
 2008  4.141  4  583  .003 
 2007  0.838  4  708  .501 
Welch 2014  2.790  4  61.621  .034 
 2013  2.152  4  129.766  .078 
 2012  4.280  4  118.256  .003 
 2011  1.407  4  89.318  .238 
 2010  1.193  4  84.962  .320 
 2009  1.270  4  91.655  .288 
 2008  7.998  4  104.648  .000 
 2007  0.934  4  53.035  .452 
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Table 116 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 234 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  2.582  4  961  .036 
 2013  3.275  4  970  .011 
 2012  2.514  4  1,012  .040 
 2011  2.187  4  961  .069 
 2010  5.128  4  993  .000 
 2009  0.551  4  1,324  .698 
 2008  1.465  4  1,080  .211 
 2007  4.393  4  778  .002 
Welch 2014  3.822  4  62.147  .008 
 2013  2.123  4  169.042  .080 
 2012  2.513  4  151.023  .044 
 2011  1.505  4  148.197  .203 
 2010  4.347  4  133.066  .002 
 2009  3.422  4  131.216  .011 
 2008  4.058  4  128.962  .004 
 2007  2.259  4  81.513  .070 
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Table 117 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 311 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  3.351  4  737  .010 
 2013  1.808  4  789  .125 
 2012  6.490  4  922  .000 
 2011  4.146  4  992  .002 
 2010  2.013  4  1,170  .091 
 2009  3.440  4  1,121  .008 
 2008  12.244  4  1,315  .000 
 2007  0.867  4  709  .483 
Welch 2014  1.628  4  90.984  .174 
 2013  2.143  4  203.269  .077 
 2012  4.893  4  259.508  .001 
 2011  6.085  4  205.580  .000 
 2010  4.914  4  327.005  .001 
 2009  3.001  4  227.863  .019 
 2008  9.170  4  228.487  .000 
 2007  0.268  4  89.460  .898 
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Table 118 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 313 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  18.003  4  7,537  .000 
 2013  13.768  4  8,663  .000 
 2012  21.269  4  10,858  .000 
 2011  18.032  4  10,766  .000 
 2010  22.641  4  12,053  .000 
 2009  29.976  4  13,496  .000 
 2008  46.925  4  12,238  .000 
 2007  12.962  4  3,740  .000 
Welch 2014  21.326  4  1,154.661  .000 
 2013  17.410  4  2,717.057  .000 
 2012  42.273  4  3,668.738  .000 
 2011  20.575  4  2,797.007  .000 
 2010  36.016  4  3,739.346  .000 
 2009  27.194  4  3,686.394  .000 
 2008  92.928  4  2,736.784  .000 
 2007  21.385  4  741.853  .000 
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Table 119 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 326 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  6.311  4  692  .000 
 2013  4.018  4  697  .003 
 2012  2.574  4  668  .037 
 2011  3.262  4  596  .012 
 2010  6.239  4  704  .000 
 2009  3.211  4  818  .013 
 2008  8.545  4  682  .000 
 2007  0.794  4  285  .530 
Welch 2014  2.694  4  81.278  .037 
 2013  1.210  4  153.494  .309 
 2012  1.677  4  124.980  .159 
 2011  21.563  4  145.023  .000 
 2010  1.277  4  139.672  .282 
 2009  6.032  4  147.935  .000 
 2008  2.834  4  115.127  .028 
 2007  0.390  4  43.581  .815 
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Table 120 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 329 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  32.569  4  2,049  .000 
 2013  15.783  4  2,085  .000 
 2012  8.198  4  2,109  .000 
 2011  14.932  4  2,115  .000 
 2010  17.403  4  2,089  .000 
 2009  10.120  4  2,380  .000 
 2008  31.288  4  2,374  .000 
 2007  10.285  4  628  .000 
Welch 2014  4.954  4  120.572  .001 
 2013  6.640  4  360.308  .000 
 2012  5.256  4  303.572  .000 
 2011  13.021  4  254.601  .000 
 2010  16.748  4  280.584  .000 
 2009  4.554  4  304.075  .001 
 2008  7.335  4  289.580  .000 
 2007  8.765  4  60.494  .000 
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Table 121 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 373 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  3.765  4  753  .005 
 2013  1.735  4  802  .140 
 2012  3.376  4  833  .009 
 2011  3.693  4  741  .005 
 2010  8.889  4  806  .000 
 2009  0.646  4  917  .630 
 2008  2.563  4  671  .037 
 2007  73.268  4  61,041  .000 
Welch 2014  1.388  4  78.957  .246 
 2013  1.906  4  189.082  .111 
 2012  2.077  4  199.185  .085 
 2011  7.533  4  172.243  .000 
 2010  2.573  4  188.946  .039 
 2009  0.516  4  150.071  .724 
 2008  3.327  4  116.464  .013 
 2007  76.014  4  1,847.060  .000 
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Table 122 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 390 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  4.397  4  2,742  .002 
 2013  2.931  4  2,830  .020 
 2012  2.645  4  2,907  .032 
 2011  8.586  4  2,807  .000 
 2010  0.453  4  2,634  .770 
 2009  6.277  4  3,026  .000 
 2008  5.497  4  2,800  .000 
 2007  82.247  4  14,840  .000 
Welch 2014  7.335  4  332.621  .000 
 2013  5.328  4  567.069  .000 
 2012  8.520  4  569.488  .000 
 2011  9.514  4  483.664  .000 
 2010  7.564  4  458.314  .000 
 2009  5.128  4  448.819  .000 
 2008  9.819  4  383.576  .000 
 2007  101.224  4  1,014.393  .000 
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Table 123 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 391 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  6.330  4  2,585  .000 
 2013  2.552  4  2,465  .037 
 2012  4.302  4  2,425  .002 
 2011  2.014  4  2,270  .090 
 2010  1.712  4  3,033  .145 
 2009  4.365  4  2,900  .002 
 2008  2.982  4  2,204  .018 
 2007  2,764.925  4  83,396  .000 
Welch 2014  0.811  4  201.217  .519 
 2013  3.316  4  442.033  .011 
 2012  3.491  4  356.437  .008 
 2011  3.500  4  298.721  .008 
 2010  1.680  4  488.669  .153 
 2009  4.778  4  384.294  .001 
 2008  0.944  4  287.713  .439 
 2007  84.165  4  2,269.164  .000 
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Table 124 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 392 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  3.800  4  14,583  .004 
 2013  8.194  4  15,244  .000 
 2012  7.268  4  16,370  .000 
 2011  6.751  4  15,553  .000 
 2010  4.818  4  15,666  .001 
 2009  8.880  4  16,975  .000 
 2008  24.137  4  14,371  .000 
 2007  2.136  4  4,386  .074 
Welch 2014  32.125  4  1,803.768  .000 
 2013  40.152  4  3,551.085  .000 
 2012  44.256  4  3,813.917  .000 
 2011  41.507  4  3,361.174  .000 
 2010  35.912  4  3,345.568  .000 
 2009  37.796  4  3,319.858  .000 
 2008  61.060  4  2,512.793  .000 
 2007  7.485  4  696.765  .000 
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Table 125 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 464 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  6.181  4  543  .000 
 2013  4.292  4  544  .002 
 2012  6.696  4  533  .000 
 2011  18.670  4  421  .000 
 2010  5.532  4  488  .000 
 2009  6.027  4  449  .000 
 2008  5.524  4  463  .000 
 2007  2.764  4  663  .027 
Welch 2014  2.183  4  80.352  .078 
 2013  1.264  4  130.074  .287 
 2012  3.833  4  141.859  .005 
 2011  3.028  4  71.178  .023 
 2010  2.349  4  157.115  .057 
 2009  3.070  4  115.901  .019 
 2008  4.519  4  120.155  .002 
 2007  0.882  4  141.322  .476 
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Table 126 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 470 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  12.546  4  24,119  .000 
 2013  11.511  4  22,841  .000 
 2012  11.038  4  21,681  .000 
 2011  40.542  4  20,013  .000 
 2010  19.994  4  19,025  .000 
 2009  7.881  4  20,708  .000 
 2008  15.822  4  19,209  .000 
 2007  16.558  4  5,967  .000 
Welch 2014  13.066  4  672.778  .000 
 2013  5.969  4  710.000  .000 
 2012  7.096  4  802.398  .000 
 2011  34.294  4  434.290  .000 
 2010  20.555  4  728.484  .000 
 2009  4.844  4  582.111  .001 
 2008  34.463  4  427.938  .000 
 2007  16.510  4  292.624  .000 
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Table 127 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 603 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  8.437  4  10,601  .000 
 2013  7.952  4  10,468  .000 
 2012  5.546  4  10,841  .000 
 2011  10.320  4  10,357  .000 
 2010  18.606  4  10,640  .000 
 2009  6.801  4  10,780  .000 
 2008  11.904  4  9,439  .000 
 2007  3.241  4  2,577  .012 
Welch 2014  15.356  4  1,627.693  .000 
 2013  21.159  4  4,040.416  .000 
 2012  17.987  4  3,939.376  .000 
 2011  28.499  4  3,540.227  .000 
 2010  40.946  4  3,801.775  .000 
 2009  19.563  4  3,169.619  .000 
 2008  34.763  4  2,925.208  .000 
 2007  10.159  4  749.066  .000 
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Table 128 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 639 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  2.272  4  2,484  .059 
 2013  1.192  4  2,676  .312 
 2012  4.236  4  2,793  .002 
 2011  6.382  4  2,403  .000 
 2010  3.451  4  2,777  .008 
 2009  1.095  4  3,322  .357 
 2008  16.135  4  2,958  .000 
 2007  4.315  4  832  .002 
Welch 2014  4.850  4  504.069  .001 
 2013  1.398  4  1,045.668  .233 
 2012  4.734  4  1,179.763  .001 
 2011  9.526  4  858.890  .000 
 2010  6.686  4  1,210.530  .000 
 2009  1.544  4  1,118.797  .187 
 2008  11.410  4  964.439  .000 
 2007  1.616  4  267.160  .170 
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Table 129 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 690 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  2.936  4  8,097  .019 
 2013  6.890  4  8,462  .000 
 2012  2.929  4  9,121  .020 
 2011  5.629  4  8,603  .000 
 2010  9.800  4  8,781  .000 
 2009  15.197  4  10,066  .000 
 2008  10.174  4  8,941  .000 
 2007  3.167  4  2,509  .013 
Welch 2014  13.209  4  638.149  .000 
 2013  20.660  4  1,219.399  .000 
 2012  20.134  4  1,245.986  .000 
 2011  24.179  4  1,029.060  .000 
 2010  31.084  4  1,180.292  .000 
 2009  35.966  4  1,212.844  .000 
 2008  32.290  4  879.101  .000 
 2007  18.518  4  288.925  .000 
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Table 130 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 765 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  3.417  4  12,874  .008 
 2013  6.073  4  12,435  .000 
 2012  1.282  4  12,206  .274 
 2011  1.745  4  11,529  .137 
 2010  4.458  4  12,179  .001 
 2009  1.569  4  12,755  .180 
 2008  15.216  4  11,755  .000 
 2007  1.418  4  3,287  .225 
Welch 2014  7.785  4  593.738  .000 
 2013  10.403  4  489.765  .000 
 2012  2.503  4  473.894  .042 
 2011  1.184  4  298.415  .318 
 2010  5.585  4  379.914  .000 
 2009  0.882  4  339.986  .475 
 2008  13.708  4  382.196  .000 
 2007  0.923  4  77.526  .455 
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Table 131 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 766 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  11.402  4  22,887  .000 
 2013  28.260  4  23,343  .000 
 2012  21.820  4  23,739  .000 
 2011  10.049  4  23,991  .000 
 2010  26.069  4  24,309  .000 
 2009  9.699  4  30,412  .000 
 2008  52.737  4  28,106  .000 
 2007  4.540  4  8,597  .001 
Welch 2014  37.010  4  634.640  .000 
 2013  58.743  4  577.298  .000 
 2012  32.118  4  513.503  .000 
 2011  18.809  4  325.948  .000 
 2010  29.060  4  362.017  .000 
 2009  3.438  4  495.479  .009 
 2008  56.449  4  537.923  .000 
 2007  24.579  4  143.711  .000 
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Table 132 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 775 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  18.390  4  63,543  .000 
 2013  34.418  4  62,511  .000 
 2012  22.559  4  62,929  .000 
 2011  11.043  4  61,892  .000 
 2010  34.283  4  67,450  .000 
 2009  41.970  4  76,421  .000 
 2008  46.575  4  70,327  .000 
 2007  2.687  4  20,360  .030 
Welch 2014  45.424  4  1,611.349  .000 
 2013  98.679  4  1,624.203  .000 
 2012  64.461  4  1,333.897  .000 
 2011  58.313  4  771.804  .000 
 2010  131.257  4  892.275  .000 
 2009  24.958  4  1,058.923  .000 
 2008  67.229  4  1,474.428  .000 
 2007  19.560  4  383.403  .000 
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Table 133 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 853 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  14.325  4  3,908  .000 
 2013  12.079  4  3,346  .000 
 2012  12.525  4  2,934  .000 
 2011  13.351  4  2,718  .000 
 2010  18.702  4  2,558  .000 
 2009  11.180  4  2,492  .000 
 2008  11.586  4  2,075  .000 
 2007  2.459  4  478  .045 
Welch 2014  6.035  4  357.961  .000 
 2013  13.333  4  659.756  .000 
 2012  5.299  4  444.583  .000 
 2011  8.902  4  393.137  .000 
 2010  8.396  4  371.135  .000 
 2009  5.835  4  307.800  .000 
 2008  5.318  4  251.904  .000 
 2007  1.193  4  43.285  .328 
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Table 134 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 871 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  28.671  4  25,673  .000 
 2013  35.567  4  22,171  .000 
 2012  31.236  4  18,976  .000 
 2011  29.824  4  16,497  .000 
 2010  25.815  4  16,220  .000 
 2009  21.603  4  14,990  .000 
 2008  24.244  4  14,041  .000 
 2007  4.192  4  2,884  .002 
Welch 2014  17.120  4  1,630.802  .000 
 2013  13.628  4  2,297.481  .000 
 2012  17.033  4  1,961.552  .000 
 2011  17.571  4  1,266.774  .000 
 2010  12.054  4  1,287.933  .000 
 2009  7.837  4  1,166.572  .000 
 2008  15.971  4  994.725  .000 
 2007  2.234  4  183.806  .067 
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Table 135 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 881 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  11.151  4  1,672  .000 
 2013  9.983  4  1,800  .000 
 2012  2.174  4  1,918  .070 
 2011  20.835  4  1,894  .000 
 2010  12.663  4  2,297  .000 
 2009  5.346  4  2,065  .000 
 2008  11.133  4  1,772  .000 
 2007  9.434  4  359  .000 
Welch 2014  7.693  4  390.032  .000 
 2013  33.950  4  790.094  .000 
 2012  7.519  4  802.065  .000 
 2011  19.694  4  696.615  .000 
 2010  25.499  4  931.537  .000 
 2009  12.099  4  547.670  .000 
 2008  10.244  4  516.942  .000 
 2007  11.014  4  139.963  .000 
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Table 136 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 882 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  4.382  4  621  .002 
 2013  5.400  4  571  .000 
 2012  2.312  4  637  .056 
 2011  1.056  4  537  .378 
 2010  6.267  4  756  .000 
 2009  3.282  4  374  .012 
 2008  3.154  4  671  .014 
 2007  9.785  4  124  .000 
Welch 2014  1.690  4  143.137  .156 
 2013  15.990  4  257.289  .000 
 2012  4.390  4  285.493  .002 
 2011  0.923  4  251.877  .451 
 2010  20.420  4  344.640  .000 
 2009  3.461  4  99.245  .011 
 2008  3.073  4  190.335  .018 
 2007  2.471  4  36.930  .061 
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Table 137 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 885 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  94.656  4  24,889  .000 
 2013  61.365  4  25,544  .000 
 2012  39.748  4  25,337  .000 
 2011  96.552  4  24,888  .000 
 2010  146.662  4  22,573  .000 
 2009  129.851  4  24,267  .000 
 2008  117.692  4  19,855  .000 
 2007  23.137  4  5,471  .000 
Welch 2014  149.005  4  3,686.595  .000 
 2013  116.387  4  8,870.925  .000 
 2012  92.899  4  8,719.115  .000 
 2011  140.984  4  7,222.703  .000 
 2010  182.635  4  7,133.104  .000 
 2009  285.302  4  3,949.661  .000 
 2008  196.469  4  3,633.558  .000 
 2007  43.079  4  1,125.301  .000 
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Table 138 
 
Homogeneity of Variance and Test of Equality of Means - DRG 894 
 Year 
 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Levene 2014  10.903  4  684  .000 
 2013  2.557  4  752  .038 
 2012  2.492  4  747  .042 
 2011  12.087  4  824  .000 
 2010  13.533  4  731  .000 
 2009  2.881  4  458  .022 
 2008  15.220  4  874  .000 
 2007  2.182  4  250  .072 
Welch 2014  9.627  4  168.504  .000 
 2013  4.295  4  323.920  .002 
 2012  3.821  4  328.597  .005 
 2011  8.143  4  251.958  .000 
 2010  28.064  4  229.567  .000 
 2009  4.016  4  194.121  .004 
 2008  11.827  4  240.061  .000 
 2007  1.396  4  48.652  .249 
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Appendix G: HCUP Data Use Agreement 
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